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This thesis comprises three essays on monetary policy and financial markets.
The research uses micro data and textual analysis to answer questions in the
intersection between finance and monetary economics. Simple and intuitive models
complement the empirical analysis.
In the first essay, I present a large database of speeches by Federal Reserve
officials that I assembled with web scraping algorithms. I parse the topic and
tone of the speeches to provide empirical evidence on how Fed officials use their
speeches to guide short-term interest rate expectations. Measures of misalignment
between market and central bankers’ expectations predict tone in speeches about
monetary policy. If markets’ near-term interest rate expectations are too high,
central bankers’ speak more negatively to signal that less interest rate hikes are
coming. These effects are strongest for voting Fed Presidents and Chairs of the
Fed Board of Governors. I study this policy of communicating in response to
market expectations in a rational expectations model, in which the central bank
communicates in a discretionary fashion between interest rate decisions and is
averse to bond market volatility.
The second essay is co-authored with Michael Ehrmann and Bauke Visser
and builds on the speech data and methods presented in the first essay. We use
the Federal Open Market Committee as a setting to study how the right to vote
affects behavior in a committee decision-making process, both during meetings
and in between meetings. We find no evidence for a hypothesis maintaining that
without the voting right, presidents use their public speeches and their meeting
statements to compensate for this loss of formal influence; instead, the data support
the hypothesis that with the voting right, presidents are more involved. Financial
markets react less to presidents’ public speeches in years they have voting rights
than in years they have not. We argue that this is consistent with our evidence on
the communication behavior of presidents.
The third essay provides firm-level estimates of the real effects of US monetary
policy on investment in 36 countries. The key identification idea is that firms, that
roll over US Dollar debt shortly after FOMC meetings, are more exposed than firms
that do not. Reductions in business investment after US monetary tightening are
largest in countries with pegged or managed exchange rates (non-floaters) but also
significant in floaters. The stronger spillovers in non-floaters arise from firms with
high leverage and are amplified by exchange rate fluctuations. A simple model
of currency choice rationalizes my findings. Exchange rate management leads to
higher financial vulnerability because it allows smaller and less productive firms to




This introduction gives a broad context to the dissertation, which comprises three
essays on monetary policy and financial markets. The order of the essays is
chronological and thus reflects my development during the PhD program.
The first two essays, chapter 1 and 2, analyse from distinct and complementary
viewpoints the public communications by the Federal Reserve System and its
officials and the link between these communications and financial markets. Both
essays use the same database of speeches that I assembled using webscraping
tools. To the best of my knowledge, this database is still to date one of the most
comprehensive databases of speeches by Federal Reserve officials that exists.
The two essays also share the method to parse the content of the speeches’
texts. I first introduced this database and my application of the methods in my first
working paper during the Ph.D. program (Tietz, 2018). The first essay is a newly
revised version.
In the first essay, I focus on the role that very short-term market expectations
concerning monetary policy decisions play in explaining the content of the Fed
officials’ speeches. A simple model assesses the implications of the empirical pattern
under rational expectations. This essay has also brought to light heterogeneity in
communication behaviour across different types of Fed officials.
The second essay, a slightly revised version of my co-authored work Ehrmann
et al. (2020), is partly motivated by this heterogeneity across Fed officials and
takes an in-depth approach to differences in behaviour and possible explanations.
Together with my co-authors, we focus specifically on the implications of the voting
right rotation among the regional Fed presidents on the FOMC.
Reflecting the different focus, new insights and additional resources, the second
essay naturally complements the first one. We add new data, e.g. the texts of
transcripts of the FOMC meetings, and the unit of analysis changes from individual
speeches to intermeeting periods and Fed districts.
The third essay, chapter 3, turns to the effects of monetary policy and the analysis
puts again emphasis on the role of financial markets. I estimate the real effects of
US monetary policy outside of the United States that arise through spillovers to
non-financial firms’ financing conditions, with special focus on foreign currency
corporate bonds. A basic corporate finance model rationalizes my findings.
Monetary policy and financial markets interact in manifold ways with feedback
loops operating in both directions. Paying tribute to such complexity, my disserta-




How does the Fed manage interest
rate expectations?1
1This is a revised version of my working paper with the same title. I am thankful for comments
by Itay Goldstein, Philipp König (discussant), Charles Martineau (discussant), Lucio Sarno, Maik
Schmeling, Valentin Schubert Yannick Timmer, and Andreas Uthemann (discussant), discussions with
Thorsten Beck, Michael Ehrmann, Jordi Galí, Sam Hanson, Peter Karadi, Greg Mankiw, Julien Pinter
(discussant), Ricardo Reis, Jeremy Stein, Adi Sunderam, and participants at: EFA Annual Meeting
(2019), CEBRA Annual Meeting (2019), Harvard Macro Lunch (2019), Bank of Canada Central Bank
Communications Conference (2018), 6th Emerging Scholars Conference (2018) and Cass Business
School Seminar (2018). Special thanks to Sylvain Champonnois who introduced me to computational
textual analysis.
3
Chapter 1: How does the Fed manage interest rate expectations? 4
“...when policy expectations in the market seem to be out of alignment with our own
expectations, I have done that myself: to give speeches in which I try to say things that will
correct this misalignment.”
Janet Yellen
Central Bank Communications Conference, ECB, November 2017
1.1 Introduction
How do central bankers manage interest rate expectations? Do they use their speeches to
steer markets? Are they always successful in smoothening policy implementation?
To answer these questions, I assemble a comprehensive database of speeches by
officials of the Federal Reserve System and parse their contents. I find that measures
of misalignment between financial markets’ and central bankers’ expectations
predict the tone and topic in speeches. If markets’ short-term expectations regarding
the Fed funds rate are higher than those of the Fed, FOMC members give speeches
which are more negative in tone. Excessively hawkish (dovish) market expectations
are followed by dovish (hawkish) signals from the FOMC members. This finding
holds when measuring Fed expectations by assuming that FOMC members know
the upcoming decision already few weeks in advance as well as when measuring
Fed expectations with Greenbook projections.
I provide evidence for a causal link from misalignment to speeches by analyzing
quantitatively the link between misalignment and the topic of speeches. Larger
misalignment is associated with an increased probability that central bankers
mention explicitly “market expectations” in their speeches. A direct link between
misalignment and the speech topic makes it unlikely that the predictive power of
misalignment for speech tone is driven entirely by the Fed’s private information,
or subject to reverse causality. I also provide a brief narrative analysis of FOMC
transcripts, documenting the Fed’s concerns about misaligned market expectations
and their use of communication to address them (e.g. the above quote).
Since the roles on the FOMC vary across its members, I account for hetero-
geneity across different speaker types. I document that the predictive power of
misalignment for speech tone is stronger a) for the Chair and Vice Chair of the
Board of Governors and b) for the same Fed president when he or she has the right
to vote on the FOMC than when not. These findings represent interesting stylized
facts to be investigated in future research.2
My evidence on a link between misalignment and speeches is consistent with
the quote by Janet Yellen above. The occasional existence of such link conforms well
2In follow-up work with Michael Ehrmann and Bauke Visser (Ehrmann et al., 2020), we investigate
in-depth the voting rotation among Fed presidents and related mechanisms.
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with conventional wisedom. More surprising is that such communication policy
has been sufficiently systematic to be measurable with statistical significance. The
difference between an occasional and systematic policy is crucial because systematic
policies are easier to internalize by the private sector.
Intuition might suggest that such policy is socially optimal. If central bankers
become aware of misconceptions by the market, it seems intuitive that they should
try to reduce them. Yet, theoretical work on rational expectations indicates that
policies responding directly to private sector expectations often induce instabilities,
for example Bernanke and Woodford (1997). Rational agents understand that policy
is set as a function of their expectations and re-optimize accordingly, creating a
coordination problem between the beliefs of the central bank and the private sector.
Motivated by the systematic nature of the communication response to market
expectations, I construct a 3 period model capturing the cycle from one FOMC
meeting to the next. Following Stein and Sunderam (2017), policy is discretionary,
the Fed is averse to bond market volatility and has private information about the
level of the short-term nominal interest rate consistent with achieving its inflation
and employment targets. The central bank sets interest rates at two consecutive
meetings and releases a signal in the intermeeting period. The financial market
tries to outguess the central bank, estimating its target rate using information
contained in the nominal short rate and the intermeeting communication. Two
types of equilibria arise. In the benign case, communication reduces expectational
errors successfully. In the worst case, market expectations become self-fulfilling,
policy outcomes and bond market volatility go haywire.
If the central bank is not averse to bond volatility, its intermeeting commu-
nication has a unique interpretation for the market: The central bank reacts to
unexpected changes in financial conditions since the last meeting. If instead it is
averse to bond volatility, it underadjusts to new private information attempting
to smoothen out the implementation of the policy change. This creates an infer-
ence problem for the market. The market cannot be sure whether intermeeting
communication responds to surprises in financial conditions or is part of a strategy.
Market beliefs about motives for communicating can become self-fulfilling and the
central bank might face a trade-off between moving the interest rate closer to target
and not upsetting bond markets. Surrendering to market expectations will keep
markets calm but leaves financial conditions off target.
Empirical evidence points to an increasingly good anticipation of upcoming
monetary policy decisions. (Lange et al., 2003; Poole et al., 2002) And enhanced
central bank transparency is a common explanation for the improvements. (Blinder
et al., 2001; Blinder et al., 2008) At the same time, theory suggests that efficiency
gains through central bank transparency are not unlimited. (Stein, 1989; Morris
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and Shin, 2002; Faust, 2016; Morris and Shin, 2018) Empirical insights about the
effects and limits of transparency are still scant.
With this paper I aim to provide a first step towards filling this gap, adding to a
recent strand of empirical papers on language-based central bank communication,
see e.g. Hansen et al. (2017), Schmeling and Wagner (2017), or Lucca and Trebbi
(2009). I make three contributions. First, the database of around 3800 speeches
that I assemble is to the best of my knowledge one of the most comprehensive
ones considered in the literature. Second, analyzing the speeches sentence by
sentence allows me to adjust the widely-used dictionary developed in Loughran
and McDonald (2011) conditional on the nouns mentioned in that sentence, making
it more applicable to the central bank context while refraining from subjective word
choices. Third, by identifying words characteristic of discussions about current
monetary policy affairs, I offer a simple and objective way of filtering out irrelevant
speeches.
I further contribute to the broader empirical literature on the workings of
monetary policy. Krueger and Kuttner (1996), Lange et al. (2003) and Gürkaynak et
al (2004, 2007b) develop a measure of unanticipated monetary policy changes used
by the vast majority of empirical papers, e.g. Steinsson et al. (2018), Hanson and
Stein (2015), Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016).
I make two contributions. First, while all papers above rely on asset price
changes to infer signals about monetary policy, I use textual analysis of speeches
by Fed officials. Second, my analysis turns around the usual perspective: Rather
than explaining the impact of monetary policy on markets, I explain how central
bankers react to market expectations. The insights from previous papers imply
a challenge for that perspective. Financial markets might endogenously respond
to monetary policy. This identification problem is treated most prominently in
Rigobon and Sack (2003). Rigobon and Sack (2003) ask whether the Fed adjusts its
stance in response to stock market movements while I analyze how implementation
of a given desired stance interacts with financial market expectations.
The theoretical aspects of this paper relate to the public communication litera-
ture following Stein (1989) and Morris and Shin (2002). My model builds on the
setup in Stein and Sunderam (2017) and adds explicit central bank communication.
Contrary to most papers, the policy maker in my model sets the mean of the signal
instead of its precision (the noise variance). This follows Banerjee and Liu (2014).
A further departure from mainstream is that the policy maker communicates as
well as takes policy action, as in James and Lawler (2011). A recent application of
this literature to monetary policy is the paper by Morris and Shin (2018). It shares
the idea that the central bank chooses how to weigh-in price-based signals into
its reaction function. A key difference is that, in my model, the central bank has
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There is no exhaustive archive of speeches by senior Fed officials. I collect speeches
from four different sources. The first one is an archive of speeches on the webpage of
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The website contains speechs by members of
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, starting from 1996. The second source is
the BIS archive, starting from 1997. The BIS archive provides speeches from central
bankers wordwide. For the US, the BIS archive does not only cover speeches by
members of the Board of Governors but also from presidents of regional Federal
Reserve banks. The third source is FedInPrint, which indexes publications from
the Federal Reserve System. Lastly, I visit the webpages of the 11 regional Federal
reserve banks. The last source is crucial to gain sufficient coverage of speeches by
the regional Fed presidents.3
From each of the sources, I download all speeches available and collect for each
speech information on the exact date, location and the surname of the speaker.
As the sources are partly overlapping, I subsequently delete all duplicates. The
complete sample consists of 3846 unique speeches given between 1985 and 2018.4
The pre-processing of the text involves the following steps. I split the speeches into
sentences, remove all non-alphabetic characters, stopwords, words with less than 3
characters, and convert the remainder to lower case.
1.2.2 Asset price data for market expectations
The baseline market expectations are derived from daily time series of the prices
of short-horizon Fed funds futures. These contracts cover the period of a given
calendar month and are settled against the 30 day average of effective fed funds
rate. Krueger and Kuttner (1996), Gürkaynak et al. (2007b) and Hamilton (2009)
show that Fed funds futures have strong predictive power for near-term Fed policy.
3Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speeches.htm; BIS:
http://www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/index.htm; FedInPrint (does not host speech data but provides
links): https://www.fedinprint.org/.
4Since the sample includes only 3 different speakers before 1995, I proceed with the around 3500
speeches from 1995 onwars. I also remove all speeches by current or past Fed officials that they gave
while not being Fed official, e.g. speeches by Stanley Fischer during his governorship at the Bank
of Israel. Analyzing the coincidence of surnames and speech location, I also detected instances of
wrongly included speeches due to identical surnames, e.g. Esther George, President of the Federal
Reserve of Kansas City, and Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, 1993-2003.
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Figure A.6 plots the time series of futures-based expectations concerning the
next policy decision together with the Fed target rate. Details of the construction
are outlined below. Appendix Table A.5 lists the Bloomberg Tickers.5
A general concern about asset price based measures of expectations is that they
might be conflated with risk premia. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) find excess
returns on Fed funds futures can be predicted with real-time data on non-farm
payrolls.
Two arguments are crucial to understand this concern in the context of this paper.
First, the return predictability/risk premium argument relies on the assumption of
perfect information and rational expectations. However, asymmetric information
is at the very heart of this paper. As Hamilton (2009) argues, non-farm payrolls
might predict Fed futures’ excess returns because they were driving Fed policy at
times when the market did not fully incorporate them into their expectations.
Second, even if the return predictability was evidence for risk premia, they are
likely irrelevant at the horizons I consider. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) focuses on
longer horizon contracts and returns at monthly frequency. For the contract most
relevant to my study, 1 month ahead, they find an average excess return of only 2.9
basis points. Instead, Hamilton (2009) studies short-horizon contracts and finds
that daily risk premia variations are negligible.
Lastly, I also control for the macro variables thought to drive risk premia.
1.3 Measuring misalignment and speech content
1.3.1 Misalignment
Here I define my measures of misalignment and its components. Let misalignment
at date t concerning the upcoming interest rate decision at t f omc be
misalt = EMarkett (r
tar





where rtar is the Fed funds target rate.6 While EMarkett can be derived with relative
ease from market prices, measuring EFedt is less straightforward. E
Fed(rtart f omc) is the
benchmark used by central bankers to align market expectations with. My baseline
5One alternative to Fed funds futures are FOMC overnight index swaps (OIS). FOMC OIS cover
exactly the periods between FOMC meetings and thus do not require a mapping from the time period
of the contract to the FOMC cycle. However, the FOMC OIS are available only from 2007 and hence
Fed funds futures remain the most-widely used gauge of market expectations. Appendix Figure A.7
shows that the two sources of market expectations are broadly consistent. Another alternative are
Eurodollar futures, which are here not discussed for brevity. Unreported exercises suggest that the
main findings remain largely unchanged.
6I will refer to the “target rate” even though from December 2008 onwards the Fed announces a
target range. During that period, I will use the arithmetic average of the upper and lower bound of
that range. Effects of excess reserves and related robustness checks are discussed below.
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is to assume that central bankers have perfect foresight on the upcoming decision
two (three, four..) weeks before the meeting. I also construct actual interest rate
expectations by the FOMC based on the Greenbook supplements.
Market expectations. I derive market expectations EMarkett (r
tar
t f omc) about the level
of the Fed funds rate after next FOMC meeting from Fed funds futures prices.
There are usually 8 FOMC meetings during the year, with intermeeting periods
of around 6 weeks. Suppose next FOMC meeting takes place in the current month
at date t f omc. Let rt be the effective Fed funds rate (EFFR) at date t. If there are D
days in the month and the FOMC t f omc is at the d-th day, the rate implied by the








Et(r̄t>d) is the expected average funds rate after next FOMC meeting, r̄t<d is the
average funds rate that prevails until the FOMC meeting.7 If the upcoming FOMC
is in the next calendar month, I match it with the appropriate futures contract.
Solving Eq. 1.1 for Et(r̄t>d) yields the expected average Fed funds rate after the
next FOMC
EMarkett (rt f omc) ≡ Et(r̄t>d) =
D
D− d FF1t −
d
D− d r̄t<d. (1.2)
Appendix A.1.2 contains a time series plot of EMarkett (rt f omc) and robustness tests
with respect to episodes of high EFFR volatility around settlement periods and
structural changes in the position of the EFFR relative to the target rate (e.g. QE).
Central bankers’ expectations: A) Perfect foresight. I employ two alternative
measures of EFedt (r
tar




t f omc) assumes that any interest rate
decision was known to the Fed speakers already two weeks before the meeting.
The timing is varied in robustness tests. I compute EFed,Fwdt (r
tar
t f omc) as
EFed,Fwdt (r
tar




t f omc . (1.3)
So the target rate change ∆rtart f omc (at upcoming FOMC date) is added to the current
Fed funds target rate rtart
8 and the sample is restricted based on the assumed
number of weeks of foresight. I denote the corresponding misalignment with
7I make two adjustments. First, to avoid that the weights are very big numbers, I use next
month’s future contract if the FOMC meeting is on one of the last 5 days in a month. Second,
if date t is the d̂-th day of the month, some time before the FOMC at d, the equation would be




D Et(r̄t>d). In these cases I assume that market participants do
not expect any target rate changes during the period before the next FOMC meeting.
8In a robustness test, I replace the future level of the target rate EFed,Fwdt (r
tar
t f omc ) with the future
level of the effective Fed funds rate, accounting for structural shifts in the position of the average
effective Fed funds rate within the target range (e.g. those related to large excess reserves).
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misalFwdt .
Central bankers’ expectations: B) Greenbook forecasts. To relax the assump-
tion of perfect foresight, I derive an alternative measure of EFedt (r
tar
t f omc) based on
the interest rate projections underlying the Greenbook forecasts prepared by the
staff of the Federal Reserve Board.9 These forecasts have been shown to carry
significant private information by the Fed and explain a large share of the Fed’s
policy changes. (Romer and Romer, 2000, 2004) Romer and Romer (2008) further
show that individual FOMC members’ forecasts do not carry useful information
beyond that contained in the Greenbooks.
The Greenbook projections forecast the quarterly average Fed funds rate, so
usually covering two FOMC meetings. To keep focus on short-term expectations,
I consider one and two quarter ahead forecasts.10 For corresponding market
expectations, I combine the appropriate future contracts to compute the futures
implied average Fed funds rate over the forecasted quarter.
The misalignment concerning the average Fed funds rate in the coming quarter,
r̄1Q, is then computed as
misalGB,1Qt = E
Market
t (r̄1Q)− EFed,GBtGB (r̄1Q), (1.4)
for t ∈ {tGB + 1, ..., t f omc, ..., tGB + T}. So Greenbook forecasts delivered to FOMC
members at date tGB for the FOMC meeting at t f omc are compared to the market
expectations at dates t > tGB. The choice of parameter T reflects the trade-off
between a larger sample of subsequent speeches and the potential contamination
through new information arrival after forecast preparation. The baseline results
will be based on t ∈ {t f omc, ..., tGB + 3 weeks}. Implications for identification will
be discussed in more detail in Section 1.4.1.
Descriptive analysis of misalignment. Table 1.1 provides summary statistics
for the misalignment measures. Average absolute misalignment in the last two
weeks before the decision is around 5 basis points.11 Measured against the usual
step size of interest rate decisions, 25 basis points, misalignment of 5 basis points
appears economically significant. Assuming the Fed wants to hike by 25 basis
9The Greenbook data is made available to the public with a 5 year lag. Since 2010, the Greenbook
is called Tealbook (merged with Bluebook). Data and definitions can be found on the webpage of the
Philadelphia Fed (here).
10Two remarks:1)I cannot use current quarter forecasts. The Greenbook forecasts are compared to
the market expectations following the FOMC meeting, so the current quarter forecasts at the second
meeting do not relate to future policy. The forecasts at the first meeting carry predictive content for
both meetings but subsequent market expectations only for the second meeting. 2)For very few data
points when GB interest rate projections are unavailable, I use inflation and output gap forecasts in
an estimated forward-looking Taylor-Rule, details in Appendix A.1.4.
11Appendix Figure A.8 plots the empirical densities of misalignment. Misalignment is nearly
symmetrically distributed around zero with a slightly negative skew, which is consistent with Cieslak
(2018) who finds that markets tend to underestimate future monetary easing.
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points, a -5bp misalignment says that the market is pricing only 20bp, thus assigning
a 80% probability to a 25 bp hike.
Perfect foresight, weeks before FOMC Greenbook
0 1 2 3 4 5 1Q ahead 2Q ahead
Mean 0.053 0.056 0.059 0.064 0.067 0.073 0.186 0.279
Stdev. 0.084 0.089 0.094 0.099 0.103 0.116 0.233 0.343
Min. -0.275 -0.285 -0.300 -0.365 -0.450 -0.510 -0.548 -0.759
Max. 0.401 0.460 0.455 0.480 0.460 0.470 0.899 1.469
Notes: Summary statistics for misalignment measures for scheduled FOMC meetings. Standard
deviation, minima and maxima are computed on the raw, daily misalignment values, while the
averages are computed on absolute values of misalignment. Misalignment was around 30 basis
points one week ahead of unscheduled meetings.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of misalignment measures
Misalignment exhibits additional intuitive features. First, its average absolute
value and variability are decreasing as the upcoming FOMC gets closer, consistent
with the idea that market expectations converge gradually to the outcome. Second,
the average absolute value and variability increase with the underlying forecast
horizon. For the 1 and 2 quarter ahead misalignment measures, the full-sample
average absolute value is around 20 and 40 basis points respectively.
Figures A.4 and A.3 illustrate the time variation of both misalignment measures.
Misalignment appears larger at meetings at which the target rate is changed, around
turning points in the monetary policy cycle and during NBER recessions.12 The
magnitude of misalignment concerning the upcoming decision has decreased while
interest rates were stuck at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Since this is the main focus
of this paper, the baseline sample will exclude the ZLB period.
The size of one and two-quarter ahead misalignment has also decreased during
the ZLB but stayed persistently positive at around 15-20 basis points. This is
consistent with that financial markets were constantly expecting Fed hikes in the
medium term between 2009 and 2011, see e.g. Cieslak (2018). Only after the
introduction of calendar forward guidance in late 2011, rate expectations were
pushed towards zero.13
Appendix A.4 provides a brief narrative analysis of FOMC transcripts and min-
utes that confirms the main features of misalignment and the Fed’s consideration
12Due to the small number of these events in the sample, a rigorous statistical analysis is difficult.
13At the same time, extracting accurate market expectations from futures quotes has become more
difficult during the ZLB period. Further analysisis provided in the Greenbooks (see e.g. page 48 in
the June 2010 Greenbook, here) shows that market expectations exhibited later lift-off dates when
measured at the mode than when measured at the mean. Also the NY Fed dealer survey suggested
at times lift-off dates 1 to 2 quarters later than what market based expectations implied.
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of it.
1.3.2 Parsing the content of speeches by Fed officials
Speech tone. As baseline measure of the tone in the speeches, I use the dictionary
developed in Loughran and McDonald (2011) following Schmeling and Wagner
(2017), with some adjustments for the central banking context (more below).14
For each sentence s in speech i, I obtain Ni,s, the number of words that are
identified by Louhgran and McDonalds (LMcD) as conveying a negative meaning,
and Ti,s, the total number of words. The list of negative words will vary slightly with
the topic of sentence s (more below). I aggregate by summing over all sentences in
a speech, Ni = ∑s Ni,s and Ti = ∑s Ti,s. I then compute the tone of speech i as




Adjustments for central banking context. The LMcD dictionary was built in the
context of company reports, which is similar but different from the central banking
context. To check whether the “negative” words identified by LMcD make sense in
the central banking context, Appendix Table A.1 lists for each year in the sample
the 5 words of the LMcD dictionary that were used most often in the speeches.
The most frequent words are clearly associated with negative meaning in
the central banking context, e.g. loss and recession. A special case is the word
unemployment, which in many years is one of the most frequent words. Given its
mandate to promote price stability and maximum employment, it is natural that
Fed officials mention “unemployment” frequently, not necessarily with negative
meaning.
The topic “unemployment” is further special in that some adjectives and verbs,
which typically indicate negative meaning in the context of other topics, have a
positive meaning for “unemployment.” For example, “lower output growth” usu-
ally conveys a deterioration of economic conditions while “lower unemployment”
indicates an improvement.
I address these concerns in two ways. First, I exclude the word “unemployment”
from the list of negative words. Second, for all sentences that contain the word
“unemployment” but not the words “inflation”, “employment”, or “growth”, I delete
“decline” and “declined” (“lower” is not included in LMcD) and add “higher” and
“high” to the list of negative words.
Appendix A.1 contains summary statistics (Table A.2), a time series plot of
average speech tone (Fig. A.2), and further background information.
Identifying speeches about monetary policy. Fed officials give speeches at a
14My findings are robust to using a simple bigram search as in Apel and Grimaldi (2012).
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wide variety of occassions, including events entirely unrelated to monetary policy.
Including speeches that talk exclusively about unrelated topics would introduce
noise and hinder the analysis. I therefore implement a classification algorithm
following Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) to filter out relevant speeches.
I proceed in three steps. First, I infer pairs of words that occur often together
(“bigrams”) from the speeches’ text.15 This ensures that word pairs like “monetary
policy” are treated as one phrase and has been shown to improve the performance
of topic classification algorithms (Wang and Manning, 2012).
Second, I select 300 speeches manually which relate clearly to monetary policy,
e.g. the speech given by Rosengren on 15th February 2017 “Monetary Policy as the
Economy Approaches the Feds Dual Mandate.” I then compute for any phrase p
that occurs at least once in the speeches the statistic
ωp,c =
(Np,cN−p,−c − Np,−cN−p,c)2
(Np,c + Np,−c)(Np,c + N−p,c)(Np,−c + N−p,−c)(N−p,c + N−p,−c)
, (1.6)
where Np,c is the number of occurrences of phrase p in documents labelled with
c ∈ {monetary policy relevant, not relevant}. Analogously, N−p,−c is the number
of occurrences of all phrases except phrase p in all documents not labelled c.
ωp,c measures how characteristic word p is for label c, accounting for the word
count conditional on c but also the frequency of occurrence in all non-c documents.
Table A.4 lists the words that ωp,c identifies as most representative of the monetary
policy topic. The results are intuitive: Speeches about monetary policy contain
more mentions of words like “inflation” and “monetary policy.”
In the third and final step of the speech classification, I count for each speech the
occurrences of the 200 words most characteristic for the monetary policy topic.16
I then define an exogenous threshold, 10% of total words, that a speech has to
exceed in order to be classified as “relevant to monetary policy.”
In the regression analysis, I will subset on the speeches that are related to
monetary policy according to this threshold. My findings are robust to other
treshold values and the estimates change in an intuitive way (Table A.9).
15For this, I use the R-package “wordVectors,” which implements a prominent algorithm presented
in Mikolov et al. (2013).
16I delete only few words from the list like “regulatory” or “supervision” in order to reduce the
chances of misclassification. The value added of determining the characteristic words statistically is
of course that it is less arbitrary and it is easier to agree on a set of words to search for than to agree
on every speech’s topic individually. Appendix Figure A.1 plots the empirical distribution of the
occurrences of the characteristic words across speeches.
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1.4 Empirical analysis
1.4.1 Empirical strategy
Main regression specification. To analyse the relationship between speech tone
and the misalignment measure, I estimate the equation
τjt = αj + βmisalt−1 + θmisalt−1 × Statusjt + φStatusjt + γXt−1 + εjt, (1.7)
where τjt is the tone in the speech given by speaker j on day t (defined in Eq. 1.5).
misalt−1 is the 5-day rolling average of the misalignment measure on the day before
the speech.17 Xt−1 is a vector of controls, including four economic surprise indeces
(employment, inflation, output and macro sentiment) following Beber et al. (2015)
and a dummy variable for the Asian, Russian, Dotcom, and 2008 financial crisis.
In my baseline, I control for speaker fixed effects to absorb time invariant varia-
tion in communication behaviour across speakers. Since the key regressor misalt−1
is an aggregate variable and variations between FOMC periods are potentially
important, I do not include FOMC fixed effects but control for macro variables (see
above) and provide a robustness test. I use robust standard errors.18
Speaker heterogeneity. Since there are different types of FOMC members, I es-
timate Equation 1.7 separately for speeches by members of the Board of Governors
(“governors”) and regional Reserve Bank presidents (“presidents”).19 Within the
groups of presidents and governors, the dummy Statusjt captures further hetero-
geneity. For the presidents’ sample, Statusjt equals one if speaker j will be a voting
member at the upcoming FOMC meeting and zero if non-voting. For the governors’
sample, Statusjt equals one if the speaker is the chair or vice chair of the Fed Board.
Identification. To address identification challenges, I complement the speech
tone regressions with an analysis of the relationship between the topic of the
speeches and misalignment. This approach is similar in spirit to the one taken
by Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020). The results in Section 1.4.3 show that
misalignment predicts not only the speech tone but also the speech topic. Larger
misalignment raises the probability that the speeches contain explicit references to
17Speeches are unevenly spaced over time, so controlling for “lagged” speech tone is non-trivial
(and inconsequential in experiments) and thus omitted in favour of simplicity.
18My choice follows the bias-variance trade-off argument applied to the estimator variance
following Cameron and Miller (2015). Low within-cluster correlation and low number of
“short”/unbalanced clusters favor a parsimonous specification, which applies especially to the
governors. Thus, I use robust SEs throughout as baseline but report a robustness test. Table A.15
shows the main findings hold when clustering standard errors by speaker.
19The Board of Governors oversees the Federal Reserve System as a whole. Instead, the presidents
essentially represent their home districts. The presidents are divided into four groups, within which
the right to vote on the FOMC rotates with one year terms. The NY Fed has a permanent voting right
and I therefore treat its presidents as governors.
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market expectations. I now describe the main identification concerns and how the
content analysis helps to alleviate them.
One main identification concern is that both misalignment and speech tone
might be driven by the Fed’s private information resulting in a correlation without
causal link from misalignment to speech tone. In this case, central bankers would
speak more hawkishly simply because they are more hawkish and, at the same time,
the market is looking “too dovish” because they do not know the hawkish news yet.
If this story was the sole driver of the misalignment-tone correlation, any significant
link between misalignment and the speech topic would shed light on the subject
of the Fed’s private information. However, it is unlikely that the Fed has private
information about market expectations because these are, by definition, determined
in the private sector and generally publicly observable. From this perspective, any
predictive power of misalignment for the “market expectation” topic suggests that
the Fed is indeed reacting to misalignment. Such causal link from misalignment
to speeches arises if central bankers want to reduce the misalignment to avoid a
market surprise, the central hypothesis tested in this paper. An additional channel
could be that misalignment has immediate consequences which the Fed seeks to
prevent, even without consideration of the potential market surprise.20 Since my
main focus is on very short-term misalignment such effects are likely limited and I
leave it for further research to explore.
A second challenge concerns reverse causality, that speech tone could drive
misalignment and not vice versa. This problem is best discussed in terms of the two
components of misalignment, market expectations and the Fed’s future decision
(misaligment based on perfect foresight) or the Fed’s expectations (proxied by
Greenbook forecasts). If the reverse causality was working through the first compo-
nent of misalignment, i.e. through the effect of speeches on market expectations,





> 0. My estimate is therefore a conservative one. Another
manifestation of reverse causality could be that the finding is driven by the effect
of speeches on the second component of misalignment, i.e. on future Fed decisions
or the Greenbook forecasts. However, following the argument above about the
omitted variable bias, the fact that misalignment predicts the mentioning of market
expectations largely rules out that such reverse causality story would be the only
driver of misalignment-tone correlation. For if it was the only driver, much of the
20For example, suppose market expectations are (excessively) hawkish and cause financial con-
ditions to tighten. Suppose further that the Fed privately decides that the tightening of financial
conditions warrants a relatively loose monetary policy at the next meeting. A related question is
whether there were cases where misalignment was so large that it influenced the decision to be taken.
Self-fullfilling market expectations will be explored in the model developed further below.
21If the expectation management is effective, we would expect that more positive speeches make
market expectations more hawkish, that is Corr
(
τjt, EMarkett (rt f omc )
)
> 0.
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effect of these speeches on future decisions and staff forecasts would need to stem
from issues dealing with market expectations.
Finally, in Appendix A.4 I provide a brief narrative analysis that confirms the
FOMC’s concern about misaligned market expectations and their use of communi-
cation to reduce them.22
1.4.2 Speech tone regressions
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 present the main estimates using the baseline misalignment




misalt−1 −0.251∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗ −0.157∗∗
(0.051) (0.053) (0.064) (0.063)
Speaker FE Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Observations 589 589 289 289
R2 0.237 0.239 0.098 0.116
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation: τj,t = αj + βmisalt−1 + γXt−1 +
εjt, where (j, t) indexes speaker and day of speech. misalt−1 is lagged 5-day rolling average
misalignment, standardized by its standard deviation. “Presidents” (“Governors”) denotes the
sample of speeches by Fed presidents (Fed Board Governors). Standard errors are HC White-
Hubert. Controls are data surprises for 51 macroeconomic variables at t− 1 (see Appendix
A.1.3) and dummies for the Asian, Russian, Dotcom and 2008 financial crisis. Sample includes
speeches of the subset “MP10” (least 10% of all words are “monetary policy relevant words”),
and within 5 weeks of the upcoming FOMC. ZLB period is excluded.
Table 1.2: Effects of misalignment assuming perfect foresight
Baseline estimates for presidents and governors. Table 1.2 starts with the
most basic specification, a univariate regression of speech tone on average mis-
alignment during last week. The negative sign of coefficient β means that if market
expectations are too hawkish, the tone in speeches becomes more dovish (i.e. using
more negative words). β can be interpreted as the negative of the percentage
change in the number of negative words used in a given speech in response to
a one standard deviation (∼9bp) increase in the misalignment measure. So in
the first column, β = −0.251 implies that, if the market expects the Fed funds
rate to be 9 basis points higher after the next FOMC meeting than it will actually
be, the percentage number of negative words used in the speeches increases by
22For example, in very similar spirit as the quote of Janet Yellen in the introduction, Ben Bernanke
said in August 2003: “the markets have largely missed this point [...] To the extent that we can
sharpen our message [...], we should make every effort to do so.”
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around 25 basis points. In the sample, the average speech has around 1650 words,
implying that the speaker will use around 4 more negative words which is 6%
of the average number of negative words per speech. The full-sample standard
deviation of speech tone is 1.64. Thus, in the baseline, misalignment explains circa
15% of the speech tone variation.
Voting right and chairs heterogeneity. Table 1.3 reports the estimates including
the interaction of misalignment with the Statusjt-dummy. For the presidents’
sample, Statusjt equals one if the speaker has the right to vote at the upcoming
meeting. For the governors’ sample, Statusjt equals one if the speaker is chair or
vice chair of the Board of Governors.
I document the speaker heterogeneity here mainly as stylized facts and to
ensure transparency of the headlines results. Section 1.4.4 will provide some




misalt−1 −0.177∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.060 −0.055
(0.059) (0.061) (0.078) (0.078)
misalt−1 × Statusjt −0.248∗∗ −0.250∗∗ −0.264∗∗ −0.273∗∗
(0.110) (0.111) (0.123) (0.121)
Speaker FE Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Observations 589 589 289 289
R2 0.244 0.247 0.118 0.122
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation: τj,t = αj + βmisalt−1 +
θmisalt−1× Statusjt + φStatusjt + γXt−1 + εjt. misalt−1 is lagged 5-day rolling average misalign-
ment, standardized by its standard deviation. “Presidents” (“Governors”) denotes the sample
of speeches by Fed presidents (Fed Board Governors). Standard errors are HC White-Hubert.
Statusjt is a dummy equal to one if the speaker is a voting FOMC member (in the Fed presidents
sample) or equal to one if the speaker is the chair/vice chair (in the Board of Governors sample).
Controls are data surprises for 51 macroeconomic variables at t− 1 (see Appendix A.1.3) and
dummies for the Asian, Russian, Dotcom and 2008 financial crisis. Sample includes speeches of
the subset “MP10” (at least 10% of all words are “monetary policy relevant words”), and within
5 weeks of the upcoming FOMC. ZLB period is excluded.
Table 1.3: Effects of misalignment assuming perfect foresight, voting/chair dummy
Table 1.3, left-hand panel, shows that the predictive power of misalignment
for speech tone is more than twice as strong for presidents with voting right than
without. In the right-hand panel, the effect for Fed governors is almost exclusively
driven by the chairs and vice chairs.23 For the specification including controls, the
23In the previous version, the right-hand panel reported (contrary to left-hand) the adjusted R2.
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estimated effect for voting presidents (chairs) is β + θ = −0.170− 0.250 = −0.420
(−0.328). Thus, voting members (chairs) use around 8 (5) more negative words in
response to a 1 standard deviation increase in misalignment. This effect captures
around 40% of the within-speaker variation in speech tone.
(a) Presidents
Dependent variable: τjt
1Q ahead 1Q ahead 2Q ahead 2Q ahead
misalt−1 −0.187 −0.026 −0.189∗ −0.013
(0.123) (0.171) (0.105) (0.144)
misalt−1 × Statusjt −0.436∗∗ −0.457∗∗
(0.211) (0.187)
Obs 205 205 200 200
R2 0.363 0.373 0.370 0.383
(b) Governors
Dependent variable: τjt
1Q ahead 1Q ahead 2Q ahead 2Q ahead
misalt−1 −0.062 0.237 −0.103 0.156
(0.161) (0.183) (0.144) (0.183)
misalt−1 × Statusjt −0.848∗∗ −0.616∗∗
(0.337) (0.311)
Obs 102 102 100 100
R2 0.293 0.330 0.290 0.315
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Speech tone τjt is regressed on misalignment based
on Greenbook projections betw 1996 and 2012, excl the Global Financial Crisis. Standard
errors are HC White-Hubert. Misalignment compares market expectations at date t with the
projections from the most recent Greenbook. Statusjt equals one if the speaker is a voting
president (presidents sample) or the chair/vice chair of Fed Board (governors sample). For each
Greenbook, speeches up to 3 weeks after it was released to the FOMC are included. Periods
between unscheduled and subsequent scheduled meetings are excluded. Controls are rolling
5-day averages of data surprises at t− 1 (see A.1.3) and real-time estimates of previous quarters
CPI inflation and real GDP growth obtained from the Greenbooks. Based on the subsets of
speeches “MP10” with at least 10% of all words are “monetary policy relevant words.”
Table 1.4: Effects of misalignment based on Greenbook projections
Estimates using Greenbook-based misalignment. To relax the assumption of
perfect foresight, Table 1.4 reports estimates using misalignment based on Green-
book forecasts. Contrary to the misalignment measure based on perfect foresight,
Greenbook-based misalignment exhibits patterns at business cycle frequency (see
Fig. A.3). I therefore augment the Equation 1.7 with real-time estimates of previous
quarter’s real GDP growth and CPI inflation obtained from the Greenbooks.
The effect of misalignment on subsequent speech tone, β, is again negative.
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The interaction of misalignment with Statusjt shows that the effect is mostly
driven by voting presidents and the chairs and vice chairs of the Fed Board.
For voting presidents (chairs), the effects are β1Q + θ1Q = −0.462 (−0.611) and
β2Q + θ2Q = −0.470 (−0.460), implying an increase of negative words by around 8
words. For the chairs of the Fed Board, the estimates imply around 10 and 8 more
negative words. The magnitude of these effects must be assessed carefully.
The coefficients measure the change in speech tone τjt in response to a 1
standard deviation increase in misalignment. As shown in the summary statistics,
misalignment at more distant horizons is on average larger and more volatile.
When measured in terms of the same delta in misalignment, speeches react far less
strongly to misalignment at more distant horizons.
This could be explained with higher uncertainty associated with more distant
forecast horizons. At more distant horizons, risk-averse policy makers might then
require larger misalignment to feel compelled to guide expectations.
In the current setup, the sample consists of speeches given in the 3-week periods
starting from the delivery of the Greenbook to the FOMC. This typically includes
5-6 days before the FOMC meeting. There are two important considerations. First,
due to the blackout period around FOMC meetings during which Fed officials are
not allowed to deliberate on monetary policy,24 the effective time period under
consideration is closer to 2 weeks. Second, the period includes the FOMC meeting
and associated announcements. Since monetary policy shocks at these meetings
could affect both speeches and misalignment, Appendix Table A.10 reports the
estimates controlling for them. The main findings do not change.
1.4.3 Speech topic regressions
1.4.3.1 Mentions of market expectations
To implement the content analysis motivated in Section 1.4.1, I identify speeches
that explicitly discusss market expectations. Many of these speeches will be
contained in the set of “monetary policy speeches.” Since the targeted content is
very specific, I here simply search all speeches for the phrases listed in Table 1.5.
If a speech contains any of these phrases, it is labelled as “market expectations-
speech.” The selected search terms are a conservative choice in the sense that
central bankers might react to market expectations not by explicitly mentioning
them, but by providing guidance on the underlying issues. I find 240 speeches
24The effective timing of this period has varied. In the latest update in 2011, the FOMC states on
its webpage (Statement can be found here: link) “The blackout period will begin at the start of the
second Saturday [...] before the beginning of the meeting and will end at midnight [...] on the next
day after the meeting.” As FOMC meetings usually start on a Tuesday or Wednesday, the blackout
period usually covers 10-11 days before the meeting.
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market expectations markets predict
markets expect market participants anticipate
market expects market participants anticipated
market expected market participants foresee
market participants expected market forsees
participants expect markets forsee
fed funds futures
Notes: List of phrases used to identify speeches that explicitly mention “market expectations.”
Table 1.5: Phrases identifying speeches discussing market expectations
which mention at least one of the key words, around 7% of all speeches in sample
(Table A.3).
1.4.3.2 Extensive margin of communication: Speech topic
Probit specification. To test for a link between the market expectations topic and
misalignment, I first construct a panel data set that records the number of speeches
(all speeches and topic-specific) for each speaker and week before scheduled
FOMCs. Naturally, it is rare that a speaker gives more than one speech mentioning
market expectations in the same week, and I therefore opt to model the occurrence
of these speeches as binary variable. I then estimate the following probit equation,
again separately for the presidents’ and governors’ samples,
Prob(Topic = “Mexp”)jt =φ
[
β abs(misal)t−1 + θ abs(misal)t−1 × Statusjt
+ Statusjt + φ abs(misal)t−2 + Xjt−1
]
(1.8)
where (j, t) indexes speaker and week, Topicjt = “Mexp” indicates whether a
speech mentions market expectations, as defined in Table 1.5. abs(misal)t−1 is
the absolute value of misalignment. Xjt−1 is a vector of controls that includes the
absolute value of the average data surprise indeces described above and the number
of speeches by speaker j in week t.25 The baseline covers weeks 2 to 5 before each
FOMC (if existent), and omits unscheduled FOMCs, crises and the ZLB period.26
The main sample then covers 123 FOMCs between March 1994 and January 2018.
Misalignment drives speech topics. Table 1.6 reports estimates of Equation 1.8
for the market expectations topic and a broader outcome variable for the probability
25I do not include FOMC fixed effects because they would be a perfect predictor of the speech
content probabilities in FOMC periods, in which no president mentions market expectations. A similar
argument applies to speaker fixed effects, for speakers that never mentioned market expectations. I
found that controlling for the number of speeches is a good alternative.
26The first/last weeks are omitted because they fall into the “Purdah period,” during which Fed
officials are not allowed to give policy-related speeches. Controlling for the lag of misalignment
further constraints the sample since I rule out that the lagged value is from previous FOMC period.
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Dependent variable: Prob(Speech with Topic)jt
Presidents Governors
abs(misal)t−1 −0.261 0.243 −0.207 0.090
(0.204) (0.209) (0.138) (0.178)
abs(misal)t−1 × Statusjt 0.227 0.440∗∗∗ −0.023 0.505∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.135) (0.209) (0.162)
Topic MonPol MarketExp MonPol MarketExp
Obs 4490 4490 3700 3700
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimates from probit regressions Prob(Topic = C)jt =
φ
[
β abs(misal)t−1 + θ abs(misal)t−1× Statusjt + Statusjt +φ abs(misal)t−2 +Xjt−1
]
where (j, t)
indexes speaker and week, topic C ∈ {MonPol, “Mexp”}. “Presidents” (“Governors”) denotes
the sample of speeches by presidents (governors). Standard errors in parentheses. Sample
includes weeks 5 to 2 before each FOMC. abs(misalt−1) is the absolute value of misalignment.
Xt−1 is a vector of controls (see main text). Statusjt equals one if the speaker is a voting president
(presidents sample) or the chair/vice chair of Fed Board (governors sample).
Table 1.6: Effect of misalignment on probability of speeches mentioning market expectations
of speeches about monetary policy as used in the tone regressions.
Larger misalignment significantly raises the probability of the market expecta-
tions topic both for voting presidents and the chairs of the Fed Board. The effect
of misalingment on the monetary policy topic is insignificant. The latter is not
surprising since speeches about monetary policy are very frequent and there will be
many monetary policy speeches at small misalignment, making it a poor predictor.
Table 1.7 reports the marginal effects to assess the economic magnitudes.
∆Prob(Speech with “Mexp”)jt
Presidents Governors
abs(misal)t−1 Voting Non-voting Chairs Rest
5bp 0.081 0.039 0.085 0.026
(0.038) (0.054) (0.033) (0.044)
10bp 0.115 0.043 0.130 0.027
(0.066) (0.066) (0.073) (0.047)
15bp 0.151 0.048 0.180 0.028
(0.096) (0.078) (0.109) (0.051)
Notes: Table shows the change in Prob(Speech with “Mexp”)t in response to an 10bp increase
in misalignment, conditional on the (pre-existing) level of misalignment. Standard errors in
parentheses. Prob(Speech with “Mexp”)jt is the probability that in week t speaker j gives a
speech mentioning market expectations. The control variables are held at their means plus one
standard deviation, the second lag of misalignment is set equal to 0.
Table 1.7: Marginal effects of misalignment on probability of market expectations topic
At an pre-existing misalignment of 5 basis points, a 10 basis point jump in
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misalignment increases the probability of a speech mentioning market expectations
by around 8 percentage points for both voting presidents and chairs of the Board.
This effect is increasing in the level of misalignment. At higher levels of misalign-
ment (10 and 15 bp), the marginal effects are economically large but with weak
significance due to the small number of episodes with misalignment at these levels.
Further discussion. Table A.3 shows that around 7% of all speeches include
explicit mentions of market expectations, suggesting that the speech topic might be
considered a rare event. Probit estimates can be biased in such situation. Therefore,
Appendix Table A.14 shows that the findings are robust to using the rare-events
logistic regression model from King and Zeng (2001) which corrects for this bias.
One concern about the content analysis could be that the mentions of market
expectations are not truthful in the sense that they are driven by private strategic
considerations inconsistent with the Fed’s objective.27 Two remarks are important.
First, to the extent that such private strategic incentives are distributed symmetri-
cally around the FOMC consensus, or unrelated to it, the effects of such mechanism
on my estimates will be negligible. Second, such intepretation would be hard to
reconcile with the evidence from the tone regressions which suggests that Fed
officials attempt to reduce misalignment.
1.4.4 Further discussion & robustness
Zero lower bound. The main sample excludes the ZLB period because the interest
rate stopped being the main tool of monetary policy. I define the ZLB period as the
three year period from 2010 to 2012. The starting and end points for this period are
based on the general judgement that during this time there were zero to very little
speculations that the Fed target rate would be changed at the upcoming meeting.
It’s important to stress that this regards expectations concerning the upcoming
decision. During the first half of the ZLB period, up until late 2011, markets were
quite persistently expecting Fed lift-off in the upcoming quarters. Regarding the
end point, 2013 featured the Taper Tantrum and some policy makers were arguing
that rates should be raised in 2013. These dating decisions are not unambiguous.
For example, as early as April 2012, Jeffrey Lacker, President of the Richmond
Fed, and James Bullard, President of the St. Louis Fed, publicly argued that rates
27For instance, imagine a Fed president who is, like the market, more hawkish than the rest of the
FOMC. Her/his mentions of market expectations would be in an confirming sense. Another related
argument is put forth by Vissing-Jorgensen (2019) who claims that Fed officials would systematically
leak information to move market expectations, in an attempt to reduce the Fed’s future policy
flexibility in favor of their preference. Vissing-Jorgensen (2019) analyzes this problem in a game
theoretic model and provides some narrative evidence for leakages and the Fed’s concern that
communication can reduce policy flexibility. Since I focus on the upcoming policy decision, concerns
by the Fed about reducing market volatility are likely more important. The unobservable nature of
informal leakages makes it impossible for me to examine the issue systematically.
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should be raised in 2013.28 Equally, while the Fed announced it would leave the
Fed funds target range at 0-25 basis points for an “extended period” in March 2009,
there were debates about whether the Fed would cut rates into negative territory.29
Appendix Table A.15 shows that the negative correlation between speech tone and
misalignment also holds if the ZLB period is included, though the link becomes
weaker.
Unobserved updates to Fed expectations. I do not observe how the Fed’s
expectations evolve continously over time. If positive public news arrive, observed
speeches and market expectations should rise instantly while measured Fed expec-
tations remain constant until updated. This would result in a positive correlation
between speech tone and misalignment and hence my estimates are conservative
with respect to this concern.
Expected effective funds rate. In Table A.15, the perfect foresight misalignment
is constructed by assuming perfect foresight concerning the effective fed funds
rate, not the target rate. This can alleviate concerns that structural changes in
the position of the effective fed funds rate within the Fed’s target range could be
driving the results, especially in the years where asset purchase programmes have
altered the aggregate liquidity conditions.
Speech classification thresholds and tone measures. Table A.9 confirms that,
as the classification threshold for monetary policy related speeches increases, the
estimates become less noisy and the effect size increases. The same holds for the
governors’ sample.
Table A.13 shows that the results are robust to exchanging the basline measure
of speech tone with the Loughran-McDonald or with the popular method of
counting bigrams as in Apel and Grimaldi (2012).
Effects by proximity to FOMC. Appendix Table A.11 suggests that the effect
of misalignment weakens as the number of weeks before the upcoming FOMC
meeting increases. For this purpose, the misalignment measure is interacted with
week dummies. The positive coefficients suggest that the effect is strongest shortly
before the FOMC, consistent with that policy makers need confidence about the
upcoming decision and that this confidence grows as the meeting approaches.
Scatter plot. Figure 1.1 plots speech tone as a function of the misalignment
error. Consistent with the summary statistics, misalignment is often relatively
close to zero, within a 10 basis points range at either side. However, there are also
observations of large misalignment. Figure 1.1b shows that the main finding is
robust to excluding observations with small misalignment.
28See these Reuters articles (link and link) and this CNBC article (link).
29See e.g. Mankiw discussing the Fed going negative in this New York Times article (link). Media
reports were especially steered by the fact that the Swedish central bank started implementing
negative rates in this year (see e.g. link).





































Notes: The figure plots the speech tone measure τjt and the lagged 5-day moving average
misalignment misalFwd,t
f omc
t−1 , as used in the regressions, for speeches up to 5 weeks before the
upcoming FOMC meeting. Colors refer to the voting status of the respective speaker at the
upcoming FOMC meeting. Based on the subsets of speeches “MP10” with at least 10% of all
words are “monetary policy relevant words.”
Figure 1.1: Relationship between speech tone and misalginment
FOMC fixed effects. Table A.12 compares the baseline estimates with a specifi-
cation including FOMC fixed effects, with and without the crisis year 2008. With
FOMC fixed effects, the coefficients β and θ measure responses of speech tone to
variations of misalignment within that period. Since the Fed’s expectations (in the
case of perfect foresight equal to the actual future decision) is a characteristic of
the FOMC period, the fixed effects fully absorb this component of misalignment
and the regression is therefore akin to regressing speech tone on only the market
expectations component but controlling for the Fed’s expectation. As expected, the
estimates are less precise and somewhat smaller but the main effect holds and is
significant for the voting presidents and the chairs of the Fed Board.
Voting rotation: Incentives, decision power and knowledge. Above I have
documented that Fed presidents react more strongly to misalignment when they
have the right to vote than when they do not. The voting right rotation between
Fed presidents on the FOMC follows a pre-determined rule that is unrelated to
macroeconomic and financial conditions.30
One could therefore argue, as in an earlier version of this paper, that the
voting-right rotation offers an exogenous variation in the incentives of a speaker to
engage in expectation management. Because he or she makes a formal and publicly
recorded decision at the FOMC meeting, a voting president is more directly, and
officially, associated with the decision. Viewed through the lens of the model in
Holmström (1999),31 the increased exposure induced by the voting right would
30Regional Fed presidents take turns for one year terms in their right to vote on the FOMC
decision according to a fixed cycle announced by the Board of Governors.
31In the model, the agent exerts more effort if the principal becomes better informed about the
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imply that the respective president puts more effort, which could manifest itself in
an more eager expectations management.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the above identification argument requires auxiliary
assumptions. While the rotation is exogenous, its effects on the presidents’ incen-
tives and information requires a whole separate analysis and is outside the scope
of this paper. For the purpose of this paper, the heterogeneity between voting and
non-voting presidents is simply presented as a stylized fact. It has motivated the
follow-up work presented in Ehrmann et al. (2020).
1.5 Rational expectations model
The preceding empirical analysis is strongly suggesting that central bankers do
indeed use their speeches to correct perceived expectational errors by the market.
Theoretical work on policy rules under rational expectations suggest that a policy
directly responding to market expectations might lead to instabilities, e.g. Bernanke
and Woodford (1997).32 The key insight is that such policy, if known to the
public, creates a coordination problem. It raises a question concerning the efficacy
of the type of policy that I have just provided empirical evidence for. Does
intermeeting communication in response to expectational errors arise under rational
expectations? If so, under what conditions? And, is it successful in equilibrium?
I develop a simple analytical framework to answer these questions. The setup
follows closely the model presented in Stein and Sunderam (2017).
1.5.1 Framework
The game’s two players are the financial market and the central bank. Policy
is discretionary. The central bank sets the nominal short-term interest rate and
communicates, both in response to private information about the target interest
rate i∗. i∗ symbolizes the level of the nominal short rate at which inflation and
output gap are at the values targeted by the central bank. The market’s only action
is to estimate i∗ using its observations of the nominal short rate and central bank
communication.
There are three periods t = 1, 2, 3. t = 1 and t = 3 represent two consecutive
FOMC meetings, t = 2 is the inter-meeting period. In period 1, the Fed obtains
private information e1 about its target rate i∗t . No new information arrives until
the end of the game, at which point the private information is fully revealed to
agent. A similar argument is put forth by Hansen et al. (2017).
32See also Bernanke and Mishkin (1997). Bullard and Mitra (2002) argue the Taylor principle
would be necessary and sufficient for expectational stability under forecast-based rules. Their finding
is qualified by Preston (2006) who shows that it only holds if only one-period-ahead forecasts matter.
Chapter 1: How does the Fed manage interest rate expectations? 26
the market and the interest rate is set exactly at target value. The full revelation
and implementation of private information at the end of the game is motivated
by the focus on short-term monetary policy implementation. Equations 1.9 to 1.16
summarize all important relationships assumed in this model.
i∗0 = i0 (1.9)
i∗1 = i
∗
0 + e1 (1.10)
i∗2 = i
∗
0 + e1 (1.11)
i∗3 = i
∗
0 + e1 (1.12)
i1 = i0 + k(i∗1 − i0) + u1 (1.13)
i2 = i0 + βs2 + u2 (1.14)
s2 = δ + γ (1.15)
i3 = i∗3 , (1.16)
Equations 1.9 and 1.16 state that the game starts and ends with the nominal interest
rate at its target value. Equations 1.10 to 1.12 capture that the only new information
arrives at t = 1, the target rate is constant thereafter.
The central bank sets interest rates at the FOMC meetings according to Equation
1.13 by choosing k which governs the strength of adjustment in the short rate in
response to i∗.33 I follow Stein and Sunderam by assuming that the central bank
observes e1 after deciding on k. This simplifies expressions below but preserves the
commitment problem between time periods. In the inter-meeting period, t = 2, the
central bank releases a noisy signal s2 whose mean δ it picks (Eq 1.15).
Equation 1.14 signifies the assumption that central bank communication affects
the nominal short rate (or financial conditions more broadly). This is crucial for
two reasons. Firstly, it rules out cheap talk. Secondly, β allows for a directional
interpretation of the signal. If β > 0, an increase in the signal implies a rise in the
nominal short rate. Therefore an increase in s can be interpreted as more hawkish
communication.34 ut ∼ N(0, σ2u) and γ ∼ N(0, σ2γ) are noise terms that materialize
after the central bank moves but before the market moves, preventing the market
to backout perfectly the private information.
Since e1 is initially private information of the central bank, the market needs
to estimate i∗t , based on the signals it receives: The change in the nominal interest
rate and the signal released in period 2. The market assumes that the target
rate i∗ follows a random walk,35 i∗t = i
∗
t−1 + et, and otherwise knows the entire
33Following Stein and Sunderam (2017), in this setting, the interest rate process is not recursive.
Note that instead of i2 = i1 + ... and i3 = i2 + ..., we have i1 = i0 + ..., i2 = i0 + ... and i3 = i0 + e. The
last condition reflects the fact that at the end of period 3, the nominal interest has to be on target. So
the new information has to be fully impounded in financial conditions. Using i2 = i0 + ... instead of
i2 = i0 + ... prevents the system to become recursive. If it was recursive, i2 would become the fourth
endogenous variable. In this sense, i2 = i0 + ... is a simplifying assumption.
34In future work, it would be interesting to endogenize β and study whether and how it relates
to the market’s signal extraction problem. Since this requires a far more elaborate framework, it is
outside the scope of this paper.
35This assumption simplifies the link between the time-t estimate of the target rate and the infinite
horizon forward rate. Appendix A.3.3 details the relationship between the central bank’s aversion to
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structure of the economy except of k and δ. Instead, the market is using guesses K
and D respectively. However, with rational expectation, the market will correctly
conjecture K = k and D = δ. As will become clear shortly, the market’s estimates
matter to the central bank because they drive the infinite horizon forward rate,
i∞t = Et(i
∗
t ), and therefore bond market volatility.
Central bank loss function. As layed out above, the central bank’s choice
variables are the degree of interest rate adjustment in period 1, k, and the mean δ of





(i∗t − it)2 + θ(∆i∞t )2. (1.17)
(i∗ − i)2 captures the terms for the deviation of inflation and output gap from
target values in the conventional loss function. The squared change in the infinite
horizon forward rate, (∆i∞)2, captures the central bank’s aversion to bond market
volatility. θ parametrizes the strength of this aversion. Stein and Sunderam
(2017) introduce this type of loss function to explain monetary policy gradualism,
the empirical pattern that central banks adjust policy rates slowly and in small
increments.36 An important distinction is that my model focuses on a phenomenon
at higher frequency than the monetary policy inertia. Gradualist monetary policy
is usually measured at quarterly frequency. Instead my model focuses on the
implementation of the upcoming decision and the three dates span a typical FOMC
period of around 6-7 weeks.
1.5.2 Solution
The model’s solution is obtained by starting at the last decision made. Given the
assumed full revelation and implementation of private information, there is no
action in period 3. For exposition and without loss of generality, I set the initial





Market expectations. This section derives the market’s estimate of the Fed
target rate in period 1 and 2, applying linear minimum mean squared error
(LMMSE) technology to the observed signals.37 In period 1, the only observed signal
is the change in the nominal interest rate, ∆i1. Deriving the LMMSE estimator38
bond market volatility and the market’s expectational errors.
36The large, positive coefficient on the autoregressive term in the Taylor-Rule has been subject to
much debate. Rudebusch (2002, 2006) argues that it is due to persistence in omitted variables. Others
argue that the Fed has an explicit desire to smoothen interest rates, for recent empirical support see
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). Stein and Sunderam (2017) deliver an economic rationale for
such explicit desire to smooth interest rates. Other rationales include parameter uncertainty (Sack,
1998) or history-dependence as a expectation management tool (Woodford, 2003).
37One could think of the market’s utility function being the negative of the mean squared error.
38χ is basically the OLS estimator from a regression of i∗ on ∆i.




K2σ2ε + σ2u︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
∆i1. (1.18)
In period 2, the market combines information contained in the rate change and in
the central bank communication. (Below I provide an intuition for why the market
would put a non-zero weight on a signal released already last period.) To derive at
its optimal estimate ê1,t=2, the market uses a LMMSE of the form
ê1,t=2 = α1∆i1 + α2s2. (1.19)
Appendix A.3.1 goes through the derivations that yield the coefficients from the
optimal estimate:
α1 =




Var(∆it)Cov(i∗t , st)− Cov(∆it, st)Cov(∆it, i∗t )
Var(st)Var(∆it)− Cov(st, ∆it)2
. (1.21)
By weighting the two signals, the market takes rational account of the variances of
and co-variances between the two signals and their respective co-variation with the
unknown target rate. As the market knows the structure of the economy except of
the central bank parameters k and δ, Equations 1.20 and 1.21 can be brought to life
by computing the theoretical moments. For the rational expectations solution, the
central bank’s choice for the mean of the signal needs to be derived first. I therefore
postpone the development of analytical expressions to the next section.
Period 2. In period 2, the central bank solves:
min
δ
L2 = (i∗2 − i2)2 + θ(∆i∞2 )2 + (i∗3 − i3)2 + θ(∆i∞3 )2.
It chooses δ taking the market’s expectation parameters α1 and α2 as given. The
central bank does not internalize that the market understands its incentives and
adjusts accordingly. The FOC yields
δ̂ = E(δ) =
e1β + α2θ
[







1− (2α1 − χ)K
)




β2 + 2α22θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
v2
u1. (1.23)
Again, under rational expectations, the market will understand that the central
bank’s optimal choice of δ is δ̂, D = δ̂. As E(γ) = 0, we have E(ŝ) = δ̂.
I can now develop analytical expressions for the coefficients of the market’s
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forecast function. Using δ̂ and χ to compute analytical expressions in Equations






























The fact that v1 and v2 depend on α1 and α2 is crucial. It signifies that the agents
understand that the central bank will communicate partly in response to their
expectations. The latter implies that, as the agents’ expectation formation varies,
the meaningfulness of the central bank communication will vary as well. I define
the meaningfulness as the covariation of the signal with the information of interest,
e, which will be helpful to gain intuition for the equilibrium outcomes.
Period 1. With the central bank’s optimal choice δ̂, I can plug E(ŝ2) into L1
and differentiate with respect to k. Importantly, the expected choice of δ will affect
the optimal value for k as ŝ2 is a function of ∆i1. Plugging in the optimal signal,
multiplying out and evaluating the expectations, E(u1) = E(u2) = E(e1) = 0, the
expected loss function at t = 1 is
E(L1) =2α21k




uθ − 2α1χk2σ2e θ − 2α1χσ2uθ − 2α1kσ2e θ + 2α22ŝ2θ + b2ŝ2
+ 2χ2k2σ2e θ + 2χ
2σ2uθ + k
2σ2e − 2kσ2e + σ2e θ + 2σ2e + 2σ2u .
The FOC then gives the optimal k
k̂ =
1 + α1θ
1 + 2α1θ(α1 − χ) + 2θχ2
. (1.26)
The fact that k̂ does not depend on α2 reflects that the central bank sets the mean
of the signal, which is zero at expected values, E(e) = E(u) = 0.
Finally, the model solution is pinned down by Equations 1.18, 1.24 and 1.25
specifying the market’s estimators, Equation 1.26 for the central bank’s choice of
degree of adjustment to private information k̂, and imposing rational expectations.
Types of equilibria. Before analyzing the equilibrium outcomes, the different
types of equilibria are characterized. First the edge case θ = 0.
Proposition 1. If the central bank is not averse to bond market volatility, θ = 0,
the model has a unique equilibrium where the central bank adjusts fully to new
information, i.e. k = 1. Nevertheless, if central bank communication is assumed
to affect financial conditions, β 6= 0, the market will put, in period 2, a non-zero
positive weight on both the past change in the nominal interest rate as well as on
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the central bank communication. We have α1, α2 > 0 as long as there is noise in the
central bank’s instruments σ2u , σ2γ > 0.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix A.3.4. Why does the
market put a non-zero weight on central bank communication even though the
central bank reacts fully to its new information in the first place? The key is
that, in period 1, the central bank decides on k based on E(u), before u actually
realizes. A surprise in u will therefore lead to a) a higher/lower nominal rate and
b) consequently to higher/lower market expectations concerning i∗. In period 2, by
sending a signal s, the central bank gets a chance to react to these misalignments.
As long as θ = 0, the central bank communication will unambigously cater the need
to react to surprises in the noise term. There is no trade-off for the central bank
between keeping markets calm (keeping ∆i∞t small) and achieving the inflation
target (keeping i close to i∗).
However, if θ > 0, the central bank underadjusts to its private information.
Table 1.8 lists the equilibrium choices for k, α1 and α2 for different θ. As in Stein and
Sunderam, as the central bank’s aversion to bond market volatility (θ) increases, the
degree k with which it reacts to new private information decreases. At the same
time, the weight on the interest rate signal ∆i in period 2 increases, and decreases
for the communication signal.
Observation 1. For β > 0, θ > 0, there is a critical threshold for the strength of
aversion to bond market volatility, θ̄, which is decisive for the uniqueness of the
model’s solution. If θ < θ̄, a unique equilibrium with α1, α2 > 0 and 0 < k < 1
obtains. If θ > θ̄, there are multiple equilibria.
Observation 2. For β > 0 and 0 < θ < θ̄, k̂ is decreasing in θ : As the aversion to
bond market volatility becomes stronger, the central bank reacts less and less to its
private information, i.e. underadjustment increases.
The underadjustment can create a trade-off for the central bank between the two
terms in its loss function: Financial conditions might be too tight (i > i∗) but market
expectations regarding i∗ too dovish (î∗ < i∗). An easing of financial conditions
would help achieving the inflation target but might confuse market expectations
further. Moreover, when k < 1, central bank communication can have two motives.
The central bank might use s as a strategic complement to its underadjustment
in period 1: Having “misguided” markets in period 1, it aims to gently correct
expectations in period 2, thereby smoothing the process of impounding e. At
the same time, the central bank could also be reacting to realized noise in the
short rate. As the market does not observe e and u, it faces uncertainty whether
central bank communication is reacting to incoming data surprises or whether it
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is a strategic move to steer market expectations. The trade-off and uncertainty
about motives for communication create a coordination problem between beliefs by
the central bank and the market. Higher values of θ exacerbate this coordination
problem and at some point introduce multiple equilibria. This is summarized in
Observation 1. Depending on its beliefs, the market might want to put a positive
or a negative weight on the signal. The expected covariation of the signal s2 with i∗
(“meaningfulness”) and the beliefs about which values for u and e have realized
determine the market’s expectations.
Observation 2 characterizes the first type of the equilibria in which the be-
haviour of the market and the central bank is the same as in the unique equilibrium:
The market puts a positive weight on both the interest rate signal and the commu-
nication, and the central bank’s underadjusts more if the aversion to volatility is
higher. The two last rows from Table 1.8 show that entirely different outcomes are
possible too: In this scenario, the market puts a negative weight, α2 < 0, on s2 and
the central bank adjusts more to the private information. This is the outcome of
self-fulfilling expectations. As suggested above, if θ > 0, the market faces an identi-
θ Unique k α1 α2
0 Yes 1 0.010 0.098
0.1 Yes 0.960 0.041 0.092
0.2 Yes 0.929 0.058 0.088
0.4 Yes 0.881 0.078 0.082
0.6 No 0.845 0.090 0.079
0.6 No 0.959 0.294 -0.316
0.6 No 0.944 0.260 -0.361
Notes: The table shows equilibrium values of α1,
α2 and k for different values of θ, the central bank’s
aversion to bond market volatility. Apart of θ, all
solutions share the same calibrations: σ2u , σ2γ, σ2e =
1 and β = 0.1
Table 1.8: Equilibrium outcomes across θ values
fication problem: Is the central bank trying to correct expectational errors resulting
from surprises to the noise term of the interest rate process or is its communication
reflecting the continuation of a gradualist strategy where the central bank attempts
to impound its private information smoothly into the market?
Key to the outcomes are market beliefs about the correlation of the signal with
its forecast target i∗ and, equally important, the central bank’s beliefs about the
market’s weights. If the market assumes the correlation between s and i∗ is negative,
it should put a negative weight on s. If the central bank thinks that the market
will put a negative weight on its communication, but the directional impact of s
on i2 is pretermined at β > 0, the central bank faces a trade-off. By setting s < 0,
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the central bank could try to counteract α2 < 0, thereby ensuring that the market’s
estimate of i∗ is updated in the right direction. Instead, the central bank could keep
s > 0 and hence move financial conditions towards target.
An increase in the strength of volatility aversion of the central banker has two
effects: Firstly, the increased degree of underadjustment makes the motives for
communicating in period 2 more ambiguous and therefore increases the room for
speculation. Secondly, once caught up in speculations about its motives, the higher
the aversion to volatility, the more likely that the central bank gives in and makes
expectations self-fulfilling.
In Appendix A.3.5, I derive the threshold θ̄ numerically. I also show that θ̄ is
decreasing in the variance of the interest rate noise relative to the variance of the
private information. The intuition for this is that as the variance of the interest
rate noise term increases, the margin of error for the market’s estimate in period 1
increases. The increased uncertainty makes multiple equilibria possible for lower
degrees of aversion to bond market volatility. The opposite holds for the variance
of the noise term in the signal s. As the noisiness of communication in period 2
increases, agents put less weight on it and therefore the interpretation of it becomes
less important.
1.5.3 Expectation management in equilibrium
With the solutions to the model, I now turn to the initial questions. Is a signal as a
function of expectational errors obtainable under rational expectations? And if so,
does it improve on policy outcomes.
Comparative statics. Figure 1.2 shows that, in the unique equilbria, the signal
is in a negative, linear relationship with the expectational error in period 1. The
expectational error is defined as χ∆i1 − e1, the difference between the market’s
estimate and the actual e1.
Figures 1.2a and 1.2b then illustrate that the slope flattens if θ or β increase,
respectively. A flatter slope means that central bank’s response to expectation
errors gets weaker. The effect of θ can be explained by the endogenous response
of the market’s forecast function to the central bank’s increased volatility aversion.
Instead, a higher β corresponds to a larger impact of the communication on the
nominal short term interest rate. A stronger market impact of communication
implies that the potential tradeoff between minimizing expectational errors and
bringing financial conditions on target gets stronger. As a result, the equilibrium
link between expectational error and communication gets weaker. Assessing these
predictions empirically is an interesting avenue for future research.
Comparing outcomes across equilibria. In the unique good equilibrium θ =
0.2, market expectations move gradually towards the correct value for the new
Chapter 1: How does the Fed manage interest rate expectations? 33




























Notes: The figures plot the equilbrium relationship between the value of the signal s and
χ∆i1 − e1, the expectational error made by the market with its estimate of period 1. 1.2a and
1.2b vary θ and β respectively. To generate the errors, the model was simulated for a series of
realizations of e1 while the noise to the nominal interest rate and the signal itself were set equal
to zero, i.e. u, γ = 0. The baseline calibration was used σ2u , σ2γ, σ2e = 1 and β = 0.1.
Figure 1.2: Response of intermeeting communication to expectational errors
target rate i∗ = 0.75. (Appendix Table A.16a tabulates the key variables.) The
expectational error opened up by the underadjustment in period 1 is reduced
through the intermeeting communication.
Instead, the outcomes are less benign in the case of high aversion to bond
market volatility θ = 0.6. (Appendix Table A.16b) The losses due to derailed short
rates as well as the loss due to bond market volatility are dramatically higher than
in the low θ equilibrium. In this case, the central bank surrenders to the market’s
expectations that its communication will be negatively correlated with e, and sets
its actually negative in order to move market expectations in the right direction.
The central bank is successful in doing so: The market revises its estimate of e
upwards in period 2. However, it also pushes the nominal short rate away from the
target. The high value of θ makes the central bank prioritize the correctness of the
market’s estimate at the expense of inappropriate levels of the nominal short rate.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that Fed officials react with their speeches to mis-
alignment between their own and financial market expectations. The effects are
strongest for the chairs and vice chairs of the Board of Governors and voting Fed
presidents.
To address identification challenges, I show that larger misalignment also
predicts more frequent mentions of market expectations in the speeches. I also
provide a brief narrative analysis, confirming the Fed’s concern with misaligned
expectations and use of communication to reduce it.
While the occasional existence of such link conforms well with conventional
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wisedom, it is an important insight that such communication policy has been
sufficiently systematic to be measurable with statistical significance. Systematic
policies are easier to internalize by the private sector. Consistent with earlier papers,
my simple model shows that the direct response of central bank communication to
private sector expectation can induce multiple equilibria, some with undesirable
properties. The model yields further predictions that will be promising to evaluate
empirically.
Increased central bank transparency over the last two decades has made mone-
tary policy considerably more predictable. This paper provides new evidence on
the mechanics of expectations management in the run-up to decisions.
Importantly, my paper constitutes a first step towards understanding empirically
and theoretically the intricate feedback loops between central banks and private
sector expectations. Future work on this issue seems promising.
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2.1 Introduction
The effect of decision rights on behaviour plays an important role in the design and
evaluation of decision-making processes, both private and public. The incomplete
contracts approach argues that agents seek to compensate the loss of a decision
right, e.g. by investing less in relationship-specific assets (Grossman and Hart,
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). A common form of a decision right is a voting right.
Voting rights are important when groups of decision makers, like shareholders and
committee members, need to reach agreement.2
We study the effect of voting rights on behaviour of individual members of a
decision-making committee in a context that allows for causal inference. We exploit
the rotation of voting rights among Federal Reserve Bank presidents on the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), the monetary policy committee of the United
States. We are interested in the way rotation affects presidents’ behaviour, both
during FOMC meetings as documented in the verbatim transcripts, and in-between
meetings as witnessed by their speeches. We also study whether voting status
matters to how financial markets react to speeches, and whether it does so in ways
consistent with the observed changes in behaviour.
While monetary policy is set in a centralised manner for the United States as a
whole, it is the role of the Reserve Bank presidents to gather intelligence about the
prevailing economic conditions in their respective Reserve district and to bring this
intelligence to the discussion on monetary policy at the FOMC.
The FOMC meets eight times per year. It is attended by the Reserve Bank
presidents of the 12 Fed districts and the 7 governors of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. Of these 19 persons, at any meeting, only 12 cast a
vote: the 7 governors, the president of the New York Fed and 4 of the remaining 11
presidents. Which 4 is determined by a scheme that has not changed since 1942.
The 11 districts are assigned to three groups of three districts and one group of
two. Within each group, the voting right rotates on a yearly basis. In any district,
presidents are appointed for a five-year period that is renewable. As a result,
presidents typically experience years with the right to vote – when they are FOMC
members – and years without the right to vote – when they are FOMC participants.
We exploit this exogenous variation to investigate how the voting status affects
behaviour of presidents in the meeting and in between meetings.
We formulate two hypotheses. First, the loss-compensation hypothesis is that in
years without the right to vote, a president uses speeches during the intermeeting
2Research by Gompers et al. (2010) on dual-class firms (firms that have issued shares with and
without voting rights) shows that firm value is decreasing in insider voting rights. Li et al. (2008) find
that the unification of dual-class shares into a single class by granting voting rights to all shareholders,
attracts institutional investors.
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period and interventions during the meeting to compensate for the loss of voting
right. Under this hypothesis, we expect that during years without the right to vote,
the number of speeches, the length of the interventions at the meeting and the tone
of either react more strongly to the differences between the economic performance
of the president’s home district and the U.S. economy.
Second, the involvement hypothesis maintains the opposite. Having the right
to vote makes Bank presidents more involved. As a result, they will make their
speeches and interventions more dependent on gaps between the regional economy
and the U.S. economy when they have voting status. This may have a variety
of reasons, including signalling their sensitivity as a decision maker to regional
interest, using speeches as an indication of what is on their mind and may guide
their votes, and as a test ground of lines of argumentation.
To test these hypotheses empirically, we parse the texts of a comprehensive
set of documents prepared by the Federal Reserve System. For the intermeeting
period, we focus on presidents’ speeches; for the meetings themselves, we study
the content of the FOMC meeting transcripts. This allows us to analyse, within
one unified framework, multiple stages of the FOMC decision process. Speeches
appear a natural place to start an analysis of intermeeting periods. Fed officials and
the public see them as potentially influential and previous empirical research has
shown that speeches can indeed influence markets (Blinder et al., 2008). Moreover,
other ways of influencing – e.g. telephone conversations among presidents or
meetings with journalists– are harder or impossible to observe.
We measure communication behaviour along two dimensions. First, the exten-
sive margin is covered through the number of speeches in a given intermeeting
period and through the length of interventions made during the meeting. Second,
at the intensive margin, we measure the tone of the speeches or meeting interven-
tions. Our main empirical analysis relates these measures to regional economic
conditions (in particular the gap between the unemployment rate at the Fed district
level and the national unemployment rate), the voting status of the speaker and
interactions thereof.
The patterns in the data consistently support the involvement hypothesis.
Our findings can be organised in three sets. The first set of findings concerns
communication behaviour in the intermeeting period. We find that in years when
Bank presidents have voting rights, they give more speeches, the larger is their
regional unemployment gap. In years without voting rights, there is no such
dependence on the regional economic situation. Also the tone of their speeches
reacts in line with the involvement hypothesis, in that speech tone becomes more
negative as the regional unemployment gap gets worse, but only so if they have
voting rights.
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We furthermore find that the speeches of voting presidents react to local condi-
tions only before the publication of the Beige Book, a report that contains mostly
anecdotal, qualitative information about regional economic conditions gathered by
each Federal Reserve Bank and is published two weeks before each FOMC meet-
ing. We argue that the Beige Book’s publication marks a reduction in information
asymmetry about regional conditions in the Fed districts and take this to suggest
that the desire to signal private information about local deviations from the U.S.
average is underlying some of the observed pattern.
The second set of findings relates to behaviour during the meeting. The
tone of the presidents’ opening interventions becomes more negative as regional
unemployment gaps worsen. This relationship is present for all presidents, but
it is stronger in their voting years. This suggests that they use their opening
interventions at the meeting to signal district-specific information. At later stages
of the meeting, after the economy go-round, when the discussion moves on from
discussion the economic situation to the implications for monetary policy decisions,
the regional unemployment gap loses its significance, which points towards a
convergence process wherein regional conditions become less important as the
meeting progresses (El-Shagi and Jung, 2015).
The third set of findings analyses the financial market reaction to the speeches.
We find that markets respond systematically less to speeches by voting presidents
than to speeches by non-voting presidents. This might seem surprising - after all,
having a voting right might make them more influential in deciding the outcome
of the meeting. However, if the speeches by presidents with voting rights give
more emphasis to regional economic conditions, market participants will find it
relatively easier to extract relevant information about the upcoming monetary
policy decisions from the speeches by presidents without voting rights. This could
explain why more involved committee members might be influencing markets less.
Do our findings say anything on whether or not the final outcome of FOMC
meetings gives an exaggerated weight to regional conditions? It is important to
note that this paper cannot shed any light on this question. Regional information is
important in coming to an assessment of the overall economy, and actively sought
for by all central banks. Whether our findings imply too much or too little influence
on the final outcomes is impossible to say; this paper only provides descriptive
evidence on behavioural patterns of committee members. Jung and Latsos (2015)
provide a normative analysis and show that even though interest rate preferences
of Reserve Bank presidents are affected by regional conditions, this did not impede
the Fed’s capacity to set interest rates with a nationwide focus.
Related literature. Our paper lies in the intersection of two (largely separate)
strands of literature that focus on i) public communication by policy makers and ii)
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decision making in committees, respectively.
The literature on central bank communication has provided ample evidence that
speeches by committee members are followed closely by the media and financial
markets, and have the potential to move asset prices (see the literature survey by
Blinder et al., 2008). Interestingly, most research on the market reaction takes the
communication decisions of the policy makers as given, even though the latter have
been shown to be used strategically to prepare the public for the upcoming meeting:
speaking activity intensifies before committee meetings in which policy rates are
changed (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007), and the tone expressed in these speeches
responds to market misperceptions about upcoming decisions (Tietz, 2018). Further
evidence that communication is used strategically is provided by Vissing-Jorgensen
(2019), who argues that committee members compete for the attention of financial
markets in order to move market expectations and therefore influence the policy
decision, via public appearances and through informal communication channels.
As to the second strand of literature on committee design, the reason why
decisions are delegated to committees is that the aggregation of diverse information
and the possibility to discuss possible actions should lead to better outcomes
than decisions made by one individual. This is the focus of a large literature on
committee design with prominent contributions such as Li et al. (2001), Prat (2005),
Visser and Swank (2007) and Levy (2007). Still, substantive empirical evidence
shows that the decision-making process in committees is subject to frictions such
as uncertainty about preferences, herding or reputational concerns (Gerling et al.,
2005).
A substantial body of literature looks at these questions for central banks
(inter alia, Blinder, 2007; Riboni and Ruge-Murcia, 2014; Sibert, 2003; Swank
et al., 2008), on the one hand because of the importance of central bank decisions
for the economy and financial markets, and on the other hand because central
bank committees have become increasingly transparent and often make their
deliberations as well as their voting records available to the public, thereby giving
researchers the chance to study the processes at work.
Our main focus is on the comparison of presidents’ communication behaviour
in voting and non-voting years. This distinction has been shown to matter. Tillmann
(2011) shows that non-voting members of the FOMC overpredict (underpredict)
inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favour tighter (looser) policy,
suggesting that non-voting member use their forecast in an attempt to influence
policy. Tietz (2018) finds that voting members react more strongly to misperceptions
by the market about upcoming policy decisions. Still, most papers, empirical and
theoretical alike, focus on other forms of heterogeneity, importantly on the role
of the chairman or the distinction between presidents and governors. (Chappell
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et al., 2004; Riboni and Ruge-Murcia, 2010, 2014). We view these comparisons as
important and complementary to our analysis.
Several papers study the regional representation of the FOMC setup. Hayo and
Neuenkirch (2013) show that speeches by FOMC members reflect regional economic
conditions,3 and Meade and Sheets (2005) find that Reserve Bank presidents from
districts with higher (lower) unemployment rates than the U.S. aggregate are more
likely to dissent in favour of looser (tighter) monetary policy in the deliberations of
the committee. At the same time, El-Shagi and Jung (2015) argue that this tendency
is already reduced in the second round of comments at the meeting, pointing to a
consensus-enhancing factor being at work.
Despite the tendency to dissent in the discussion stage at the FOMC meetings,
Meade (2005) shows that verbal dissents often do not result in actual dissents in
the official vote. Still, a role for regional information has also been detected at the
voting stage, e.g. by Eichler et al. (2018) who show that if a district’s banking sector
weakens, the associated Reserve Bank president is more likely to vote for looser
monetary policy.
The difference between the discussion stage (where disagreement is voiced) and
the voting stage (where dissent is rare), as well as the fact that more disagreement is
voiced in the first than in the second round of discussions during the meeting are in
line with the notion of a conformity bias (Visser and Swank (2007)), a notion that is
supported empirically by evidence on the FOMC: once committee members became
aware that transcripts of their discussions would be made public, less disagreement
has been voiced in the FOMC meetings (Meade and Stasavage, 2008, Swank et al.,
2008). Hansen et al. (2017) also provide empirical evidence for the conformity bias
for the FOMC, and furthermore document a discipline effect, whereby agents exert
more effort in equilibrium when their actions become more easily observable to
the principal (Holmström, 1999).
Organisation of the paper. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
Section 2.2 provides an historic account of the decision making process at the
Federal Reserve System, in particular the voting rotation. Section 2.3 develops our
hypotheses how the voting rotation affects behaviour, before Section 2.4 discusses
what data we employ to test these hypotheses. The empirical analysis is presented
in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
3Hayo and Neuenkirch (2013) also discuss the possibility that speeches by voters and non-
voters respond differently to regional economic conditions, but do not test whether differences are
significant.
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2.2 Historical background
Governance. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the Federal Reserve System,
made up of a Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve banks, each bank with its
own Federal Reserve city and district. After a series of depressions and financial
panics in the preceding decades, the wish was to start an institution performing
central banking functions to support the liquidity and stability of the banking
system, while addressing various fears: fear for such an institution being dominated
by New York, Wall Street and Eastern elites; fear for government control over money;
and fear for bankers’ interests prevailing over public interests (Meltzer, 2003).
The act allowed for the nomination of eight to twelve Federal Reserve cities. The
committee that was tasked with the System’s actual formation, the Reserve Bank
Organization Committee, decided in 1914 there would be twelve districts. Figure
2.1, taken from the Committee’s report, shows the boundaries of the districts and,
for each district, the location of the Federal Reserve Bank in the underlined city.
Notes: Federal Reserve cities are underlined. Source: Reserve Bank Organization Committee
(1914).
Figure 2.1: Map of the Federal Reserve districts
For any district considered, the committee took into account the size of its
banking sector, its sectoral and geographical economic connections, its transport
and communication infrastructure, and the likelihood that a Reserve bank located
in a Reserve city would be able to perform its functions at the service of the district.
As such, the districts reflected the early-twentieth century U.S. society. Meltzer
(2003, p.1) characterises the U.S.A. of the time as “a developing country, with
agriculture its largest occupation.” By and large, the district boundaries have
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remained the same to this date.
The 12 Federal Reserve banks formed a confederation, supervised by the
Board. The resulting Federal Reserve System lacked concentrated decision-making
authority. At the time, lending to depository institutions through the “discount
window” was more important than open market operations. As a result, Reserve
banks were free to sell and purchase in the open market subject to the rules and
regulations of the Board and were otherwise free to behave independently as they
saw fit.
With the emergence of a national financial market and in light of the special
position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York because of the size of its banking
sector and its role in the international financial system, struggles for power resulted,
both among the Reserve banks, and between the Reserve banks and the Board.
Despite several changes to the governance structure in the 1920s, these frictions
continued to impede the efficient functioning of the Federal Reserve System.
The Great Depression and banking crises of the 1920s and early 1930s were
taken as proof that the U.S. central banking system had failed and needed to be
re-assessed radically. The Banking Act of 1933 gave legal status to an open market
committee that included all Reserve banks as members and called it the Federal
Open Market Committee.
The Banking Act of 1935 ended the semiautonomous nature of the Reserve
banks and moved the locus of power to the Board in Washington. The chief
executive officers of the Reserve Banks lost the title of Governor and became
Presidents. The act, by and large, formed the FOMC as it still is today.
Since 1935, it consists of 12 seats, 7 seats for Board members and 5 seats in total
for 12 Reserve Banks. It is chaired by a Board member. Reserve Bank districts are
grouped and one seat is assigned to each group. In 1942, the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York obtained a permanent seat on the FOMC, and Boston, the district with
which New York had formed a group until then, was assigned to another group.
Since 1942, the groups of districts are Boston, Richmond and Philadelphia;
Cleveland and Chicago; Atlanta, St. Louis and Dallas; and Minneapolis, Kansas
City and San Francisco. To accommodate two or three districts with one seat, within
each group, FOMC membership rotates on a yearly basis. Initially, rotation was
a practical solution; in 1942 it became enshrined in law. Nonvoting Reserve Bank
presidents do “attend the meetings of the Committee, participate in the discussions,
and contribute to the Committee’s assessment of the economy and policy options.”4
Voting procedure. The official decision at the FOMC meeting is taken by a
formal vote at the end of the meeting. The chairperson proposes the policy action
4Quote from https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm,accessed September
29, 2020.
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based on the preceding discussion and every member casts her or his vote through
voicing approval or not. The outcome is decided with a simple majority rule
(Chappell et al., 2004). Historically, the vote count has always led to the approval
of the proposed policy decision. In the (rare) event of dissent, there are usually
only 1 or 2 dissenting votes. This, however, likely understates the true extent and
frequency of controversy because members often vote approvingly even though
they preferred a different policy decision (Meade, 2005).
The role of regional information and the Beige Book. The FOMC’s mandate
from Congress is “to promote maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate
long-term interest rates in the U.S. economy.”5 Each Federal Reserve Bank system-
atically collects information about its district. Part of this information is anecdotal
and is obtained “through reports from [Federal Reserve] Bank and Branch directors,
plus phone and in-person interviews with and online questionnaires completed by
businesses, community contacts, economists, market experts, and other sources.”
Regional information is regularly reviewed during an FOMC meeting. In the econ-
omy go-round, the first part of a meeting, Bank presidents discuss and comment
on regional conditions. Furthermore, this anecdotal information is presented in
the Beige Book, the Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions by
Federal Reserve District.
In 1970, then-Chairman Arthur Burns initiated the compilation of the first Beige
Book, at the time called Red Book. Burns intended the Beige Book to replace parts
of the presidents’ verbal reporting about regional conditions during the meeting,
and thus make the gathering of opinions and judgements from the districts more
efficient and effective (FOMC minutes of May 5, 1970). In the Beige Book, each
regional Fed summarises economic conditions in its district. Starting from May
1983, the Beige Book was made public. Its release date was set to two weeks before
the FOMC meeting, in an attempt to downplay its significance for policy decisions.
Still, since the 1987 stock market crash, the Beige Book started to be referenced
frequently by the press (Fettig et al., 1999).
This brief recap of the historical background of the FOMC clarifies the special
role of the Reserve Bank presidents. While monetary policy is set in a centralised
manner for the United States as a whole, it is their role to gather intelligence about
the prevailing economic conditions in their respective Reserve district and to bring
this intelligence to the discussion on monetary policy at the FOMC – via the Beige
Book and during the meeting. At the same time, they are subjected to a voting
rotation that has been decided several decades ago and is exogenous to economic
conditions today. How this voting rotation affects their behaviour is the question
5This quote is from the front matter that can be found in any recent Beige Book, see
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/beige-book-default.htm.
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we study in this paper.
2.3 Two hypotheses about how the voting right affects pres-
idents’ behaviour
The rival hypotheses that we test maintain that the strength of the relationship
between regional economic conditions and Bank president behaviour varies system-
atically with their voting status on the FOMC. To motivate these hypotheses, we
begin by arguing that, by design, regional conditions influence how Bank presidents
act and decide on the FOMC.
The previous section has already highlighted that Bank presidents collect and
present intelligence about regional economic conditions, during the meeting and
in the Beige Book. In addition, the governance of the Federal Reserve System has
a strong regional component. Presidents of Reserve Banks are accountable to a
Reserve Bank’s board of directors. These boards have strong ties with regional
financial industry, businesses and the community in general.
Earlier literature has already demonstrated that regional conditions do in fact
influence the policy preferences expressed by presidents in the policy go-round in
the meeting, their actual votes and the content of their speeches given in between
meetings. Chappell Jr et al. (2008), Jung and Latsos (2015) and Bennani et al.
(2018) find that an increase in regional unemployment is associated with a voiced
preference for a lower target rate. While Tootell et al. (1991) finds no evidence that
regional variables explain actual votes, Gildea (1992) and Meade and Sheets (2005)
find that an increase in regional unemployment is associated with an increased
probability of voting in favour of lower target rates, even if this implies a dissenting
vote. Hayo and Neuenkirch (2013) find that employment, housing, production and
financial conditions in the Fed district are reflected in the presidents’ speeches.
Note that when we write that regional conditions matter, this should typically
be taken to mean that differences between regional and national conditions matter.
As our hypotheses claim that the strength of the relationship between regional
economic conditions and president’s behaviour changes systematically with a
president’s voting status, we must first formulate hypotheses about the sign of
the relationship. Inspired by the research just cited, we assume that a president
gives more speeches in between meetings and discusses at greater length in the
meeting, the larger is the absolute difference between regional and U.S. average
unemployment. Also, we assume that the tone of presidents’ speeches and of their
discussion in the meeting becomes more negative, the larger is unemployment in
their district.
The loss-compensation hypothesis. The loss-compensation hypothesis main-
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tains that in years without the right to vote, a president uses speeches during
the intermeeting period and discussions in the meeting to compensate for the
loss of voting right. The larger the absolute difference between regional and U.S.
unemployment, the more the loss of voting power is felt. The loss-compensation
hypothesis predicts that, to compensate for this loss, the number of speeches and
the length of the discussions react more strongly to these differences in years that a
president cannot vote than in years that he can.
The tone of a speech and of the discussion reacts to regional unemployment.
The more extreme regional unemployment is relative to national unemployment,
whether high or low, the more the loss of voting power is felt. The hypothesis
predicts that, to compensate for this loss, the tone of a speech and of contributions
to the discussion reacts more strongly to the regional conditions in years that a
president cannot vote than in years with a right to vote.
All else equal, the loss in voting power should be more costly in periods
when there are conflicting views within the FOMC, or when uncertainty about the
right decision is large. The loss-compensation hypothesis predicts that in these
instances, the number and tone of speeches of non-voters react more strongly to
local economic conditions than otherwise.
The involvement hypothesis. The involvement hypothesis maintains that in
years when presidents can vote, their speeches during the intermeeting period and
discussions in the meeting reflect that they matter more to the decision. Given that
it is a president’s assignment to collect regional information and bring it to the
FOMC, they use their speeches in between meetings and their interventions during
meetings to signal their sensitivity as a decision maker to regional circumstances
and use speeches both as an indication of what is on their mind and may guide
their votes and as a test ground of lines of argumentation.
These considerations are more important, the more regional economic condi-
tions differ from those in the U.S. aggregate. The hypothesis predicts that, because
of this greater involvement, the number of speeches, the length of the meeting
interventions as well as their tone react more strongly to these economic differences
in years when a president can vote.
All else equal, the involvement will be stronger in periods of conflicting views
within the FOMC or uncertainty about the right decision, i.e. when more is at
stake. The hypothesis predicts that in these instances, the number and tone of
speeches and the length and tone of interventions of voters react more strongly to
local economic conditions than otherwise.
That is, the two hypotheses make opposite predictions concerning the change
in responsiveness of presidential behaviour to regional economic conditions as
a reaction to a change in a president’s voting status. Both hypotheses make the
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same prediction concerning the change in responsiveness of presidential speech
behaviour as a reaction to a change in the character of the preceding meeting,
conditional on voting status. We use both the across-voting status and the within-
voting status predictions to test the hypotheses.
2.4 Data
To empirically test our hypotheses, we collect data from various sources.
Speeches. We use the database of speeches originally presented in Tietz (2018).
Speeches were collected from the webpages of the Federal Reserve Banks, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, BIS archive of central bank
speeches and from FedInPrint, which provides an index of publications by the
Federal Reserve System.6 The final sample consists of 2887 unique speeches given
between 1994 and 2013.
We collect the entire text of the speeches and construct a measure of the
economic tone that gets expressed, separately for each speech. Before the analysis,
we split the speeches into sentences, remove all non-alphabetic characters, stop
words and words with less than 3 characters, and convert the remainder to lower
case. To obtain a measure of tone, we follow Schmeling and Wagner (2017) and
use the dictionary constructed in Loughran and McDonald (2011). Sentence-by-
sentence, we count the number of negative words as classified by Louhgran and
McDonald, N, and the total number of words T. Counting the words at the sentence
level allows improving the accuracy of the tone measure.
We follow Tietz (2018) and adjust the dictionary to account for the jargon
specific to the central banking context. Loughran and McDonald (2011) developed
their dictionary using company reports. While company reports share much
of the financial jargon typically used in central banking, the two contexts are
different, and some complications make further adjustments desirable. The Federal
Reserve aims to create economic conditions consistent with price stability and
maximum sustainable employment. Therefore, the word “unemployment” will
be used more often than in company reports and need not necessarily carry a
negative connotation. The word “unemployment” is also special because many
adjectives and verbs that otherwise have a negative meaning have a positive
meaning for “unemployment.” For example, declining inflation, output growth
or stock markets typically convey a worsening of economic conditions, while
declining unemployment indicates an upturn. We deal with this by excluding
the word “unemployment” from the list of negative words. Furthermore, for
all sentences that include “unemployment” but none of the words “inflation”,
6For links see data description 1.2 of chapter 1
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“employment”, or “growth”, we remove “decline”, “declining” and “declined” from
the list of negative words and add “higher” and “high.”
We then aggregate the word counts for each speech and compute the tone
measure τi for speech i as7
τi = 100× (1− Ni/Ti). (2.1)
We also follow Tietz (2018) by removing speeches that are unrelated to monetary
policy affairs, using a method from supervised machine learning. Based on 300
speeches labelled manually in Tietz (2018), we follow Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2010) and compute for each phrase p that occurs at least once in the speeches
the statistic ωp,c. ωp,c measures how characteristic the phrase p is for topic c ∈
{monetary policy relevant, not relevant}, taking into account the conditional word
counts.8
A simple threshold rule is then devised to filter out irrelevant speeches. For
each speech, we count the number of occurrences of the 200 most representative
words, i.e. with the 200 largest values of ωp,c. An exogenous threshold (5%, 7.5%
and 10% of total words) is defined, which a speech has to exceed in order to be
classified as “relevant to monetary policy.” We use the 7.5% threshold as our
baseline, but check our results for robustness.9
The last step in the preparation of the speech data for our econometric analysis
is to aggregate them to the FOMC meeting frequency. The FOMC meets eight
times a year. For each meeting period and each speaker, we calculate the number
of speeches given in the inter-meeting period and the tone as simple average of the
tone expressed in each individual speech. Appendix Table B.1 provides a set of
summary statistics for the resulting variables.
Interventions made during the FOMC deliberations. As done, for instance, in
Baerg and Lowe (2020) and Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020), we also assemble
a dataset that measures the interventions made by each FOMC member during
the deliberation stage at the FOMC meetings. For that purpose, we subject the
7An alternative way of measuring the tone of speeches is by constructing net positivity as the
share of positive words minus the share of negative words. Following the earlier literature (e.g.
Schmeling and Wagner, 2017), the measurement is restricted to negative words, in particular because
positive words are more frequently negated than negative words, therefore making the measurement
of tone relatively more noisy.
8The statistic is ωp,c =
(Np,c N−p,−c−Np,−c N−p,c)2
(Np,c+Np,−c)(Np,c+N−p,c)(Np,−c+N−p,−c)(N−p,c+N−p,−c)
, where Np,c (N−p,−c) is the
number of occurrences of phrase p (all but p) in speeches labelled with topic c (all topics but c). A
phrase is either a single word or a bigram. For more background, see Tietz (2018) or the original
paper by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).
9Given the focus of this paper, the breadth of topics relevant to our analysis is somewhat wider
than in Tietz (2018). That is why we use a slightly lower threshold value as baseline.
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FOMC transcripts to the same procedure as the speeches and calculate measures
of the length and tone of the comments, after separating the comments by each
individual. The transcripts are released with a 5-year lag, which determines the
end of our sample period in 2013. Given that the transcripts provide a verbatim
record of the deliberations, there are many instances of very short remarks. To
test for robustness of our results, we have therefore also calculated the number of
words and the tone of the interventions only counting the longest intervention by
each speaker or only including interventions that contain at least 50 words.
Dissents. Further to pre-meeting speeches and the interventions during the meet-
ing, we also collect information whether an individual member decided to dissent
in the decision stage. This information is provided on the website of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Of course, this variable is only available
for FOMC members with a voting status.
Regional economic data. The regional economic data cover unemployment, and
for robustness furthermore inflation and return on assets of the financial sector.
District-level unemployment rates are readily available for download from FRED.
The data are computed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis based on statistics
released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.10
District-level CPI inflation rates are constructed by mapping data for Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to districts. We focus on year-on-year inflation rates
to avoid seasonality issues. If one Federal Reserve district contains more than one
MSA for which we have inflation data, we weigh the MSAs with their respective
population obtained from the 2010 Census figures. Data sources, their frequency
and the mapping from MSAs to districts are summarised in Appendix Table B.2;
Table B.1 in the appendix also provides summary statistics for the resulting vari-
ables. Finally, we also retrieve data on return on assets for banks geographically
located in each Fed district, which are directly available from FRED.
The original time series for unemployment and inflation are monthly, those for
return on assets quarterly. We aggregate them to FOMC meeting frequency (recall
that the FOMC meets eight times a year) as follows: For each series, we identify the
release dates, which allows us to trace the most recently available data at each point
in time. Based on these, we construct a weighted average over the entire FOMC
intermeeting period, where each release gets weighted with the relative number
10These data were discontinued in 2015. For a robustness test where we extend the speech
data to 2018, we construct regional unemployment by mapping U.S. states to Federal Reserve
districts based on population weights, which are tabulated in Appendix Table B.3. Over the common
sample, the district-level unemployment rates computed by us and thos obtainable through FRED
are near-perfectly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 99%.
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of days during which it represented the most recent available data. This implies
that our economic conditions relate to the publicly available data at the time of the
speaking engagements. Note that our dataset does not account for revisions and is
therefore subject to the critique by Orphanides (2001). However, to the best of our
knowledge, no real-time dataset can be constructed based on the publicly available
data. Also, while we would ideally want to have forward-looking data, these are
not available.
Beige Book. Finally, we collect information on the content of the Beige Book, as
an alternative measure of regional economic conditions. For that purpose, we
calculate the tone of the Beige Book, in the same way as for speeches and meeting
interventions. We do so separately for each Fed district, following the structure of
the Beige Book, which contains a separate section for each district.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Testing the exogeneity of voting status
Our identification strategy rests on the assumption that voting status varies ex-
ogenously and is uncorrelated with economic conditions. Given that the voting
scheme became standard practice in 1935-1936, well before the beginning of our
sample period, we expect no correlation between the voting status of a Reserve






Regional return on assets 0.048
(0.070)
Observations 1,735
Notes: The table shows marginal effects of a probit model that explains voting status with
district-level inflation, unemployment and return on assets of the financial sector. Numbers in
brackets are standard errors. No parameter is estimated to be statistically significant at the 10%
level.
Table 2.1: Testing the exogeneity of the voting scheme
We test this formally in a simple probit model, in which we explain voting status
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with regional inflation, unemployment and financial sector return on assets. Table
2.1 reports the estimates of the marginal effects. There is indeed no systematic
relationship between voting status and any of the three economic conditions,
confirming the exogeneity of the voting scheme.
2.5.2 Difference in speech behaviour in the intermeeting period
Summary statistics. The summary statistics in Table 2.2 suggest that the average
behaviour of voters and non-voters is very similar over the sample. In around 65%
of all inter-meeting periods, Reserve Bank presidents do not deliver any monetary
policy-related speech, a share that is virtually identical for voters and non-voters.
The table also shows that there is a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 4 speeches
that Reserve Bank presidents have delivered in inter-meeting periods covered by
our sample. This motivates us to estimate an ordered probit model.
Total Non-voters Voters
# speeches Obs Share (in %) Obs Share (in %) Obs Share (in %)
0 1,149 66.22 733 66.39 416 65.93
1 359 20.69 235 21.29 124 19.65
2 172 9.91 106 9.60 66 10.46
3 48 2.77 26 2.36 22 3.49
4 7 0.40 4 0.36 3 0.48
Sum 1,735 100.00 1,104 100.00 631 100.00
Notes: The table shows how many speeches individual Fed presidents have delivered in the
various inter-meeting periods as well as the share of each category, for all Fed presidents in the
voting rotation (Total) and separately for voting and non-voting Fed presidents. “Obs” reports
the number of observations.
Table 2.2: Number of speeches by Fed presidents per inter-meeting period
Number of speeches. We first test the hypotheses on the responsiveness of the
number of speeches to regional economic conditions across years, with and without
the right to vote. We do this based on the following ordered probit regression
equation:
Pr(Ni,t = n) = Pr
( κn−1 < µi + µt + βNu |udit − uUS,t|
+βNv vdit + γ
N |udit − uUS,t|vdit + εit ≤ κn
)
(2.2)
We explain the number of speeches Ni,t by Reserve Bank president i in intermeeting
period t with president fixed effects µi, period fixed effects µt, the absolute differ-
ence between the economic conditions in district d of president i and U.S. economic
conditions, |ud,t − uUS,t| (which we call the regional gap), the voting status of the
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Reserve Bank vd,t and the interaction of regional economic conditions with the
voting status.
President fixed effects control for the possibility that time-invariant charac-
teristics of the president, like personality, affect speech behaviour. Malmendier
et al. (2017) and Bordo and Istrefi (2018) find that policy preferences are shaped by
the background of individuals. While the fixed effect controls for time-invariant
characteristics, it cannot account for time variation in preferences as identified
by Istrefi (2019). Period fixed effects remove all variation that is common across
all presidents in an intermeeting period, the general economic situation being an
important example. We cluster standard errors by Reserve Bank president.11
On the basis of the literature we expect presidents of either type to deliver
more speeches, the larger regional gaps are, i.e. βNu > 0 and βNu + γN > 0.
The key parameter to test our hypotheses is γN , as it measures the difference
in responsiveness of the number of speeches to regional economic conditions
across voting status. The loss-compensation hypothesis predicts γN < 0, while the
involvement hypothesis predicts γN > 0.
Table 2.3 reports the results of the estimation. The first specification, without
presidents’ voting status, shows that regional unemployment matters for the speech
activities of the Reserve Bank presidents: they tend to give more speeches, the
larger is the gap between regional and U.S. unemployment. This is in line with the
earlier evidence. The benchmark estimation in column 2 differentiates voters and
non-voters. It shows that a president’s speech activity reacts more strongly to the
regional unemployment situation in years with voting rights than in years without.
When they vote on the FOMC, their estimated reaction to regional unemployment
is almost twice as large. This reaction is statistically significant at the 1% level,
as can be seen by the sum of the two estimated coefficients, βNu + γN , provided
in the middle panel of Table 2.3. In Appendix Table A.4, we report the marginal
effects. In years a president is voting, an increase in the unemployment gap by
one percentage point reduces the probability that the president does not deliver a
speech by 13%. In non-voting years, that probability is reduced by only around
6% (and is statistically insignificant). The voting status itself does not affect the
propensity to deliver speeches, consistent with the summary statistics.
These findings support the involvement hypothesis and go against the loss-
compensation hypothesis. Presidents’ speeches respond more strongly to regional
conditions in years they vote, rather than in the years they do not.
These results are robust to redefining the threshold for relevant speeches from
11Note that the equation uses district-level macroeconomic variables and voting status. Given that
there is always at most one president per Reserve Bank for each FOMC meeting, and given that there
is no single individual who has been president of several Reserve Banks in our sample, we could also
use a notation whereby macroeconomic variables and voting status are indexed with i rather than d.
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7.5% to 5% or 10% (columns 3 and 4). The effect of regional economic conditions
also holds for speeches covered by Reuters, i.e., speeches that are apparently
deemed relevant for a more national audience (column 5). The most relevant
margin seems to be whether or not a Reserve Bank president decides to deliver
a speech. Conditioning on speaking, there is no further effect on the number
of speeches (column 7) and estimating a probit model would in principle have
been sufficient for our purposes (column 8). Another robustness test in column 9
shows that removing period fixed effects and instead controlling for the number
of speeches given by all other members on the FOMC (but excluding those by the
respective president) does not alter our findings in a substantive manner. Results
are also unaltered when we add regional inflation and the financial sector return
on assets (column 10), which by themselves do not affect the propensity to give
speeches.12 Another robustness test is provided in column 11, where we extend the
sample of speeches until 2018. Restricting the sample to 2013 due to the availability
of the FOMC meeting transcripts does not change the picture in an important way.
The last three columns of Table 2.3 extend the analysis to include different
aspects of the Beige Book. Column 12 shows that the pattern identified above also
exists if we proxy regional economic conditions with the content of the Beige Book.
This is comforting evidence in two ways. First, it suggests that our measurement of
the tone of the Beige Book captures economic conditions. Second, it also implies
that our use of unemployment as a sole proxy for regional economic conditions is
not biasing our results.
Columns 13 and 14 provide a subsample analysis. Here, regional economic
conditions are once more proxied by unemployment, but we split the sample into
the period before the release of the Beige Book, and the (shorter) period afterwards.
Our behavioural pattern is exclusive to the first subsample, suggesting that the
increased involvement relates in particular to the period in which the Reserve
Banks gather regional information, and where this information has not yet been
widely shared.
12There could be various reasons why we find that regional unemployment affects speech be-
haviour, but regional inflation and returns on asset do not, which is recurrent in the literature (Meade
and Sheets, 2005; Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2013; Eichler et al., 2018). Unemployment is more salient as
it is measured at the district level. Moreover, Fed staff talks to companies, and while it is relatively
easy to aggregate information on hiring and firings, it appears considerably harder to aggregate data
on price setting and changes. Also, unemployment tends to be a good proxy for the business cycle
and the output gap and so is highly relevant. Finally, unemployment data is released relatively early.
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Speech tone. To investigate the extent to which the tone expressed in the
speeches depends on a president’s voting status, we estimate the relationship





τuditvdit + εit (2.3)
As before, we include president and period fixed effects and cluster standard
errors by president. Appendix Table B.1 provides basic summary statistics for the
speech tone.
We expect the tone of a speech of a president of either type to be negatively
related to regional unemployment, βτu < 0 and βτu + γτ < 0. The parameter
of interest for a test of the hypotheses is γτ, as it measures the difference in
responsiveness of the tone to regional economic conditions across voting status. The
loss-compensation hypothesis predicts γτ > 0, i.e. the relationship between tone
and regional unemployment is more negative for non-voters, while the involvement
hypothesis predicts the opposite, γτ < 0.
We present the estimation results in Table 2.4. The first specification shows that
a president tends to use a more negative tone, the larger is the unemployment gap,
but that this relationship is not statistically significant. The benchmark estimation
in column 2 differentiates voters and non-voters. It shows that presidents’ tone
reacts more strongly to the regional unemployment situation when they have voting
rights: their estimated reaction to regional unemployment is more than twice as
large. This reaction is statistically significant at the 5% level, as can be seen by
the sum of the two estimated coefficients, βτu + γτ, provided in the middle panel
of Table 2.4. The estimate implies that a 1 percentage point increase in regional
unemployment relative to the U.S. figure lowers the tone of the speeches given by
the voting Reserve Bank presidents by one fourth of its standard deviation.
The findings on speech tone again support the involvement hypothesis and go
against the loss-compensation hypothesis.
We subject these findings to the same robustness tests as before, by changing the
threshold for identifying monetary policy-related speeches, by separating speeches
that are covered by Reuters and those that are not, by removing meeting fixed
effects and instead controlling for the tone of the speeches by all other FOMC
members, by adding regional inflation and the financial sector return on assets,
and by extending the sample to 2018. Results are robust.13
13As an additional robustness check, we estimate the effects on the number of speeches and
speech tone jointly in a Heckman model. The underlying idea is that we observe the sentiment of the
speeches by Reserve Bank presidents who decide to deliver a speech, but that we cannot observe the
sentiment of those who do not. If the decision to give a speech is not random, it could introduce a
sample selection bias in our estimates. The Heckman procedure corrects for such potential bias. The
procedure involves a two-stage estimation method. In the first stage (selection), the probability of
being included in the sample (in our application, the decision to deliver a speech or not) is estimated
by way of a probit model. In the second stage (option), the sentiment expressed in the speeches is
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As before, we also relate our estimation to the Beige Book. Using the content
of the Beige Book as an alternative proxy for regional economic conditions yields
largely insignificant results (note that we would expect the relationship between
Beige Book tone and speech tone to be positive, which is what we find). When
splitting the sample into pre-Beige Book release and post-release, we once more
find that the pattern identified in our benchmark estimation stems exclusively from
the pre-release window.
Intermeeting speech behaviour following dissent or a surprise decision. Mov-
ing on, we now test the predictions concerning speech behaviour in periods of
conflicting views within the FOMC or uncertainty about the right decision. Recall
that both hypotheses make the same prediction concerning the change in respon-
siveness of presidential speech behaviour as a reaction to a change in the character
of the preceding meeting, conditional on voting status.
We say that a meeting is characterised by conflicting views if at least one FOMC
member dissented in that meeting. Furthermore, we proxy uncertainty about the
right decision through periods when the committee took a surprising decision. In
particular, we measure market surprises with the high-frequency responses in Fed
funds futures around the FOMC announcements provided in Steinsson et al. (2018).
We classify a meeting as surprising if the associated monetary shock is larger than
the top 75th or smaller than the bottom 25th percentile of the shocks’ distribution.
We run separate tests for each situation. In either case, we extend the speech and
tone regression models by a dummy, Pt, that equals one if the previous meeting has
the characteristic. We interact this dummy with the regional economic conditions,
the voting status and with both variables. For the number of speeches, the model
becomes
Pr(Ni,t = n) = Pr
( κn−1 < µi + µt + βNu |udit − uUS,t|+ βNv vdit
+γNuv|udit − uUS,t|vdit + γNuP|udit − uUS,t|Pt
+γNvPvditPt + δ
N |udit − uUS,t|vditPt + εit ≤ κn
)
(2.4)
while the model for the tone of speeches turns into







+ γτuPuditPt + γ
τ
vPvditPt + δ
τuditvditPt + εit (2.5)
The loss-compensation hypothesis predicts γNuP > 0 for speech number and γ
τ
uP < 0
for speech tone; the involvement hypothesis predicts δN > 0 for speech number
explained. The estimation of our model is conveniently identified, given the exclusion restriction
that the absolute deviations of regional economic conditions from the U.S. average affect the number
of speeches but do not affect the sentiment contained in the speeches. The results of this exercise,
which we do not reported for brevity, show that our results are highly robust, both quantitatively
and qualitatively.
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and δτ < 0 for speech tone.
Dissent. Consider intermeeting periods that follow an FOMC meeting charac-
terised by dissent first.
Event at previous meeting (Pt)
Dissent Large surprise
(1) (2)
Absolute UE gap (βNu ) 0.197 0.252
(0.212) (0.196)
Absolute UE gap × voting (γNuv) -0.053 0.173
(0.142) (0.203)
Absolute UE gap ×Pt (γNuP) 0.164 0.065
(0.228) (0.156)
Absolute UE gap ×Pt× voting (δN) 0.585** 0.208
(0.228) (0.219)
Voting (βNv ) 0.192 0.066
(0.125) (0.147)
Voting ×Pt (γNvP) -0.447*** -0.204
(0.161) (0.194)
Abs. UE gap, voting, Pt = 0 (βNu + γNuv) 0.144 0.425**
(0.234) (0.181)
Abs. UE gap, Pt = 1, non-voting (βNu + γNuP) 0.361 0.317
(0.227) (0.202)
Abs. UE gap, Pt = 1, voting (βNu + γNuv + γNuP + δ
N) 0.894*** 0.698***
(0.188) (0.226)
Period FE Yes Yes
President FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,735 1,735
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the effect of regional macroeconomic conditions
and voting status on the number of speeches given by presidents in the rotation scheme, based
on an ordered probit model following Eq. 2.4 augmented with dummy variable Pt and its
interaction terms. The latter allow for differential effects for voting members depending on
whether there has been dissent in the previous meeting (Column 1) or a relatively large surprise
in the previous meeting (Column 2). UE stands for unemployment. Standard errors are in
brackets. Coefficients in bold are statistically significantly different from the top row coefficients
at least at the 10% level. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 2.5: The number of speeches after dissent or a surprise decision
Column 1 in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the results for the number of speeches and
their tone, respectively. For presidents in non-voting years, there is no statistically
significant evidence that the link between speech behaviour and regional conditions
depends on whether the last meeting’s decision was characterised by dissent or not.
The relevant coefficients for the number of speeches and for the tone of speeches
are statistically insignificant. However, in years in which presidents are voting,
there is statistically significant evidence that the number of speeches and the tone
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of their speeches react more strongly to regional economic circumstances after a
dissent than after a unanimous vote.
The middle part of Table 2.5 reports the sum of corresponding coefficients
for the number of speeches, which allows for a straightforward comparison of
the various cases. The reaction by a voting president after an FOMC meeting
with dissent, at 0.894, is more than four times as large as the estimated coefficient
for a non-voting president after a consensual FOMC meeting. The middle part
of Table 2.6 shows that the difference in the reaction of speech tone to regional
circumstances is also around 4 times larger (-0.426 versus -0.099).
Event at previous meeting (Pt)
Dissent Large surprise
(1) (2)
Regional UE (βτu) -0.099 -0.087
(0.129) (0.109)
Regional UE * voting (γτuv) -0.086 -0.123
(0.076) (0.098)
Regional UE ×Pt (γτuP) -0.033 -0.056
(0.124) (0.134)
Regional UE ×Pt× voting (δτ) -0.207* -0.051
(0.101) (0.153)
Voting (βτv) 0.620 0.818
(0.510) (0.693)
Voting ×Pt (γτvP) 1.634** 0.542
(0.750) (0.979)
Regional UE, Pt = 0,voters (βτu + γτuv) -0.185 -0.210
(0.125) (0.127)
Regional UE, Pt = 1,non-voting (βτu + γτuP) -0.132 -0.143
(0.137) (0.162)
Regional UE, Pt = 1,voting (βτu + γτuv + γτuP + δ
τ) -0.426*** -0.317*
(0.148) (0.169)
Period FE Yes Yes
President FE Yes Yes
Observations 586 586
R2 0.630 0.626
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the effect of regional macroeconomic conditions
and voting status on the tone of speeches given by presidents in the rotation scheme, following
Eq. 2.5, augmented with dummy variable Pt and its interaction terms. The latter allow for
differential effects for voting members depending on whether there has been dissent in the
previous meeting (Column 1) or a relatively large surprise in the previous meeting (Column
2). UE stands for unemployment. Standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients in bold are
statistically significantly different from the top row coefficients at least at the 10% level. ***/**/*
denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 2.6: The tone of speeches after dissent or a surprise decision
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Surprise decision. The relationship between speech behaviour and regional
economic circumstances does not seem to depend on whether the previous FOMC
decision has caused a market surprise. The relevant coefficients for voters and
non-voters are estimated to be statistically insignificant.
However, the middle part of Table 2.5 shows that the overall effect of regional
unemployment on the number of speeches for a voter after a surprise decision is,
at 0.698, close to three times as large as the estimated coefficient for a non-voter
after an unsurprising decision. Similarly, the middle part of Table 2.6 shows that
the difference in the reaction of speech tone to regional circumstances is even larger
across these two categories (-0.317 versus -0.087).
The findings on speech behaviour after dissenting votes provide further sup-
port for the involvement hypothesis, and no support for the loss-compensation
hypothesis; the findings on speech behaviour after a surprising decision do not
favour any of the hypotheses.
2.5.3 Voting status and deliberation in the FOMC meeting
The results so far have provided compelling evidence supporting the involvement
hypothesis with regard to communication behaviour in the intermeeting period.
We will now test whether this behavioural pattern prevails during the deliberation
stage at the FOMC meetings. Recall that the FOMC meeting starts with an economy
go-round, where all participants discuss the economic situation. In this round,
Reserve bank presidents discuss, inter alia, the regional economic conditions.
Subsequently, the discussion moves on to the implications for the monetary policy
decisions. Since monetary policy is set for the U.S. aggregate economy, we would
expect regional economic conditions to be playing a lesser role in this part of the
meeting. This meeting structure naturally suggests that it will be important to
analyse the first intervention of each president separately from their entire set of
interventions.
For brevity, we have relegated all results regarding the length of the interven-
tions to the appendix. Appendix Table B.5 shows that hardly any of our regression
variables exert statistically significant effects. The absence of a relationship between
the length of interventions and regional economic conditions or the number of
speeches may be explained with procedural limits of individual presidents’ speak-
ing time. Not every president will be able to freely choose how long he or she
deliberates, which suggests that the intervention length may be a censored outcome
variable.
Studying the tone of the interventions yields more interesting results. We start
our analysis with the analogous regression to the tone of speeches, based on Eq.
2.3, i.e. we test whether the tone of the meeting interventions responds to regional
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unemployment, and whether there are differences between voters and non-voters.
The results are shown in column (1) of Table 2.7 for the tone of the first intervention
of a president at the meeting. They are, once more, supportive of the involvement
hypothesis: the tone of the interventions becomes more negative, the larger the
regional unemployment gap. This is the case for all speakers, but significantly
more so for the voters.
We then expand our analysis to test to what extent speech behaviour and the
interventions at the meeting are linked, first by relating the tone of the intervention
to the tone of the intermeeting speeches and by differentiating the effect for voters
and non-voters, and then by including both regional conditions and speech tone in
our regression, which in this most expanded version is formulated as
Ti,t = µi + µt + βTu udit + β
T




τ τdit + γ
T
τ,vτditvdit + εit (2.6)
As always, we allow for president and meeting fixed effects and cluster standard
errors by president. As these regressions are conditional on presidents having given
speeches in the intermeeting period, we first repeat the earlier analysis that relates
intervention tone to regional unemployment, but condition on the observations
with intermeeting speeches.
First intervention All interventions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Regional UE (βTu ) -0.425*** -0.583* – -0.599** -0.052 -0.154 – -0.158
(0.150) (0.304) (0.281) (0.084) (0.127) (0.121)
Regional UE × voting (γTuv) -0.135* -0.282** – -0.193 -0.042 -0.094 – -0.057
(0.073) (0.130) (0.141) (0.035) (0.058) (0.058)
Speech tone (βTτ ) – – -0.243 -0.240 – – -0.071 -0.070
(0.202) (0.199) (0.049) (0.049)
Speech tone × voting (γTτ,v) – – 0.501* 0.368 – – 0.178** 0.139*
(0.254) (0.281) (0.073) (0.072)
Voting (βTv ) 0.550 1.756* -0.048 1.224 0.269 0.780* 0.181* 0.555
(0.437) (0.916) (0.230) (0.976) (0.252) (0.432) (0.097) (0.434)
Regional UE, voting (βτu + γTuv) -0.560*** -0.865*** – -0.792*** -0.094 -0.248* – -0.215
(0.141) (0.272) (0.280) (0.084) (0.138) (0.139)
Speech tone, voting (βTτ + γTτ,v) – – 0.258 0.128 – – 0.107 0.069
(0.226) (0.240) (0.065) (0.057)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
President FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.145 0.333 0.331 0.339 0.472 0.568 0.569 0.572
Observations 1,714 582 582 582 1,714 582 582 582
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the effect of regional macroeconomic conditions,
the tone of speeches and voting status on the tone of meeting interventions, based on an OLS
model following Eq. 2.6. Columns (1) and (5) include all observations for meeting interventions,
all other columns are conditional on the speaker at the meeting also having delivered at least
one intermeeting speech. The left panel relates to the tone of the first intervention at the FOMC
meeting, the right panel to the tone of all interventions together. Standard errors are in brackets.
Coefficients in bold are statistically significantly different from the top row coefficients at least at
the 10% level. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 2.7: Determinants of the tone of interventions at the FOMC meeting
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The results, reported in columns (2) of Table 2.7, confirm our evidence in favour
of the involvement hypotheses, even at higher levels of statistical significance. For
voters, there is also a somewhat stronger relationship between the tone of the
intermeeting speeches and the tone of the meeting intervention than for non-voters
(see column (3)).
The right panel of Table 2.7 reports results for the tone of all interventions
made by each president during the entire meeting. The relationship with regional
unemployment is absent, as we had expected, given that the regional economic
conditions are primarily discussed in the first go-round. What is interesting, though,
is that the tone of the speeches held in the intermeeting period is more strongly
correlated with the tone of the entire set of interventions for voting presidents than
for the non-voters, suggesting that the intermeeting speeches are more likely to
already provide an indication of the monetary policy inclination of the voters.
2.5.4 Market reaction
The goal of this section is to understand whether the reaction of financial markets
to a speech depends on the voting status of the president delivering the speech.
As before, we limit attention to speeches about monetary policy. To ensure clean
inference, we further restrict our analysis to days on which only a single speech
was given, leaving us with 585 observations. We measure the market reaction as the
absolute daily asset price change, where we focus on constant maturity Treasury
yields with maturities ranging from 3 months to 5 years (for maturities beyond 5
years, we do not find any statistically significant results).
To test for differential market reaction, we regress the absolute value of the
daily change in Treasury yields, |dR|t, on the voting dummy
|dR|t = µi + µdow + βvd,t + εit (2.7)
controlling for president fixed effects µi and day-of-the-week fixed effects, µdow.
The top panel of Table 2.8 presents the benchmark estimates. These show some
first evidence that market moves are smaller on days with speeches by voting
presidents than on days with speeches by non-voting presidents, albeit at low levels
of statistical significance. A regression coefficient of 0.005 implies a change of half a
basis point. To put the size of this difference into perspective, Table 2.8 also reports
the average absolute daily change for the various maturities, and the fraction by
which the reaction to a speech by a voting president differs. The fractions tend to
be substantial, ranging from more than 25% for 3-month rates to slightly above
10% for 5-year rates.
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3-month 6-month 12-month 2-year 5-year
Panel A: benchmark
Voting -0.006* -0.004 -0.005* -0.006* -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Average absolute change 0.023 0.021 0.026 0.036 0.045
Fraction 0.260 0.188 0.191 0.168 0.111
Observations 585 585 585 585 585
R-squared 0.064 0.134 0.163 0.118 0.072
Panel B: pre-Beige Book
Voting -0.008** -0.007*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Average absolute change 0.022 0.021 0.026 0.036 0.045
Fraction 0.357 0.335 0.311 0.225 0.157
Observations 483 483 483 483 483
R-squared 0.069 0.144 0.176 0.128 0.070
Panel C: post-Beige Book
Voting -0.003 0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.006
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Average absolute change 0.026 0.023 0.029 0.036 0.046
Fraction 0.114 0.219 0.035 0.247 0.130
Observations 102 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.325 0.365 0.341 0.403 0.346
Panel D: beyond 2013
Voting -0.005** -0.004** -0.004* -0.006** -0.006*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Average absolute change 0.021 0.019 0.023 0.032 0.042
Fraction 0.244 0.213 0.174 0.186 0.142
Observations 769 769 769 769 769
R-squared 0.069 0.142 0.165 0.128 0.081
Panel E: speeches on Reuters
Voting -0.008** -0.006** -0.005* -0.006 -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Average absolute change 0.023 0.020 0.024 0.034 0.045
Fraction 0.355 0.306 0.206 0.175 0.112
Observations 438 438 438 438 438
R-squared 0.057 0.135 0.166 0.123 0.079
Panel F: speeches from FOMC speak
Voting -0.001 -0.002** -0.003** -0.002 -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Average absolute change 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.021 0.032
Fraction 0.091 0.195 0.243 0.097 0.156
Observations 568 568 568 568 568
R2 0.082 0.102 0.136 0.103 0.073
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the effect of speeches on the daily absolute change in constant maturity treasury
yields, following Eq. 2.7. Panel A shows results for all speeches on days with only one speech. Panels B and C split this sample
into pre- and post-Beige Book release. Panel D extends the speech sample until 2018. Panel E restricts the sample to speeches
reported upon by Reuters. Panel F uses speeches with a time stamp as recorded in the “FOMC speak” database. Rows “average
absolute change” report the average absolute change of the dependent variable for the full sample. Rows “fraction” report the
absolute value of the estimated coefficient on the voting dummy as a fraction of the average absolute change of the dependent
variable. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 2.8: Effect of speeches on Treasury rates on the day of speech
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We also split our sample into the period prior and following the release of the
Beige Book. In our pre-Beige Book sample (panel B), the differences are larger (up
to 36% at the 3-month maturity) and also more significant statistically. In contrast,
no difference is observed for the post-Beige Book sample (panel C), in line with
our earlier evidence. For robustness, we extend our sample to include all monetary
policy speeches until 2018, and replicate our earlier findings, at higher levels of
statistical significance (panel D). Statistical and economic significance also increase
when we condition on speeches that are reported on Reuters (panel E).
Finally, we try to deal with the issue that our speech data does not contain time
stamps, hence we only know the day of a speech, but not the exact time when
it was delivered. Market closing for the treasury yields is at 15:30 Eastern Time,
implying that any speech delivered afterwards affects yields on the subsequent day.
To address this, we rely on “FOMC speak,” an alternative speech dataset provided
by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis,14 which contains the time stamp of a large
number of speeches. This allows us to appropriately time the speeches.
However, the “FOMC speak,” dataset does not differentiate monetary policy
speeches and other speeches. The results in panel F for 568 speeches delivered in
the years 2011-2019 confirm our earlier findings.
We also exploit the around-the-clock nature of currency trade to measure the
impact of speeches. We calculate the absolute change of the Japanese Yen-U.S.
Dollar exchange rate between London fixing and Tokyo close of business, times
that correspond to 11 am Eastern Time and midnight Pacific Time (or 1am Pacific
Time during U.S daylight saving time), respectively.15 The results (not shown for
brevity) show that presidents move also this market less in years they vote. The
difference in impact (estimated at the 10% significance level), compared to the
average absolute daily change in the exchange rate, is, at 20%, substantial.
Consistency of market reaction and presidents’ behaviour. Why do markets
react less to speeches by presidents in years they vote than when they do not
vote? We suggest an explanation based on the type of information conveyed in
the speeches. The speeches in our sample convey information about economic
conditions, but also help understanding how the upcoming FOMC meeting will
evolve, e.g. what will be contentious topics, which side will prevail, and hence what
decision will be taken. Both information types are ultimately important for asset
prices, but we argue that the first type is directly relevant for markets, whereas
14https://www.stlouisfed.org/fomcspeak/viewbydate.
15Based on the speeches with time stamp from “FOMC speak,” the time window for the treasury
yields appropriately allocates 68% of all speeches (and wrongly allocates the speeches given later in
the day). The exchange rate time window would allocate 63% of all speeches correctly, and generates
a mismatch for the speeches given early in the day. The two time windows do therefore nicely
complement one another, as they capture the set of speeches that is missing from the other time
window.
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the second type matters indirectly, through the monetary policy decision resulting
from the meeting deliberation.
If the second, indirect influence were dominant, one would expect presidents to
influence markets more in years they vote; after all, their influence on the FOMC
decision is more direct thanks to their votes. However, the market reacts less to the
speeches of voting presidents. This would either imply that the market behaves
irrationally, and consistently so, or that this indirect influence is not dominant.
This leaves the possibility that the first, direct influence of a speech is dominant,
i.e. markets are primarily looking for signals about the state of the economy.
We argue that this may explain why markets consistently pay more attention
to presidents’ speeches in years they do not vote. The argument relies on the
assumption that markets for U.S. government securities and foreign exchange are
more interested in national than in regional information. Thus, market participants
need to distinguish national from regional information when they digest a speech
– they face a signal extraction problem. Speech characteristics – their tone and
number – reflect both types of information, whether a president votes or not.
Benchmark No meeting FE
(1) (2)
Absolute UE gap (βNu ) 0.277 0.255*
(0.186) (0.134)
Absolute UE gap × voting (γN) 0.264* 0.245
(0.158) (0.150)
Voting (βNv ) -0.028 -0.028
(0.115) (0.133)
Absolute UE gap, voters (βNu + γN) 0.550*** 0.500***
(0.184) (0.156)
Period FE Yes No
President FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,735 1.735
Notes: Estimates of ordered probit model for number of speeches. See notes to Table 2.3.
Column (1) replicates the benchmark specification (Eq. 2.2) in column (2) of that table. Column
(2) is based on the benchmark specification, but without meeting fixed effects.
Table 2.9: What does the market learn from the number of speeches?
Consider Table 2.9, with two regressions for the number of speeches that
presidents give during intermeeting periods. Column 1 is the benchmark model
from Table 2.3; column 2 uses the same specification, except that we removed the
period fixed effects. Period fixed effects capture what is common to all districts
in an intermeeting period, including the general, U.S.-wide economic situation.
A comparison with the benchmark results in column 1 suggests that the speech
activity of non-voting presidents is driven by regional economic conditions that, by
and large, move in tandem with U.S.-wide economic conditions. Instead, in years
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that they vote, their speech activity is driven both by economy-wide conditions
and by idiosyncratic regional conditions.
Benchmark No meeting FE
(1) (2)
Regional UE (βτu) -0.112 -0.186**
(0.119) (0.071)
Regional UE × voting (γτ) -0.156** -0.214***
(0.062) (0.047)
Voting (βτv) 1.139** 1.434***
(0.425) (0.369)
Regional UE, voting (βτu + γτ) -0.268** -0.400***
(0.127) (0.076)
Period FE Yes No
President FE Yes Yes
Observations 586 586
R2 0.625 0.303
Notes: Speech tone is the dependent variable. See notes to Table 2.4. Column (1) replicates
the benchmark specification (Eq. 2.3) in column (2) of that table. Column (2) is based on the
benchmark specification, but without meeting fixed effects.
Table 2.10: What does the market learn from the tone of speeches?
Without the period fixed effects, regional unemployment determines the tone
of presidents’ speeches, albeit to different degrees, whether they vote or not. The
introduction of the period fixed effects shows that in years in which they do not vote,
the tone of their speeches does not react to idiosyncratic regional unemployment,
whereas in years in which they vote, it does to a significant extent.
This implies that market participants who are interested in learning about
general economic conditions from the speeches of a president face a harder signal
extraction problem in years that the president votes than in the other years. It is
then rational for markets to react less to a speech in such years.
2.6 Conclusion
Committee decision-making is ubiquitous, in the economy as well as in politics.
Some committees exhibit a changing membership or rotation of voting rights
among the membership. In this paper, we have investigated empirically whether
the right to vote affects the behaviour of committee members, using the FOMC as a
case study. We exploit the rotation of voting rights among Federal Reserve Bank
presidents on the FOMC, as it is exogenous to economic conditions and therefore
allows for a causal analysis. It is the role of the Federal Reserve Bank presidents
to gather intelligence about economic conditions in their Federal Reserve district,
and to bring this information to the FOMC meeting, as a basis for the ultimate
monetary policy decisions.
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It is ex ante unclear in what direction the voting rotation affects behaviour. On
the one hand, there could be loss-compensation behaviour, which would imply that
during years without the right to vote, the inter-meeting speeches and interventions
at the meeting react more strongly to the regional economic conditions. On the
other hand, having the right to vote could make Bank presidents more involved,
such that their speeches and interventions would be more dependent on regional
economic conditions when they have voting status.
Our empirical results support the involvement hypothesis, both when studying
intermeeting speeches and interventions at the meeting. In addition, the evidence
shows that financial market participants react less strongly to presidents’ speeches
when they are voting. While this might seem counterintuitive at first, our findings
help to explain why: the stronger emphasis on regional conditions by voting
presidents implies that it is more difficult for the market to extract signals on
U.S.-wide economic conditions and monetary policy.
Our empirical results allow the following conclusions. First, the design of
rotation schemes for voting rights deserves special attention because the committee
members adjust their behaviour endogenously according to voting status. Further
research should assess to what extent this change in behaviour is desirable and, if
not, how it could be mitigated. Second, strategic behaviour of committee members
is already at play in the run up to the meeting. While this aspect is studied in some
theoretical papers (e.g. Swank et al., 2008), the empirical literature largely ignores
this aspect. Further research on this topic seems promising. Third, consistent with
investor rationality, financial markets appear to internalise the communication
decisions by committee members. Our findings suggest that future research on the
financial market reaction to public announcements might benefit from considering
the communication choices of policy makers.
Chapter 3
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3.1 Introduction
The Mundell-Fleming Trilemma states that floating exchange rates ensure indepen-
dence of domestic monetary policy under free capital flows. If a country wants to fix
its exchange rate, it would need to impose capital controls or give up its monetary
policy independence. Financial globalization has worsened these trade-offs (Rey,
2013; Obstfeld, 2015). Recent research on the topic focuses on the role of global
banks and asset prices. At the same time, non-financial firms make increasing use
of international bond markets, even in pursuit of financial returns (Bruno and Shin,
2017; Calomiris et al., 2019) or to avoid capital controls and taxes (Coppola et al.,
2020).
The contribution of this paper is to identify the real effects of US monetary
spillovers and shed light on the role of non-financial firms’ balance sheets and
trade activities. I apply a corporate finance identification scheme to quarterly data
for firms in 36 countries between 2003 and 2017. I estimate how real investment by
these non-US firms responds to US monetary surprises.
I find that reductions in investment after US monetary tightening, dubbed real
spillovers, are significant even in countries with floating exchange rates (floaters)
and considerably larger in countries with managed or pegged exchange rates (non-
floaters). The stronger spillovers in non-floaters, relative to floaters, arise from a
relatively stronger response by firms with high leverage. Exchange rate fluctuations
contribute to the heterogeneity because they amplify spillovers for non-floaters
but dampen it for floaters. I rationalize my findings in a basic framework of
endogenous currency choice. It highlights how limited exchange rate flexibility
allows smaller and less productive firms to borrow in foreign currency, which
magnifies financial vulnerability resulting from high leverage.
The identification idea employed in this paper is that firms which have debt
denominated in US Dollars (USD) maturing shortly after FOMC announcements
are more exposed to the monetary policy changes than firms that do not. This
effect arises in a simple theoretical framework in which firms finance investment
and maturing debt through new borrowing. New borrowing faces a net worth
constraint because not all future income is pledgeable to investors. In the setup,
interest rate increases do not affect the net worth of firms whose debt structure is
constant because the present values (PV) of assets and debts fall equally. Instead,
firms with maturing debt see the PV of debts decline by less than the PV of assets,
leading to a drop in net worth and feasible borrowings.2 I combine this insight with
the argument that the exact timing of debt maturity within a given FOMC period,
2Below I discuss related cash flow effects, working through higher interest expenses or discrepan-
cies between repayment values and issuance amounts, which could strengthen these effects.
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whether it occurs before or after the FOMC, is plausibly exogenous if the debt is
not short-term. Similar arguments on the timing of maturing debt have been used
in earlier studies. For instance Almeida et al. (2012), Duval et al. (2020), Casas et al.
(2020) and Benmelech et al. (2019) exploit pre-existing refinancing needs during
financial crises.3
To implement my identification approach, I assemble globally comprehensive
corporate bond data, the union of issuance data sets by Mergent, SDC and Dealogic,
and merge it with quarterly accounting data on non-US firms from Compustat
Global and Worldscope. I further complement this data with Capital IQ, for details
on firms’ debt composition, and firms’ exporter status from Worldscope and Orbis.
The combined data set allows me to identify, for every quarter, firms that have
debt maturing shortly after FOMC announcements and those that do not. I then
regress quarterly physical investment on an interaction of the maturing variable
with the US monetary policy shock, controlling for firm and country×date fixed
effects and an array of firm characteristics.
It is crucial to stress that the maturing-debt-identification captures effects on
investment due to changes in financing conditions caused by US monetary policy. Non-
financial spillovers, such as direct effects of changes in aggregate US demand or
information released by the FOMC, that affect all firms equally, are absorbed in the
fixed effects. My main estimate, the semi-elasticity of investment with respect to
monetary shocks, thus measures the real effects of a firm-financing-spillover channel
of US monetary policy.
My analysis yields four main findings. The first key finding is that US monetary
spillovers to investment are significant even in countries with floating exchange
rates (floaters) but considerably larger in countries with managed or pegged
exchange rates (non-floaters). I estimate that, after a 25 basis point surprise
monetary policy tightening in the US, non-US firms with maturing USD debt reduce
their investment relative to those without maturing debt by -2.5% in floaters and
-6.5% in non-floaters, which corresponds to 30% and 75% of the overall standard
deviation in the quarterly growth rate of physical capital. For comparison, the
average effect for firms with USD debt (without the maturing-debt dummy) implies
that they reduce their investment on average by -1.3%, relative to firms without
USD debt. The stronger investment responses in non-floaters, relative to floaters,
persist when controlling for differences in financial development. Stricter capital
controls are associated with smaller, yet statistically and economically significant
spillovers.
My investment-shock elasticities can be decomposed into a) sensitivity of
3In ongoing follow-up work, Schubert, Tietz, and Timmer (2020) use a similar argument to mine
to identify the real effects of credit market frictions in the United States.
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financing conditions and b) sensitivity of investment to financing conditions. In a
two-stage least squares framework, using daily country-level corporate bond yields,
I show that the two factors explain each around half of the stronger spillovers
in non-floaters:4 First, consistent with the empirical literature, the US monetary
shocks cause larger fluctuations in corporate bond yields in non-floaters than in
floaters. Second, and more puzzlingly, a unit change in financing conditions (bond
yields) is associated with larger investment reductions by firms in non-floaters than
in floaters.
For my second key finding, I estimate the investment responses on sub-samples
capturing the two main candidate firm dimensions: Balance sheet health, which
I measure as net leverage (debt minus cash over assets), and trade activity, for
which I classify firms as exporters and non-exporters based on whether they report
international sales or not.
The stronger spillovers in non-floaters are due to a relatively stronger response
of highly leveraged firms. While high-leverage firms are more responsive than
low-leverage firms within both country groups, the gap is significantly larger
among them. The differential response by non-floaters, relative to floaters, does
not differ significantly between exporters and non-exporters.
My third key finding is that exchange rate fluctuations contribute to the stronger
spillovers in non-floaters relative to floaters because they amplify the firm-financing
spillover channel for non-floaters but dampen it in floaters. I show this by augment-
ing the baseline specification with an interaction of the maturing-dummy and the
exchange rate change over FOMC announcement days. This interaction captures
how spillovers via firm financing conditions depend on the exchange rate change.
The effect of interest rate shocks on investment increases in magnitude for
floaters and gets smaller for non-floaters. In other words, in floaters (non-floaters),
a surprise US tightening without ensuing home currency depreciation leads to
stronger (weaker) investment reductions than a hike with home depreciation.
For non-floaters, the maturing×depreciation coefficient is estimated to be nega-
tive. Investment reductions caused through the financing channel are larger if the
home currency depreciates. These adverse effects are concentrated in high-leverage
firms and non-exporters, which points to negative net worth effects consistent with
recent evidence (Aguiar, 2005; Salomao and Varela, 2018; Banerjee et al., 2020).
Instead, for floaters, the maturing×depreciation coefficient is estimated to be
positive, which is concentrated in non-exporters. This could be consistent with
4I instrument the firm financing costs with the monetary shock. The exclusion restriction is that,
for the firms with maturing debt, the US monetary shocks affect investment only through their effect
on financing costs. I verify the 1st stage estimates of stronger asset price responses in non-floaters in
a range of robustness exercises, regressing aggregate and bond-level corporate yields, and sovereign
bond yields on the monetary shocks.
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that firm financing conditions reflect improved sales prospects for non-exporters.
Improvements in sales by non-exporters following home depreciations are predicted
under USD trade-invoicing (Goldberg and Tille, 2008; Gopinath, 2015) thanks to
expenditure switching by domestic importers towards local products (Boz et al.,
2017; Casas et al., 2017), a conjecture I confirm in the data. The absence of
similar exchange rate effects for exporters is equally consistent with USD invoicing,
precluding competiveness gains and adverse net worth effects alike.
My fourth and final finding rationalizes the stronger spillovers in non-floaters
(finding 1) being driven by high leverage firms (finding 2) and amplified by
exchange rate fluctuations (finding 3). In a simple theoretical framework, I find that
limited exchange rate fluctuation allows fundamentally weaker firms to borrow
in foreign currency, which results in higher sensitivity to foreign monetary policy
that, in turn, is increasing in firm leverage.
My framework is based on the model of borrowing currency choice presented
in Maggiori et al. (2018). In a small open economy, firms that borrow in USD (the
foreign currency) are larger and more productive compared to home-currency-
only borrowers, because issuing debt in USD requires a fixed cost. In addition,
tapping the Dollar market implies exposure to additional types of shocks, which
more productive firms can cope better with. These firm-type selection channels
find empirical support in Maggiori et al. (2018) and Salomao and Varela (2018).
I argue that exchange rate pegs impinge on the firm-type selection by reducing
the variation of exchange rates which lowers the ex-ante likelihood of adverse
exchange rate moves.5 The relative difference in size and productivity between
USD- and home-currency-only borrowers is therefore smaller in countries with
lower (expected/announced) exchange rate variability. I confirm this conjecture
in the data. Size and productivity gaps between USD- and home-currency-only
borrowers are smaller in non-floaters than in floaters. The smaller size/productivity
gaps in non-floaters raises sensitivity to foreign monetary policy at the intensive
margin (through weaker balance sheets) as well as at the extensive margin (higher
prevalence of USD borrowers).
In summary, my findings suggest that financial frictions strengthen the Trilemma,
which helps to explain in two ways how the traditional Trilemma is consistent with
the global financial cycle (Rey, 2013). First, in my framework and in the data, ex-
change rate management is associated with an endogenous rise in foreign currency
borrowing and financial vulnerability, leading to a higher sensitivity to the global
5While I consider risk-neutral firms, changes in the variance of the exchange rate matter because
the exchange rate is log-normally distributed. Concerning the investors’ view, I assume that con-
sequent changes in the relative prices of corporate bonds do not offset the direct effects on firm
incentives. This assumption is supported by the finding that the special role of the USD (Maggiori,
2017; Jiang et al., 2018) extends to the market of corporate bonds (Liao, 2020; Maggiori et al., 2020).
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financial cycle. Second, exchange rate fluctuations impinge on the international
transmission of financing conditions, in ways that are consistent with import-driven
expenditure switching, USD invoicing and adverse balance sheet effects. Overall,
exchange rates then amplify the global financial cycle for non-floaters and dampen
it for floaters.
In this argument, managed exchange rates are associated with stronger spillovers,
not only because local monetary policy is highjacked by the implementation of
exchange rate management, but because they exacerbate financial vulnerability and
forgo benefits from exchange rate adjustments. These conclusions bear important
consequences for economic theory and policy makers.
For theory, my findings suggest to further integrate the literature on financial
globalization and its consequences with traditional, non-financial, arguments about
the benefits of exchange rate flexibility. One avenue is to shed light on the asset
pricing implications of exchange rates for liabilities by exporters vs non-exporters.
For policy makers, my findings provide a balanced view on the cost and
benefits of exchange rate flexibility. On the one hand, my estimates are in line with
the traditional Trilemma: Exchange rate management must be expected to entail
stronger monetary spillovers while a freely floating exchange rate will absorb at
least partly foreign shocks. On the other hand, the stronger spillovers are driven by
highly leveraged firms, which respond adversely to home currency depreciations.
Exchange rate pegs beget inadequate currency mismatch and fear of floating (Calvo
and Reinhart, 2002) thus becomes self-justifying. For monetary policy as well as
financial stability objectives, policy tools such as macroproduential regulation and
lending standards might be needed to reduce spillovers.
Non-financial firms tapping international bond markets imply that shoring up
the banking sector is insufficient to insulate an economy from foreign monetary
shocks. The extensive and sophisticated use of tax havens (Coppola et al., 2020)
further means that even capital controls might prove illusive in the future.
Related literature. My paper contributes to the literatures on the international
transmission of monetary policy and the consequences of financial globalization.
There is a broad range of macro-empirical studies analyzing international
monetary spillovers. One strand focuses on spillovers to asset prices, mostly
interest rates. Klein and Shambaugh (2015), Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010), and
Kearns et al. (2020) find that interest rates in peggers are more responsive to foreign
monetary policy. Kearns et al. (2020) show that spillovers are strongest at the long-
end of the yield curve and increase with financial openness. Obstfeld et al. (2019)
find that peggers are more sensitive to global financial shocks. Kalemli-Özcan
(2019) shows that local credit conditions in Emerging Markets depend relatively
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more on capital inflows and that floating exchange rates help mitigate related
monetary spillovers.6
Another strand examines spillovers on economic activity. Di Giovanni and
Shambaugh (2008) find that peggers experience stronger spillovers than floaters
while Dedola et al. (2017) do not find a significant difference. Iacoviello and
Navarro (2019) find stronger spillovers for peggers within Advanced Economies
but not within Emerging Economies. Ca’Zorzi et al. (2020) document financial and
real spillovers from the US to Europe and vice versa. All of these studies find that
US monetary tightening is associated with a drop in economic activity abroad. To
the contrary, Ilzetzki and Jin (2013) find that, between 1990 and 2007, US monetary
tightening was associated with a rise in foreign industrial production, in Advanced
and Emerging Economies alike. I contribute to this macro-empirical literature with
novel micro-data estimates of the real effects of spillovers, focusing on non-financial
firms, and firm-level channels to explain heterogeneity across countries.
The micro-empirical literature on monetary spillovers focuses mostly on finan-
cial variables. Bräuning and Ivashina (2019), Temesvary et al. (2018), Morais et al.
(2019), Giovanni et al. (2017) show that US monetary policy drives significantly
foreign bank credit and bond issuances. Instead, I provide estimates of the real
effects for a broad set of countries. Also analyzing firm-level data but focusing on
the effects of exchange rates in general, Banerjee et al. (2020), Salomao and Varela
(2018), Casas et al. (2020) and Bruno and Shin (2019) provide evidence that home
currency depreciations affect firms adversely through balance sheet channels.
Contractionary effects of home currency depreciations have long been studied
in macro theory, often with a financial accelerator-type mechanism and motivated
by currency crises. (Krugman, 1999; Aghion et al. 2001, 2004; Céspedes et al., 2004)
Akinci and Queralto (2018) find large monetary spillovers in a DSGE, in which
weaker local balance sheets lead to larger UIP deviations, amplifying the financial
accelerator.
Organization of paper. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 3.3 introduces the
empirical setup. Section 3.4 presents the main results on macro heterogeneity.
Section 3.5 explores which firm-types drive the macro heterogeneity. Section 3.6
presents a simple conceptual framework to resolve the remaining puzzle and back-
up the empirical findings. Section 3.7 revists the Trilemma debate. Section 3.8
concludes.
6Other important papers are Gilchrist et al. (2019), Burger et al. (2017), Albagli et al. (2019),
Bekaert et al. (2020), Shah (2017), Bowman et al. (2015), Fratzscher et al. (2018), Ehrmann et al. (2011),
Uribe and Yue (2006), and Bredin et al. (2010).
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3.2 Data description
I create a quarterly firm-panel that combines Compustat Global and Worldscope
data with several bond issuance data sets. On each part, Appendix C.3 contains
details.
Firm-level variables. Following Ottonello and Winberry (2018), my main
measure of investment is the quarterly log-change in physical capital ∆kp,t, where
kp,t is the capital stock net of depreciation. I further construct standard variables
such as book leverage (total debt divided by total assets), cash flow over total assets,
and sales growth. Where appropriate I convert values to home currency units and
deflate using the local GDP price index.
I complement the standard accounting data in two ways. First, I use Capital IQ
data to enrich the information on firms’ liability structure, in particular keeping
track of foreign currency debt and debt issued at variable interest rates. Second,
I flag firms as exporters if they report sales outside of their home country, using
Worldscope’s annual geographic segment data or Orbis if the former is not available.
Bond issuance data. The bond-level data is the union of three sources: Mer-
gent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD), SDC Platinum New Issues and
Dealogic. Bond information includes dates of issuance and maturity, issuance
amount, coupon, yield to maturity and currency denomination.7 I merge the bond
data with the firm-quarter panel so that I observe the bonds issued or maturing for
each firm-quarter.
Country classifications. I classify countries, at quarterly frequency, as floating,
managed, or pegged exchange rate regimes against the US Dollar based on the
de facto scheme by Ilzetzki et al. (2019). For example, I treat the Euro, as well as
currencies pegged to the Euro, as floating. In my regression analysis, I distinguish
between floaters and non-floaters (managed and pegged), because I find that results
for countries in the “managed” category are much closer to the “pegged” category
than to floaters.8
For capital account policies, I use the index provided in Chinn and Ito (2006).
For financial development, I use the IMF’s financial development index.
Sample summary statistics. The final sample covers 10431 firms from 36
countries. From these countries, 23 are classified as high income countries and 19
as floaters (at the end of sample).9 The number of firms per country range from 15
7My global bond data set is similar to and extends the ones presented in Gozzi et al. (2012),
Gozzi et al. (2008), Calomiris et al. (2019), Bruno and Shin (2017).
8My choice of a de-facto scheme is based on the evidence in Calvo and Reinhart (2002) that
actual exchange rate policy often deviates from the official one. It is also important to note that even
countries with de facto pegs experience exchange rate fluctuations.
9Table C.19 in Appendix C.3.1 provides details. The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China,
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
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∆kp,c,t Assets(USD,m) Debt/TA (Mat-Debt)/Debt
Not-Float Float Not-Float Float Not-Float Float Not-Float Float
Mean 1.83 0.41 760.5 1527.4 27.51 25.14 15.96 16.50
p25 −1.65 −1.63 100.5 136.6 13.85 11.56 1.37 1.24
p50 0.44 −0.29 264.9 387.3 26.52 23.24 5.79 6.01
p75 4.47 1.88 741.0 1313.3 39.68 36.82 22.24 23.16
SD 9.14 6.32 1447.5 3405.3 16.73 16.48 21.79 24.07
Notes: All growth rates/ratios expressed in percentage points. (Mat-Debt)/Debt is the maturing
amount of USD denominated debt over liabilities, statistics computed conditional on non-zero
values. TA is book value of total assets. Debt is book value of debt. ∆kp,c,t is the quarterly
log-change in net property, plant and equipment. The full sample standard deviation of ∆kp,c,t
is 8.3%. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises (author’s update of Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009) excluded.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics by exchange rate regime
in Cyprus to 1201 in China, the latter contributing around 10% of total observations.
Table C.5 in Appendix C.1 shows that my main finding is robust to excluding any
particular country.
On average, a firm remains in the sample for 20 quarters. Utilities, financial and
public sector firms are excluded. The sample starts in 2003 Q1 and ends in 2016
Q4 (limited by availability of high-frequency monetary shocks). I exclude years
and countries flagged as crises by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and quarters with
unscheduled FOMC meetings.
Tables 3.1 provides summary statistics of key firm fundamentals. Consistent
with country-level data, firms in non-floaters exhibit higher, more volatile invest-
ment rates, higher leverage and are generally smaller than in floaters. The maturing
debt for a given quarter and firm accounts on average for around 15% of total debt,
even though the median size is smaller, around 5%. The size of maturing debt, and
its distribution, appears roughly of similar size in floaters and non-floaters.
3.3 Empirical setup: Identifying real effects of spillovers
Why are firms with maturing debt more exposed? Consider the effects of an
interest rate increase in a setup in which firms finance investment and maturing
debt through new borrowing which is subject to a borrowing constraint. Firms
whose debt structure is constant see the present values (PV) of their assets and
debts fall equally. Their net worth is constant. Now consider firms that have
debt maturing just at the moment of the interest rate increase, and who have to
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom,
Vietnam.
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refinance at higher rates. For those firms, the PV of debts declines by less than
that of assets because the newly issued debt reflects the rate change. Firms with
maturing debt thus experience a drop in net worth and feasible borrowings, relative
to those without maturing debt. I formalize this argument in a simple theoretical
framework in Section 3.6. I combine this with the insight that the exact timing of
debt maturity within a given quarter, whether it occurs before or after the FOMC,
should be exogenous as long as it is not short-term debt.10 The tentative FOMC
schedule (link) is known usually for one year in advance (always for the “next
year”), and corporate bonds usually have original maturities between 5-8 years.
In addition, there are several other factors that appear more important for the
exact issuance timing (and, given fixed maturity, also the exact timing of maturity),
including market conditions, rebalancing of bond indices, and requirements by the
deal-managing banks.11 Figure C.2 in App. C.2.2 shows that the corporate bond
maturity is approximately uniformly distributed over the FOMC cycle. Lastly, my
use of monetary policy shocks adds an additional layer of identification as they
capture the unanticipated part of monetary policy announcements.
Appendices C.4.1 and C.2.2 provide direct evidence on the effect of monetary
shocks on corporate bond issuances. I show that corporate bond yields of issuances
after FOMC announcements are significantly affected by the associated monetary
shocks and that maturing debt raises significantly the probability of bond issuances.
Capturing maturing debt in regressions. I define a dummy variable that
indicates for each firm-quarter whether the firm has debt maturing in different
sub-periods of the quarter. As baseline, the dummy for firm p is defined as
Mat$p,t−1 =
{
1 if USD debt matures between FOMC2t−1 and FOMC1t
0 otherwise
(3.1)
where FOMC2t−1 and FOMC1t denote the last FOMC in previous quarter and
the first FOMC in the current quarter respectively. My main focus is on debt
denominated in US Dollars, but I also report results based on home-currency debt.
In Table C.1 in Appendix C.1, I show that my main finding is robust to varying the
timing assumption.12
Measure of monetary policy. My baseline measure of unexpected changes in
10I am not the first one to use this timing argument. Duval et al. (2020), Almeida et al. (2012) exploit
refinancing needs during the 2008 crisis and Benmelech et al. (2019) during the Great Depression.
More broadly, refinancing channels of monetary policy have been studied in Greenwood (2002),
Eichenbaum et al. (2018) and Wong (2019).
11Based on conversations with market participants involved in corporate bond issuances in
London. Contacts available upon request.
12In defining this time period, there is a trade-off between a) capturing all firms with increased
exposure (lengthening the period), b) ensuring a sharp measure focused on the FOMC announcement
(shortening the period) and c) the lag with which economic consequences of financial shocks
materialize. Equation 3.1 aims to offer a balanced solution.
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US monetary policy, mpt, is the high frequency response in fed funds futures
around FOMC announcements provided in Jarociński and Karadi (2020). These
shocks are based on 3-month-ahead future contracts, and measure changes in policy
expectations at slightly longer horizon than the traditional Kuttner (2001)-style
shocks based on current-month futures. I find that mpt remains highly relevant
during the zero-lower bound period. During the ZLB, mpt continues to explain
roughly the same share of variation in 2-year US Treasury yields (R2) over FOMC
announcement days and, crucially, the variation in 2-year yields declined only
marginally during that period relative to before 2009. (Table C.23, Appendix C.1)
Specification. I regress firm-level investment on the monetary policy shock
and an interaction of the maturing debt dummy with the monetary policy shock.
Equation 3.2 presents the baseline regression specification.
∆kp,c,t = ap + ac,t + b1 mp$t−1 + b2 Mat
$





+ τ1Xp,t−1 + τ2 mp$t−1 × Xp,t−1 + εp,t
where ∆kp,c,t is the quarterly log-change in net property, plant and equipment
of firm p from t − 1 to t (end of quarters) standardized by its overall standard
deviation. Mat$p,t−1 is the maturing-debt dummy defined in Equation 3.1. mp
$
t−1 is
the US monetary policy shock measured at FOMC2t−1, the last FOMC meeting of
quarter t− 1. Xp,t−1 is a vector of controls measured at previous quarter: real sales
growth, cash flow over assets, log of total assets, book leverage (debt over assets),
cash holdings, variable-rate debt (both over assets), and a dummy equal to 1 if
firm p has USD debt outstanding at any point over the sample. I do not control for
Tobin’s Q in my baseline to avoid losing observations (Appendix Table C.4 reports
a robustness test). ap and ac,t are firm and country×date fixed effects respectively.
Between- and within-group effects of maturing debt. Table 3.2 introduces the
maturing-debt scheme. Column 1 reports benchmark results. The link between the
monetary shocks and investment unconditional on firm variables is insignificant.
The insignificance is not surprising because monetary policy affects investment
through multiple, potentially offsetting, channels (e.g. financing, information,
trade).
In column 2, the monetary shock is interacted with a dummy for USD debt
and includes country×date fixed effects, absorbing all observed and unobserved
quarterly fluctuations at the country level. The estimates imply that, after a
1pp surprise monetary tightening, firms with USD debt outstanding reduce their
investment by 0.6 standard deviations, relative to firms without USD debt. This
amounts to a -5% drop in the quarterly percentage change in physical capital.
Columns 3 and 4 show that investment reductions by firms with maturing Dollar
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Dep-var: ∆kp,c,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mp$t−1 −0.652
(0.545)








Country×date FE N Y Y Y
Int-Controls N N N Y
Obs 208,479 208,479 208,479 208,479
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.173 0.180 0.181
Notes: Estimates of equation: ∆kp,c,t = β mp$t−1× Mat
$
p,t−1 + τ mp
$
t−1×USDfirmp +~ap,t + εp,t,
∆kp,c,t is the log change in net PPE, normalized by its standard deviation. Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy
equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. mp$t−1 is
the high-frequency response of fed futures from same FOMC in pp. (from Jarociński and Karadi,
2020). All specs include~ap,t, denoting firm-, fiscal-quarter-FE and firm controls. Firm controls
(at previous quarter) are real sales growth, cash flow, log assets, leverage, cash/TA, variable-rate
debt/TA. Int-controls are interactions of mp$t−1 with the latter four controls. Standard errors
two-way clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises (update of
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) excluded.
Table 3.2: Investment, monetary shock, and maturing debt: The financing spillover channel
debt, relative to those without, are considerably larger, on average around 1.5
standard deviations.
My estimates isolate the financing channel and do not imply that the level of
investment changes by the same amount. Since the monetary shocks might work
through other channels, the total effect on investment may be a smaller reduction
or even an increase in investment.
Including interactions of the firm controls with the monetary shock renders the
USDfirmp-shock interaction insignificant, while it hardly changes the coefficient of
the maturing×shock interaction. It highlights that the differential response by firms
with USD debt per se is endogenous and that it is captured well by the interaction
controls. It validates the maturing-debt-timing variable as capturing an exogenous
increase in exposure.13
13Table C.13 in Appendix C.1 provides an additional exogeneity test, verifying that the firm
characteristics are not significantly related to the debt maturity timing.
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3.4 Macro heterogeneity
3.4.1 Heterogeneity across country groups
Table 3.3 investigates how the financing spillover channel varies across key macroe-
conomic dimensions: Exchange rate regime, financial openness and development.
Spillovers strongest for non-floaters with open capital account. The classic
Trilemma predicts that, under free capital flows (also dubbed open capital ac-
count or financial openness), exchange rate management implies loss of monetary
independence and stronger influence of foreign monetary policy.
I first assess the role of financial openness. Column 2 augments the baseline
specification with a triple interaction of maturing×shock with an index of financial
openness KOc,t from Chinn and Ito (2006). KOc,t is normalized such that an increase
means a lower degree of openness (stronger capital controls). The coefficient on
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 then captures spillovers to investment conditional on openness.
The estimates show that spillovers are smaller in economies that are less financially
open, confirming the notion that capital controls help to insulate the economy.
In column 3, I then include a triple interaction with a dummy capturing
non-floaters. 1nfltc,t equals 1 if firm p’s home country c does not have a floating
exchange rate against the US Dollar.14 My normalization of KOc,t ensures that
the coefficient on mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t captures the hypothesis posed by the
Trilemma: Conditional on financial openness, non-floating exchange rates should
lead to stronger spillovers. To focus on this hypothesis, I will adhere to this
specifiction in all of the remaining analysis.
In column 3, the large and negative coefficient on mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t con-
firms the hypothesis that, conditional on openness, non-floaters experience stronger
spillovers. Investment reductions by firms with maturing USD debt, relative to
those without, are markedly stronger in countries with non-floating exchange
rates than in those with floating exchange rates. Equally important, the spillovers
to floaters with open capital account (coefficient on mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1) is still sta-
tistically and economically significant. The latter contradicts the Trilemma and
confirms Rey (2013)’s argument that the global financial cycle implies that countries
will always experience strong influences from US monetary policy. Importantly,
these estimates identify the financing spillover channel and are not driven by e.g.
correlated business cycles.
Financial development does not explain it all. A country’s exchange rate
14“Not-floating” groups together pegs and managed exchange rates. Table C.3 shows that the
effect for the sample of managed exchange rates alone lies between those for floaters and pegs, albeit
clearly more closely to the peggers. I therefore keep together managed exchange rates and pegs as
“non-floating.”
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Dep-var: ∆kp,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −1.586∗∗∗ −1.763∗∗∗ −1.268∗∗ −2.624∗∗∗ −2.208∗∗
(0.505) (0.319) (0.621) (0.745) (0.956)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 ×KOc,t 0.329 0.993∗∗∗ 1.283∗ 1.694∗∗
(0.396) (0.259) (0.757) (0.652)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$




p,t−1 × FinDevc,t −1.252∗∗ −1.143
(0.574) (0.931)
Obs 208,479 208,479 208,479 208,479 208,479
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.182 0.182 0.181 0.182






p,t−1×Zc,t +~ap,t + εp,t, ∆kp,c,t is
the log change in net PPE, normalized by its standard deviation. Zc,t ∈ {KOc,t,1nfltc,t , FinDevc,t}.
KOc,t measures capital openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006;higher values=less open). FinDevc,t is
IMF yearly financial development index (higher values=less developed). KOc,t and FinDevc,t are
standardized by their standard deviations. 1nfltc,t equals 1 if country c has a de-facto not-floating
exchange rate (from Ilzetzki et al., 2019). Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt
maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed
futures from same FOMC in pp. (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). All specs include firm-,
fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction controls. Firm controls (at
previous quarter) are real sales growth, cash flow, log assets, leverage, cash/TA, variable-rate
debt/TA, USD-debt-dummy. Int-controls are interactions of mp$t−1 with the latter five controls.
Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date. Quarterly data from 2003 to 2016, crises
(update of Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) excluded.
Table 3.3: Estimates of the financing spillover channel by exchange rate regime, financial openness
and financial development
regime choice and its development status are linked endogenously. The stronger
response in non-floaters might therefore simply be a reflection of different levels
of financial development. In columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.3, I regress investment
simultaneously on two triple interactions, the maturing×shock interacted with a
dummy for non-floaters and the IMF’s financial development index. The estimates
show that a country’s exchange rate regime remains a statistically and economi-
cally significant determinant of spillover strength when controlling for financial
development.
Persistence, asymmetry, ZLB and other robustness checks. Appendix C.1
offers various robustness checks. First, to check whether the effects on investment
reverse in the subsequent quarters, I estimate dynamics in the maturing×shock
coefficient using local projections á la Jordà (2005). Figure C.1 in the Appendix
shows that the effects are estimated to be negative consistently over time and stay
statistically significant over 3 to 4 quarters. Second, Table C.12 suggests that the
effects have become stronger in the ZLB period but the difference is statistically
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insignificant. The base effect for the pre-ZLB period remains significant. Third,
tightening shocks are associated with somewhat stronger effects than easing shocks,
but this difference is also statistically insignificant. Fourth, in Table C.5 I drop
each country in the sample one by one. Fifth, in Table C.1 I vary the timing
assumption regarding maturing debt and FOMC meetings. In both cases the main
findings are robust. Sixth, Table C.2 shows that my findings remain unchanged if I
estimate the maturing interaction separately on sub-samples corresponding to the
country groups and normalizing the dependent variable with its country-specific
standard deviation. Appendix C.2.1 offers additional discussion of results (incl.
unconventional monetary policy).
3.4.2 Higher sensitivity to or of financing conditions?
Last section showed that real spillovers in non-floaters are considerably larger than
in floaters, even controlling for financial development. This section highlights that
my main measure of spillover strength β̂R, the semi-elasticity of investment w.r.t.
the monetary shock, summarizes multiple steps in the transmission of monetary
policy.
The real spillover heterogeneity can be attributed to two factors. First, dif-
ferences in the sensitivity of financing conditions. US monetary shocks cause
bigger fluctuations in financing conditions for non-floaters. Second, differences in
sensitivity of investment to financing conditions. Firms in non-floaters react more
strongly to a unit change in financing conditions. The following stylized regression
framework illustrates the point formally.
reduced form: investment = β×monetary shock + e (3.3)
true model I: investment = κ × financing cost (3.4)
true model II: financing cost = θ ×monetary shock (3.5)
AAAAI & II =⇒ investment = κ × θ ×monetary shock (3.6)
Equation 3.3 is a simplification of my main regression. Equation 3.4 captures that
what matters for firms’ investment decision is not the monetary shock itself but
their actual cost of financing. In both equations, I abstract from other drivers of
investment because the maturing-debt approach isolates effects due to Fed-induced
changes in financing conditions. Equation 3.5 describes how US monetary policy
affects financing conditions. Equation 3.6 thus concludes that, at least conceptually,
my reduced-form estimates β̂R can be decomposed into the product
βR = κR × θR.
My finding of heterogeneity in the reduced form estimates of real spillovers
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(β̂nflt < β̂float) could be the result of heterogeneity in the sensitivity of financing
costs to US monetary shocks (θnflt 6= θflt), heterogeneity in the firms’ reaction to a
unit change in the financing costs (κnflt 6= κflt) or a combination of both.
I investigate the decomposition empirically in two exercises. First, I estimate
the equations using a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator, using country-level
corporate bond yields to measure financing costs around FOMCs (see Appendix
C.3 for data details). Second, I use the bond-level data used to construct the
maturing-debt dummy to estimate the relationship between the yields at issuance
and the US monetary policy shocks.15
The specification for the 2SLS incorporates the insights from the stylized frame-
work into the previous reduced form specification. I instrument the firm financing
costs with the monetary shock.16 The exclusion restriction is that, for the firms with
maturing debt, the US monetary shocks affect investment only through their effect
on the financing costs. The country-level indices track local currency corporate
bonds. Therefore, I broaden the definition of my maturing dummy to capture also
maturing debt denominated in home currency, denoted as Matallp,t−1. The estimated
effects are smaller but significant when using the dummy only based on USD debt
(consistent with correlated asset prices).
2SLS estimates of spillovers. Table 3.4 reports 2SLS-estimates. Panel 3.4a
shows that the reaction to a unit change in financing costs by firms in non-floaters
is still considerably larger than in floaters (κ̂nflt < κ̂flt). The second stage thereby
rejects the idea that the heterogeneity in investment elasticities is entirely the result
of stronger asset price reaction. The 2SLS estimates are about 3.5 times larger than
the OLS estimates, which is modest according to the meta-study of IV-estimates in
Jiang (2017). In economic terms, the 2SLS estimates are expected to exceed the OLS
estimates as endogenous variations in the corporate bond yields are likely to bias
downward the OLS coefficient on ∆fcp,t ×Matallp,t−1.17
15For 2SLS, I cannot use the corporate bond issuance yields for two reasons. First, it only
includes yields of newly issued bonds, not of those alreay trading. This means that, for each firm,
I do not observe its financing costs in quarters in which it did not issue a bond. Second, since I
capture financing conditions only conditional on issuance, these yields are biased because I miss the
“counterfactual issuances” by firms that decided not to issue or were not able to issue, e.g. due to
market conditions.
16Technically, because of the fixed effects in my specification, I instrument the interaction between
the maturing-debt dummy and firm financing costs with the interaction between the maturing-debt
dummy and the monetary shock.
17For example, consider the arrival of positive news about the economy’s prospect. A direct effect
is that firms raise investment because they expect higher demand. This will apply to all firms. The
coefficient on ∆fcp,t ×Matallp,t−1 reflects the indirect effect of the news on investment via its impact
on financing conditions (felt more strongly by firms with maturing debt). First, the direction of the
indirect effect is ambiguous. Yields might rise if monetary tightening is anticipated, or fall if risk
premia compress. Second, if the direct and indirect effects work in the same direction, it will depend
on their relative magnitude. Thus, the effect of ∆fcp,t ×Matallp,t−1 is more ambiguous if ∆fcp,t is not
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(a) Second stage: κ̂R, investment response to instrumented financing costs
Dep-var: ∆kp,c,t
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
∆fct−1,c ×Matallp,t−1 −0.357∗∗ −1.269∗∗ −0.602∗∗∗ −2.052∗∗
(0.146) (0.599) (0.182) (0.805)
Country Float Float Non-Float Non-Float
Obs 70,604 71,774 135,401 136,705
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.161 0.196 0.194







Adjusted R2 0.213 0.130
Notes: 2SLS estimates of Eq.: ∆kp,c,t = κR∆fct−1,c × Matallp,t−1 +~ap,t + εp,t, ∆fct−1,c denotes the change in
domestic corporate bond yields of country c over the last FOMC announcement of previous quarter.
∆kp,c,t is the log change in net PPE, normalized by its standard deviation. Matallp,t−1 is a dummy
equal to 1 if firm p had debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. mpt is the monetary
shock from same FOMC in pp (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). Includes triple interaction with
openess index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006), thus estimates of maturing interactions are conditional
on financial openness. All specifications include~ap,t, denoting firm-, fiscal-quarter-, country×date
FE; and firm-, and interaction controls. Null of weak instruments is rejected if the F-Stat exceeds
the critical value 16.38 (Stock and Yogo, 2002,10% maximal relative bias, 1 endogenous regressor, 1
instrument). Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and quarter. Quarterly data from 2003 to
2016, crises (update of Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) excluded.
Table 3.4: 2SLS estimates of investment response to financing costs
Panel 3.4b presents the 1st stage estimates. The null of weak instruments is
strongly rejected. Surprise US monetary tightening is associated with significant
increases in local curency corporate bond yields. The reaction is stronger for
non-floaters θ̂nflt > θ̂flt, confirming the notion that the heterogeneity in investment
elasticities (β̂nflt < β̂float) is partly due to stronger sensitivity of financing costs. I
confirm the finding in analog regressions using a country×FOMC panel, in Table
C.22 in Appendix C.4. At the same time, the monetary shock explains a higher
share of the variation in financing costs in floaters, which can be attributed to
more volatile yields in non-floaters. Even though the Fed-induced yield variation is
smaller, relative to total variation, in non-floaters than in floaters, it has a stronger
impact on investment in the second stage. The difference in R2 thus supports the
economic argument why the 2SLS-estimates exceed OLS.
instrumented.
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Spillovers to yields of USD-denominated corporate bonds. Due to data con-
straints, I have to assume in the 2SLS exercise that the reaction of financing
conditions is the same for all firms within a given country. I further have to focus
on the yields of local currency bonds because long time series on yields of USD-
denominated corporate bonds are sparse even at the country-level. To alleviate
concerns arising from these assumptions, I estimate the relationship between the
monetary shocks and corporate bond yields at time of issuance from my bond
issuance data set. Appendix C.4.1 reports the results and details. I find that the
yields of USD-denominated corporate bonds react significantly to the US monetary
shocks. The relationship appears stronger for non-floaters, but the relationship is
noisy and statistically insigificant. Even when taking the estimates at face value,
they imply that the stronger asset price response would not be enough to explain
away the heterogeneity in reduced-form estimates of the investment elasticities.
Appendix C.4.4 summarizes several papers that provide evidence related to
θ and how it varies across country groups. While these studies mostly examine
spillovers to government bond yields, they support the notion that asset price
reaction is stronger in non-floaters (and in EMEs as is often the focus) but that the
relative magnitude is too small to match the heterogeneity in investment elasticities.
3.5 Macro-firm heterogeneity
Real spillovers are around 3 times larger in non-floaters than in floaters (Section
3.4.1). Two factors explain each around half of the stronger spillovers in non-floaters
(Section 3.4.2): First, US monetary shocks cause larger fluctuations in financing
conditions. Second, and more surprisingly, a unit change in financing conditions is
associated with larger investment reductions.
In this section, I investigate why firms in non-floaters react more strongly than
firms in floaters, even after accounting for the stronger asset price response. I
estimate the real effects conditioning simultaneously on firm characteristics and
the exchange rate regime. The two natural candidate dimensions to investigate are
firm balance sheets and international trade activity.
I will do so in terms of the reduced form estimates of investment semi-elasticities
β, not κ, for two reasons. First, my data on the financing costs is at the country-
level and therefore insufficient to estimate the decomposition by firm-type. Second,
the empirical literature suggests that the stronger asset price reaction in certain
country groups is an aggregate phenomenon. While investors differentiate be-
tween Emerging markets with strong and weak fundamentals, they categorically
increase and reduce exposure to certain country types as an asset class. (Burger
et al., 2015; Burger et al., 2017) This notion is further supported by the large
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body of evidence emphasizing the importance of global factors in driving capi-
tal flows. (Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Rey, 2013; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015)
Balance sheets and trade exposure. I estimate the coefficient on the triple interac-
tion mp$t−1 × Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t on different subsamples of firms based on leverage
and exporter status. Since I also control for the triple interaction with KOc,t,
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t captures the hypothesis posed by the Trilemma: Condi-
tional on financial openness, non-floating exchange rates should lead to stronger
spillovers.
Firm type classifications. I label firms as “high leverage” if their net leverage
(debt minus cash over assets) was above the median net leverage computed over
all firms. The complement set of firms are labelled as “low leverage.” As baseline,
I sort on the lagged 4-quarter rolling average of net leverage (Appendix Table C.6
shows robustness under alternatives).
I label firms as exporters if, at any point during the sample period, they report
sales abroad.18 Non-exporters are firms that do not report international sales. I
discuss below that both exporters and non-exporters can be importers. Utility
firms (usually non-exporters) are excluded, ensuring that they do not bias the
comparison.
The sample covers 50 quarters (without unscheduled FOMCs) and around 9400
cases of maturing USD debt (51% in floaters, 49% in non-floaters). Thus, on average
94 per quarter and regime, allowing for accurate estimates of the heterogeneity.
Leverage drives stronger spillovers in non-floaters. Table 3.5a shows that the
stronger response by non-floaters visible in Table 3.3 is driven by firms with high net
leverage. While firms with high leverage react more strongly under both exchange
rate regimes, the difference is considerably larger in non-floaters. I find that the
result is neither driven by different country compositions across subsamples (Table
C.6), nor by shares of short-term debt, bond debt or cash holdings (Table C.10).
The stronger responses by high-leverage firms, relative to low leverage firms, is
consistent with Jeenas (2018)’s evidence for US data. Ottonello and Winberry (2018)
show that the opposite holds for within-firm leverage variations.
Table 3.5b shows that both exporters and non-exporters reduce their investment
significantly after US tightening, which holds for floaters and non-floaters alike.
Unlike the sample split by leverage, it is not clear that one particular subset of
firms (exporters or non-exporters) is driving the floater-vs-non-floater gap. The
fact that the empirical distribution of leverage is similar for exporters and non-
18Regional sales splits are often reported irregularly and in non-standardized ways, making a
time-varying measure infeasible. International trade relationships require fixed costs, thus it is
unlikely that firms switch exporter status often.
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exporters (Table C.17) helps to explain why the floater/non-floater gap is more
similar between exporters and non-exporters. The leverage results holds also within
exporters. The floater/non-floater gap is larger among high leverage exporters
than for low leverage exporters.
The dominance of leverage is not obvious. One might argue that, since the
maturing-debt identification isolates the financing spillover channel, it is natural that
leverage turns out to be the key firm characteristic. However, leverage is the result
of firm optimization and it is not obvious that firms with high leverage are more
vulnerable. This holds particularly true for foreign currency borrowing, which may
entail additional costs such as financial exposure to exchange rate fluctuations.
The financing spillover channel and exchange rates. I have so far neglected that
exchange rates react significantly to US monetary surprises (see Appendix C.4 for
evidence). Table 3.5 reports estimates of a specification that includes interactions of
the maturing-debt dummy with the exchange rate responses, mpERc,t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1,
where mpERc,t−1 is the change of the bilateral exchange rate of country c vis-a-
vis the US Dollar over the FOMC announcement day (mpERc,t−1 > 0 means USD
appreciation).
Crucially, the coefficient on mpERc,t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 captures how spillovers via firm
financing conditions depend on the exchange rate change. Consequences of exchange rate
fluctuations are captured only through their immediate impact on firm financing
conditions because the maturing-identification isolates the effects due to changes
in financing conditions caused by US monetary policy. Exchange rate channels
unrelated to financing conditions are absorbed in the fixed effects.
Changes in coefficients on maturing×monetary shock. Controlling for the
exchange rate adjustment has interesting implications for the main coefficient β
on mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1. Generally, the effects of interest rates on investment become
larger in magnitude for floaters and smaller for non-floaters. The increase in
magnitude of the maturing×shock coefficient for floaters means that, US tightening
without home depreciation leads to stronger investment reductions than a US
tightening with home depreciation, suggesting that the respective firms benefit
from the exchange rate adjustment. The benefits for floaters are particularly strong
for low leverage firms, for which the interest-rate-maturing coefficient increases by
60%, from −0.943 to −1.528. Instead, for non-floaters, the effect of the monetary
shock on investment becomes smaller when controlling for the exchange rate
response. A Fed hike without home depreciation leads to smaller investment
reductions than a Fed hike with home deprecation.
Exchange rate effects. In Table 3.5, the estimated coefficients on mpERc,t−1 ×
Mat$p,t−1 capture investment responses to a Fed-induced home depreciation by
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(a) sample splits by firm leverage
Dep-var: ∆kp,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −1.769∗∗ −2.081∗∗ −0.943∗∗ −1.528∗∗







p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −2.881∗∗∗ −1.783∗ −1.089 −0.354
(0.805) (0.898) (1.183) (1.382)
mpERt−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −0.123∗∗ −0.082
(0.048) (0.073)
Firm group (R) High Lev High Lev Low Lev Low Lev
Obs 104,063 104,063 101,933 101,933
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.169 0.218 0.218
(b) sample splits by exporter status
Dep-var: ∆kp,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −0.823∗∗ −1.199∗ −2.038∗∗ −2.489∗∗∗








p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −1.920∗ −0.985 −1.714 −1.044
(1.012) (1.196) (1.407) (1.956)
mpERt−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −0.095 −0.154∗∗
(0.067) (0.072)
Firm group (R) Export Export Non-Export Non-Export
Obs 115,229 115,229 93,250 93,250
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.164 0.240 0.240











Columns 2 and 4 augment the baseline with mpERt−1×Mat
$
p,t−1, the home currency depreciation after FOMCs interacted
with the maturing dummy. “High Lev” contains firms with net leverage above median; “Export” sample contains firms
which report international sales. ∆kp,c,t is the log change in net PPE, normalized by its standard deviation. 1nfltc,t equals
1 if country c has a de-facto not-floating exchange rate (from Ilzetzki et al., 2019). Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm
p had USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. mpt−1 is the high-frequency response of fed futures
from same FOMC in pp (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). Includes triple interaction of mp$t−1, Mat
$
p,t−1 with openess
index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006), thus estimates of maturing interactions are conditional on financial openness. All
specifications include~ap,t, denoting firm-, fiscal-quarter-, country×date FE, firm controls and interactions thereof with
mp$t−1 and 1
nflt
c,t . Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises
(updated Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) excluded.
Table 3.5: Investment response (β̂R) by exchange rate regime and firm types
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firms with maturing debt, relative to those without. It is generally estimated
negative for non-floaters and positive for floaters, confirming the conjecture that
exchange rate fluctuations amplify the financing channel for non-floaters and
dampen it for floaters. For interpretation, it is important to recall that I control
for the interest rate shock and its interaction with the maturing-variable. Three
observations stand out in the leverage- and trade-subsamples:
1) First, the negative effects of home depreciation in non-floaters are consistent
with adverse net worth effects due to currency mismatch on firms’ balance
sheets (Aguiar, 2005; Salomao and Varela, 2018; Casas et al., 2020; Banerjee
et al., 2020). This interpretation is supported by the fact that the effects are
statistically significant only for non-exporters and high-leverage firms. It is
also consistent with Alfaro et al. (2019) who finds that financial vulnerability
to home depreciation is increasing with firm leverage.
2) Second, for exporters, the insigificance of exchange rate effects is consistent
with evidence on USD invoicing (Goldberg and Tille, 2008; Ito and Chinn,
2013; Gopinath, 2015). Revenues invoiced in Dollars preclude benefits from
competitiveness gains but provide a natural hedge for USD liabilities.
3) Third, non-exporters in floaters with maturing debt raise investment after the
home depreciation, relative to non-exporters without maturing debt.
I argue that observation 3 is consistent with that non-exporters’ financing conditions
reflect improved sales prospects. To understand why non-exporters’ sales might
improve, consider the effects of a home currency depreciation (Dollar strength) if
all international trade is invoiced in US Dollars. While the prices of and foreign
demand for domestically produced export goods are unaffected, the price of
imported goods increases in home currency terms as the Dollar strengthens. The
importers will respond by switching towards domestic substitutes. This is the
import-driven trade balance adjustment as argued for by the invoicing literature
(Goldberg and Tille, 2008; Gopinath, 2015). By definition, non-exporters only have
domestic sales and therefore benefit relatively more from the boost in demand for
domestic goods than exporters whose international sales stagnate.19 Indeed, Table
C.16 in Appendix C.1, shows that, for floaters, home depreciations are associated
with higher sales’ growth for non-exporters relative to exporters and that this
differential is increasing in the home country’s share of imports invoiced in US
19Obstfeld (2001) suggests that substitution away from imports might be done not only by
households but also by firms. If non-exporters are themselves importers, they will also experience an
increase in their input costs and potentially switch to domestic substitutes too. If exporters have a
relatively high share of domestic sales, and a low share of imported inputs, they might benefit more
from such import-driven expenditure switching. This is unlikely however, in light of evidence that
large exporters are often also large importers (Amiti et al., 2014).
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Dollars. Note that the increased sales per se are common to all non-exporters and
absorbed in the fixed effects. It is to the extent that financing conditions reflect the
increased sales that firms with maturing debt are more affected by it.
Pegs vs crawls, financial development and homogenous fixed effects. Table
C.7 shows that the exchange rate effects strengthen when excluding pegs, such
that non-floaters represent only managed exchange rates.20 Table C.8 shows that
the leverage-result persists when controlling for financial development. Table C.9
shows the leverage result also holds when using an interaction term for high-
leverage over the full sample, restricting fixed effects be the same for high- and
low-leverage firms.
3.6 Rationalizing real spillover heterogeneity
The remaining puzzle. The stronger spillovers in non-floaters arise from firms
with high leverage that respond more strongly in non-floaters than in floaters.
Exchange rate fluctuations contribute to this because they amplify the financing
channel for high-leverage firms in non-floaters but not in floaters. Rational firms
anticipate the consequences of their leverage and USD debt. This section presents a
simple conceptual framework of firms’ currency choice in borrowing. It explains
why firms are willing to accept the increased exposure to monetary policy, and
how this decision depends on the exchange rate regime.
Implications of empirical findings for model choice. My empirical approach
blends out macroeconomic factors that affect all firms equally. I also currently do
not assess the consequences of the firm-level effects for macroeconomic aggregates
and how they feedback to a government’s decision to peg. Therefore, I will focus on
partial equilbrium. Furthermore, I will consider currency choice without hedging
of the exchange rate risk because my estimates imply that firms in non-floaters
do experience adverse balance sheet effects due to home currency depreciations.
Lastly, I will abstract from the interaction of the currency choice in borrowing
and the choice to engage in international trade (and currency choice therein)
because the adverse effects of home depreciation are strongest for non-exporters
(in non-floaters).
3.6.1 Setup
A small open economy is populated with a continuum of risk-neutral firms. Firm
p’s optimization problem is to decide how much to borrow and the currency de-
20Relative to crawls or bands, “hard” pegs are naturally associated with smaller and less frequent
exchange rate fluctuations (Appendix Table C.18) but they can still be substantial. Therefore, and for
continuity in my analysis, I include pegs in my baseline analysis.
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nomination of debt, US Dollar or Euro (home currency). This borrowing finances
investment Xp in a linear technology ApXp and a cash outflow related to debt
rollover. Figure 3.1 illustrates the timing. Each firm starts at t = 0− with cash
t = 0− t = 0+ t = 1
- firm-type selected:
sunk cost C












Notes: Illustration of timing assumptions. Bold letters indicate endogenous firm choices.
Figure 3.1: Model timeline
holdings Ep and pre-existing debt Qp,91. A fraction γ of pre-existing debt is matur-
ing at t = 0+, the complement 1− γ matures at t = 1. Pre-existing debt consists
either only of Euro-denominated debt or a combination of Euro and Dollar debt,
depending on firm type (more below). Each firm thus faces a flow-of-funds identity
Xp + γQp,91R91,w︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash outflows at t = 0+
= Ep︸︷︷︸
cash
+ Qe,p + Q$,pe0.︸ ︷︷ ︸
borrowing in period t = 0+
(3.7)
e0 is the exchange rate expressed as Euros per 1 US Dollar. The fractions γ and
1− γ of pre-existing debt may be interpreted as “short-term” and “long-term” debt
respectively. An alternative interpretation is that the firms inherit debts with the
same original maturity –but different remaining maturity– from earlier generations.
Debt contracting. Only a fraction φ of future income can be pledged to investors,
implying a borrowing constraint in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Using
the flow-of-funds identity, the constraint is
Q$,pR$pe1 + Qe,pRep ≤ φAp(Q$,pe0 + Qe,p) + ξp, (3.8)
where ξp = φAp(Ep − γQp,91Rp,91)− (1− γ)Qp,91R2p,91 is a convenient compound-
parameter, summarizing how the exogenous firm-specific parameters, financial
friction φ and maturity structure γ combine to the firm’s exogenous “starting
capital.”
Issuing foreign currency debt. My approach to endogenize the currency compo-
sition of debt follows closely Maggiori et al. (2018). To issue debt denominated
in US Dollar, the firm has to pay a fixed, sunk cost C. C captures long-term costs,
e.g. legal work for prospectuses or building up an investor base. Interest rates are
currency- and firm-specific, linearly increasing in the amount debt Qp,k in currency
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k ∈ {e, $}




R̄k,t represents a benchmark rate for corporate bonds in currency k, like the coun-
try’s government bond yields. The levels of benchmark interest rates, R̄$,t and R̄e,t
are log-normally distributed. The time-0 exchange rate e0 loads on the US-rate




) = E(R̄e,t). See Appendix C.5.1.1 for details.
I assume Γe > Γ$ > 0 which signifies a benefit of issuing in US Dollars, relative
to in Euros, even if the UIP holds.21





ApXp − Re,pQe,p − R$,pQ$,pe1 − (1− γ)Qp,91R2p,91 − C 1Qp,$>0
)
,
subject to the borrowing constraint, flow-of-funds, and debt demand curves. In
this simple frame, firm p’s uncertainty about πp,t=1 is coming exclusively from the
shocks to benchmark rates R̄$,t and R̄e,t.
Solution. The firm problem can be solved by first characterising the optimal
choices of the two types of firms. One type will borrow only in home currency.
The other type will borrow in both currencies. Each firm then selects its type by
comparing expected profits under both types. Firms learn their productivity, size
and starting capital at t = 0−, so the only source of uncertainty are the levels of the
benchmark rates and exchange rate.22 Appendix C.5.2 provides details.
3.6.2 Equilibrium outcomes
Two firm types arise endogenously. The first type, home currency firms, borrow
only in their home currency Euro (henceforth HC firms). The second type, multi-
currency firms, borrow in both Euro and US Dollars (MC firms). Before exploring
the firm type selection, I will revisit my identification approach through the model’s
lens.
21Maggiori et al. (2018) microfound this assumption with the argument that the response of
interest rates to changes in the supply of debt are weaker for currencies’ which attract a large pool
of wealth from investors (“deep markets”). An alternative motivation for the positive slope could
be risk-considerations by investors. The empirical literature on currency choices also highlights
hedging of operational cash flows (Allayannis et al., 2003,Graham and Harvey, 2001,Géczy et al.,
1997). McBrady and Schill (2007) finds evidence of financial return motives by public sector issuers.
22For each type, the borrowing constraint may bind or not bind not. When evaluating profit
expectations, each firm takes into account the probability that it may become constrained.
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3.6.2.1 Exogenous and endogenous sources of heterogeneity
Heterogeneous effects due to maturing debt. Consider the example of a surprise
increase in R̄e at t = 0+. For both firm types, the higher interest rate will be
associated with lower investment. Importantly, the model shows that the reduction
in investment will be larger, the more maturing debt the firm has. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.2a. Appendix C.5.3.2 discusses analytical expressions.
Interest rate increases reduce the present value (PV) of both assets and out-
standing debt. For firms without maturing debt (γ = 0), the fall in PVs of assets
and “old” debt perfectly offset each other, leaving net worth unchanged. Instead, if
γ > 0, the maturing debt is replaced with new debt. Since the interest rate paid on
new debt will reflect the rate change, the present value of the total debt (remaining
old+new) will fall by less than under γ = 0. Therefore its net worth will fall by
more. If the firm’s borrowing constraint binds, the net worth reduction translates
to lower feasible borrowings and lower investment.23 This net worth channel holds
qualitatively for both home- and multi-currency firms and home and US monetary
shocks.
In the model, MC firms face an additional cash flow reduction because the
Dollar strength ensuing US monetary tightening raises the repayment value of
maturing debt in home currency terms. In reality, similar cash flow affects can arise
for both firms due to higher interest expenses on the newly issued debt, or any gap
between the amounts of maturing debt and new issuance.
To map the model concretely to the data, firms that have debt maturing shortly
after the FOMC can be thought of as having γ > 0, and firms without maturing
debt as γ = 0. The exact timing of debt maturity (before/after an FOMC) is arguably
exogenous because the average original maturity of corporate bonds is around
4-8 years, an horizon at which firms cannot anticipate the precise timing of the
FOMC, let alone the interest rate decision taken. This is the central identification
argument used in this paper. Firms with debt maturing shortly after an FOMC
announcement will be more exposed to it than firms that do not.
Maturing effect by firm characteristics. Figure 3.2b plots ∆γ, the differential
response of a firm with maturing debt relative to without, against initial cash Ep.
∆γ is the model-analog to the coefficient on the maturing×shock interaction in the
empirics. As Ep increases, leverage endogenously decreases. This makes net worth
losses conditional on maturing debt smaller, and hence the jump in responsiveness
due to maturing debt gets smaller. The way ∆γ changes over the range of Ep is
23Generally speaking, the maturity structure of a firm as well as the amount of rollover risk
taken, are endogenous choices. However, γ can be thought of as indicating the maturity of debt
issued at earlier time but with same original maturity as the remaining old debt stock. The different
interpretation of γ does not change the predicted heterogeneity in effects due to γ, but it is crucial
for empirical identification.
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Notes: Subfigure 3.2a plots the partial derivatives ∂Q̂p,hc,e/∂R̄e and ∂Q̂p,mc/∂R̄$ against γ, the
share of pre-existing debt maturing at t = 0+. Subfigure 3.2b plots the difference in partial
derivatives ∆γp,mc = (∂Q̂p,mc/∂R̄$)|γ=1 − (∂Q̂p,mc/∂R̄$)|γ=0, (the within-firm maturing effect)
for a spectrum of MC firms differing by initial cash Ep. Derivatives are scaled such that the
y-axis represents changes in borrowing in response to a 1% increase in the gross interest rates.
Figure 3.2: Comparative statics on borrowing response to monetary shock
analog to estimating the coefficient on different subsamples, i.e. leverage-groups.24
Endogenous determinants of heterogeneity. The endogenous selection into
firm-types generates a spectrum of heterogenous responses, which is explained
not only by the different exposures of the firm types but also by the drivers of the
selection. In other words, MC firms respond more strongly to US monetary policy
than HC firms, not only because they have outstanding US Dollar debt but also
because they are “fundamentally different.” A counterfactual MC firm without
US Dollar debt would still react differently than a HC firm because it is more
productive/larger.
3.6.2.2 Firm-type selection and exchange rate regime
Firm-type selection. The endogenous selection into firm-types is governed by two
channels. The fixed cost channel implies that large and cash rich firms are more
likely to tap the US Dollar debt market because they can afford the fixed costs
more easily. Instead, the resiliency channel represents the trade-off faced by the firms
between lower funding costs and exposure to more shocks. More productive, or
cash rich, firms can cope better with the increased exposure to shocks and therefore
more likely to become a multi-currency firm.
Figure 3.3 illustrates these channels. Subfigure 3.3a illustrates the fixed cost
channel. I switch off uncertainty about interest rates and plot the regions of each
firm-type in the parameter space for initial cash and productivity. (Appendix
C.5.4.1 contains derivations.) Multi currency firms are those with highest initial
24In the model, I define leverage as Qp/ξp, i.e. borrowing amount over initial net worth. It is an
endogenous variable that is decreasing in Ep and increasing in Ap.
Chapter 3: The real effects of US monetary policy abroad 94
(a) Firm-types in parameter space








MC unconstrained MC constrained
HC unconstrained HC constrained
(b) Density & threshold of borrowing rate













Notes: Subfigure 3.3a plots regions in parameter space (Ep, Ap) associated with different firm types. Other
parameters are fixed, stochastic variables kept at expected values. Subfigure 3.3b plots the distribution
of the multicurrency benchmark rate under floating and pegged exchange rate regime (see main text for
details). Vertical bars are threshold benchmark rates above which the borrowing constraint would become
binding.
Figure 3.3: Firm characteristics, uncertainty and firm-types
cash endowments or highest productivity, or both, illustrating the standard fixed
cost channel of firm type selection. Large and cash rich firms are more likely
borrow in US Dollars because they can pay more easily for the fixed costs.
Subfigure 3.3b illustrates the resiliency channel. The key interaction of firm
characteristics with uncertainty concerns whether the borrowing constraint is
binding or not.25 I solve the condition under which the borrowing constraint binds,
Q̂cp,· < Q̂up,·, for threshold benchmark rates R̃p,k. If the realized benchmark rate is
above the threshold, R̄k,t > R̃p,k, firm p will be constrained. The threshold rates
R̃k,p depend on firm characteristics. The more productive the firm, the deeper is the
threshold in the tail of the distribution (e.g. right-hand vertical bar in 3.3b), meaning
it can sustain higher rate realizations before becoming constrained. This is the
“resiliency channel” of firm-type selection. More productive firms are better able to
deal with the increased exposure to shocks resulting from US Dollar borrowing
and thus more likely to do so.
Role of exchange rate regimes. Subfigure 3.3b also illustrates how the exchange
rate regime choice may affect the resiliency channel. It plots the distribution of
the multi-currency benchmark rate under a floating and a managed exchange
rate regime.26 The multi-currency benchmark rate’s variance is smaller under the
25In this setup, when considering mean-preserving shifts in uncertainty, the probability that the
constraint is binding is a sufficient statistic for the impact of uncertainty on expected proftability and
hence the firm-type selection. Appendix C.5.2 provides more discussion.
26See the Appendix for details on the distribution (C.5.2.4) and on parameters related to exchange
rate policy (C.5.1.2). In this simple model with two stochastic shocks (one for each currency’s
benchmark rate), I define a managed exchange rate regime as one where the exchange rate loads only
weakly on the interest rate shock (which reduces the variance of the exchange rate). Consistent with
the Trilemma trade-off and evidence thereof, the managed exchange rate regime is also characterised
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pegged exchange rate regime, reducing the probability of becoming constrained
relative to the floating regime. This reduction in uncertainty benefits relatively
more the firms with low productivity (left-hand vertical bar) than those with high
productivity (right-hand vertical bar). Exchange rate management thus dampens
the resiliency channel, predicting that the size/productivity gap between HC and
MC firms should shrink.
Two remarks are at order. First, since the effects of exchange rate management
on the resiliency channel vary across the spectrum of firms, it would be interesting
for future work to derive the aggregate effect based on countries’ firm productiv-
ity/size distributions. Second, to isolate the effects of changing uncertainty, the
comparison of exchange rate regimes in 3.3b considers mean-preserving uncer-
tainty changes. Appendix C.5.1.2 suggests that potential shifts in first moments
of borrowing costs would further raise the attractiveness of US Dollar borrowing
under exchange rate management.27
Role of capital account regimes. Capital controls may be interpreted as impact-
ing the size of the fixed cost C to issue foreign currency debt. The reason is that,
under stringent capital controls, firms have to construct complex legal frameworks
or resort to tax havens to borrow from foreigners. Coppola et al. (2020) provide
related empirical evidence. In this sense, tighter capital controls are predicted to be
associated with larger size/productivity gaps between HC and MC firms.
3.6.3 Validating model implications
The model rationalizes my finding of stronger spillovers in non-floaters by show-
ing that limited exchange rate variability allows ex-ante weaker firms to borrow
in foreign currency, which leads to higher financial vulnerability to monetary
spillovers.
In the model, regardless of the exchange rate regime, firms borrowing in foreign
currency are on average larger and/or more productive than firms borrowing only
in home currency. This size/producivity gap between home- and multi-currency
firms are decreasing with a) the fixed costs required to borrow in foreign currency
and b) with the expected exchange rate variability.
To provide a first, crude empirical validation of these model implications, I
compare average firm characteristics between firm-types. Figure 3.4 plots the
difference between firms with and without USD debt in terms of average total
assets and productivity growth. I estimate the latter following the procedure in
by a stronger loading of the Euro benchmark rate on the USD benchmark rate shock, raising its
variance and enhancing further the relative attractiveness of USD borrowing.
27There is a lack of systematic evidence on how the pricing of risky assets differs across exchange
rate regimes (especially when disregarding currency crises). This seems an interesting avenue for
future work although challenging due to the endogeneity of exchange rate regime choices.











Exchange rate regime float non−float
Notes: Figure plots differences in average firm characteristics by exchange rate regime. E.g.
the left-most bar is defined as total assets of average multi-currency firm minus total assets of
average home-currency firm, based on firms in floating exchange rate regimes.
Figure 3.4: Home currency vs multi currency gaps by exchange rate regime
Wooldridge (2009). The fact that all bars have positive values illustrates that, as
predicted by the model, firms that borrow in US Dollars are on average larger and
more productive than their home-currency counterparts.
The size gap also holds when measuring it in terms of log-differences,28 which
echos the empirical findings in Maggiori et al. (2018). Figure 3.4 also shows that
the gaps between HC and MC firms are smaller in countries with non-floating
exchange rates, confirming the predictions by the model. Especially the firm size
gap is highly statistically significant. At present, these results are obtained on the
sample of firms with quarterly data. In future work, the same analysis can be done
using annual data which would allow for a considerably larger number of firms to
be included.29
Implications for aggregate responsiveness to foreign MP. The findings in this
section suggest that exchange rate and capital account policies alter an economy’s
aggregate responsiveness to foreign monetary policy also by changing firms in-
centives to borrow in foreign currency. In the model, and as confirmed in the
data, lower exchange rate variability allows smaller and less productive firms to
borrow in foreign currency increasing the amount of exposure in the economy. Thus,
exchange rate policy alters aggregate responsiveness to foreign monetary policy
not only at the intensive margin but also at the extensive margin. Finally, these
28This relationship persists in unreported regressions with country fixed effects.
29One should also account for cross-country differences in the firm size distributions in terms
of higher moments (e.g. skewness). Measuring the MC gap as log-difference helps somewhat but
a more rigorous examination seems promising (though outside the scope of this paper). Another
concern could be that countries with pegged exchange rates are also often less developed. In the
model, financial development might be captured with the level of financial frictions φ, suggesting
that lower development might be associated with larger MC gaps. From this perspective, my basic
estimates of the difference in MC gaps across regimes might be biased downwards.
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findings appear also important for financial stability, which is here not discussed
to stay within the scope of this paper but seems promising for future work.
3.7 Policy implications: Revisiting the Trilemma
The battle lines in the Trilemma debate depend crucially on the definition of mone-
tary policy independence. A narrow definition could be called narrow instrument
independence and is the ability of a central bank to steer short-term nominal interest
rates freely according to domestic monetary policy objectives. A broader defini-
tion, wide monetary independence, focuses on the central bank’s ability to achieve its
monetary policy objectives.30
Considerable evidence has accumulated that confirms the Trilemma in the
narrow sense (Shambaugh, 2004; Obstfeld et al., 2005 and others). At the same time,
research on the global financial cycle (Rey, 2013 and others) suggest that domestic
financial conditions are so strongly influenced by foreign factors that wide monetary
independence fails even in floaters. The departure from the Trilemma advocated in
Rey (2013) concerns the lack of wide monetary independence in floaters.
My evidence informs about monetary independence in the wide sense because I
capture the real effects of spillovers, i.e. the spillover consequences for variables that
are the local central bank’s (intermediate) targets. They confirm the Trilemma, in
the sense that non-floaters experience stronger interference in their target variables
than floaters do. Importantly, they also explain how this is consistent with pervasive
financial globalization.
First, while I have emphasised the fact that non-floaters react more strongly,
it is important to stress that spillovers are indeed significant also for floaters.
Second, my evidence sheds light on how global finance shapes monetary spillovers
differently in non-floaters than in floaters. I find that the firm-financing channel
works through both local currency and foreign currency debt, capturing two forms
of financial globalization. First, arbitrage activity in integrated markets imply
that local interest rates are subject to foreign factors. Second, domestic firms
which borrow internationally, in foreign currency, establish a direct exposure to
foreign interest rates and exchange rates that would exist even if local financing
conditions are totally disconnected from foreign factors. The second view, the
30In their original articles, Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963) do not discuss the influence
of foreign shocks or foreign monetary policy on domestic monetary policy. They compare the
effectiveness of domestic monetary policy under floating and fixed exchange rates, assuming an
open capital account. The role of capital flows in the arguments, then and now, illustrates well how
economic models have evolved. In Fleming (1962), stronger reaction of capital flows to the interest
rate enhances the effectiveness in domestic monetary policy (since it leads to larger deprecations
boosting the trade balance). Instead, nowadays, capital flows and their response to interest rates are
thought to obstruct it by putting pressure on local balance sheets and asset prices.
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internationalization of corporate finance, offers one explanation for the puzzling
lack of wide monetary independence in floaters. It also helps to explain why non-
floaters experience even stronger spillovers. My findings suggest that exchange rate
pegs reduce monetary independence not only by hijacking the monetary instrument
but by allowing weaker firms to borrow in foreign currency, which compromises
monetary independence in the wide sense.
These issues might get intensified in the future, both in floaters and non-
floaters, due to the increasing use of tax heavens (Coppola et al., 2020; Zucman,
2014) allowing companies to avoid capital controls. A pessimistic, and misleading,
conclusion might therefore be that the Dilemma morphs into “no choice at all,”
in the sense that there will always be foreign financial shocks interfering with
domestic monetary policy regardless of regime choice. To the contrary, my findings
imply that, while some global influence is inevitable, regime choices do matter
significantly in determining the strength of spillovers.
Finally, the Trilemma has become even more difficult since financial stability
objectives have been added explicitly to central bank mandates (Obstfeld et al.,
2010; Aizenman, 2013; Aizenman, 2019). My findings about the role of high
leverage firms, and weaker firms borrowing in foreign currency, suggest that, at
least in this respect, financial stability and monetary objectives might be aligned.
Financial stability policies aimed at curbing foreign currency leverage will also help
insulating monetary policy from foreign factors.
3.8 Conclusion
Macroeconomic phenomena are the result of microeconomic decisions. In this
spirit, this paper analyzed firm-level data at global scale to shed new light on
one of the oldest issues in international macro and finance, the Mundell-Fleming
Trilemma.
My findings are as follows. Reductions in business investment following US
monetary tightening are largest in countries with pegged or managed exchange
rates but also significant in floaters. The stronger spillovers in non-floaters are
driven by firms with higher leverage. Home currency depreciations ensuing sur-
prise Fed tightening contribute to the heterogeneity because they amplify spillovers
for non-floaters and dampen them for floaters. The higher vulnerability of high-
leverage firms in non-floaters can be explained through the endogenous increase in
foreign currency borrowing associated with exchange rate management.
Since Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963) first stipulated the Trilemma, vast
globalization has steered a debate whether it still holds. Substantial evidence shows
that the global capital flows and asset price cycles transmit financial conditions
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forcefully, leading some to conclude that only complete isolation would ensure
monetary independence.
I interpret my findings as reconciling the traditional Trilemma argument with
the recent evidence on strength and pervasiveness of the global financial cycle. On
the one hand, my estimates are in line with the traditional Trilemma argument:
Limited exchange rate flexibility is associated with stronger spillovers and exchange
rate fluctuations cushion the blow for floaters. On the other hand, I find that also
floaters experience significant spillovers. Importantly, the stronger spillovers in
non-floaters are driven especially by high-leverage firms.
So financial spillovers are ubiquitous and powerful, consistent with the global
financial cycle literature. The endogenous reponse by firms to exchange rate
management implies that financial spillovers are more powerful in non-floaters,
validating the prediction of the traditional Trilemma. The Trilemma thus manifests
itself not only through hijacking domestic monetary policy but also through foreign
currency borrowing and associated financial vulnerabilities.
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A.1.1 Parsing content of speeches
Year Top word 1 Top word 2 Top word 3 Top word 4 Top word 5
1996 losses problems failures question problem
1997 problems unemployment late challenge question
1998 crisis problems problem crises unemployment
1999 problem crisis problems unemployment challenge
2000 unemployment crisis problems challenge question
2001 slowdown question late problem problems
2002 critical unemployment problems recession loss
2003 problems late losses unemployment problem
2004 late volatility concerns problems unemployment
2005 concerns late concern problems question
2006 concerns late losses problems stress
2007 problems crises crisis losses concerns
2008 problems foreclosures crisis turmoil losses
2009 crisis losses problems failure problem
2010 crisis unemployment losses problems recession
2011 crisis unemployment recession stress problems
2012 unemployment crisis recession losses problems
2013 crisis unemployment stress recession losses
2014 crisis unemployment stress recession question
2015 crisis recession stress unemployment force
2016 crisis stress unemployment questions recession
2017 crisis stress unemployment force tightening
Notes: The table shows for every year the words from the Loughran-McDonald “negative
words”-dictionary that were found most often in the speeches.
Table A.1: 10 negative words in the LMcD dictionary found most often in speeches by year
variable Mean SD Min Max
τ 96.34 1.64 89.18 99.90
Total words 1658.25 703.56 208.00 4497.00
Negative words 61.95 40.25 1.00 271.00
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the speech tone (τ), number of total words, and
number of negative words in the speeches used in the analysis.
Table A.2: Summary statistics of speech tone
I have also verified that the speech tone measure is driven by a diverse set of words,
to avoid that few particular words are driving the tone variation. To do so, I have
computed the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index across matched words (for
brevity unreported). A value of 100 percent would indicate that only a single
word drives the index. The index hovered around 1 to 2 percent over the sample,
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Notes: The figure plots the number of speeches (vertical axis) for the share of characteristic
words as % of total words in these speeches. The vertical bars show the thresholds (5%,7.5%,
10% and 12.5%) used to decide whether a speech should be labelled as monetary policy relevant.
The most representative words of the monetary policy topic are as identified by ωp,c are listed
in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
Figure A.1: Identifying speeches relevant to monetary policy
‘Mexp’ All %
total 240 3470 6.92
Weeks before FOMC 1-4 182 2479 7.34
5-8 58 991 5.85
Speaker type President 172 2174 7.91
Governor 68 1296 5.25
Notes: Column “Mexp” reports counts of speeches including phrases about “market expecta-
tions,” as defined in Table 1.5. Based on sample of scheduled FOMC meetings.




















































Notes: The figure plots the moving average over the last 25 speeches of speech tone.
Figure A.2: Speech tone τ
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word ω word ω word ω
inflation 0.1255 gradual 0.0141 firm 0.0096
outlook 0.0675 community 0.0139 maximum_employment 0.0095
labor_market 0.0595 economic_activity 0.0137 improvement_labor 0.0094
funds_rate 0.0548 supervision 0.0137 forecast 0.0094
unemployment_rate 0.0465 rate 0.0136 weakness 0.0093
recovery 0.0462 conditions 0.0135 internal 0.0093
fomc 0.0448 favorable 0.0135 nominal 0.0093
unemployment 0.0440 utilization 0.0135 disinflationary 0.0093
monetary_policy 0.0433 cra 0.0133 slow 0.0093
spending 0.0381 organizations 0.0133 market_discipline 0.0093
banks 0.0373 annual_rate 0.0132 core 0.0093
longer_run 0.0348 policy 0.0132 standards 0.0092
basel 0.0340 pickup 0.0131 upward_pressure 0.0092
risk_management 0.0293 real_gdp 0.0131 elevated 0.0092
fiscal 0.0288 tightening 0.0130 personal_consumption 0.0091
energy_prices 0.0279 organization 0.0127 long_run 0.0091
nairu 0.0276 low 0.0127 communities 0.0091
price_stability 0.0267 expected 0.0127 treasury_securities 0.0091
slack 0.0263 committee 0.0126 readings 0.0091
supervisors 0.0262 long_term 0.0125 subdued 0.0091
inflation_expectations 0.0259 commodity_prices 0.0124 inventories 0.0090
interest_rates 0.0258 management 0.0122 restraining 0.0089
pace 0.0257 developments 0.0121 movements 0.0089
prices 0.0245 near_term 0.0121 commodities 0.0089
banking 0.0241 gradually 0.0120 loan 0.0089
aggregate_demand 0.0239 oil_prices 0.0120 restraint 0.0089
longer_term 0.0237 rates 0.0119 regulations 0.0089
regulatory 0.0235 purchases 0.0119 coming_quarters 0.0088
productivity_growth 0.0231 systems 0.0116 sustainable 0.0088
resource_utilization 0.0226 recession 0.0115 oil 0.0088
employment 0.0226 slowdown 0.0115 year 0.0088
supervisory 0.0222 housing 0.0113 target 0.0088
activities 0.0217 equipment 0.0110 per_month 0.0088
productivity 0.0216 asset_purchases 0.0109 wage 0.0087
demand 0.0212 outlays 0.0108 cbo 0.0087
labor_force 0.0209 accommodative 0.0108 continued 0.0086
accommodation 0.0207 moderate 0.0108 industry 0.0086
growth 0.0206 prospects 0.0106 boost 0.0086
community_banks 0.0206 percent 0.0105 next_year 0.0085
institutions 0.0202 services 0.0105 transitory 0.0085
consumer_spending 0.0202 stance_monetary 0.0104 anticipated 0.0085
bank 0.0191 capital_requirements 0.0104 agencies 0.0084
full_employment 0.0183 unit_labor 0.0104 sales 0.0084
output 0.0183 derivatives 0.0103 stimulus 0.0084
energy 0.0177 import_prices 0.0103 rising 0.0084
increases 0.0176 quarters 0.0103 slower 0.0083
decline 0.0175 rebound 0.0102 solid 0.0082
regulation 0.0170 remains 0.0102 highly_accommodative 0.0082
budget 0.0169 expenditures 0.0102 recent_months 0.0082
neutral 0.0163 equipment_software 0.0102 phillips_curve 0.0082
banking_organizations 0.0161 indicators 0.0101 remained 0.0082
trend 0.0159 bankers 0.0101 residential_construction 0.0082
rise 0.0155 weak 0.0101 price 0.0081
compliance 0.0154 last_year 0.0101 effects 0.0081
federal 0.0154 risk 0.0101 likely 0.0081
forecasters 0.0153 taylor_rule 0.0100 manufacturing 0.0080
unemployed 0.0152 expansion 0.0100 job 0.0080
cyclical 0.0151 slowed 0.0100 disclosure 0.0080
hiring 0.0150 production 0.0099 new_jersey 0.0080
headwinds 0.0148 labor 0.0099 capital 0.0079
regulators 0.0148 price_index 0.0099 persistent 0.0079
drag 0.0147 effect 0.0098 appears 0.0079
percentage_point 0.0147 well_anchored 0.0098 projections 0.0079
slowing 0.0146 pce 0.0098 first_half 0.0078
second_half 0.0145 economy 0.0097 household 0.0078
practices 0.0145 institution 0.0097 net_exports 0.0077
gains 0.0142 dual_mandate 0.0096
Notes: The table lists the 200 phrases most characteristic of the “monetary policy” topic as identified by ωp,c defined
in Eq. 1.6 following Gentzkow and Shaprio (2010). A higher value in ω means the word is more characteristic. The
values are values of ω multiplied by 100 for illustration and sorted in decreasing order from left to right. Two-part
phrases separated by an underscore are bigrams formed on the basis of how often these words occur together and are
treated as a single word when ωp,c is computed. Bold phrases were disregarded in classifying speeches, in order to
reduce the risk of misclassifying speeches that talk purely on banking regulation and supervision.
Table A.4: Words characteristic of “monetary policy relevant topic”
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) Target rate (%
)
Misalignment horizon 1Q ahead 2Q ahead
Notes: Each dot/triangle represents average misalignment (left-hand axis) between the Green-
book release and corresponding FOMC, derived from the Greenbook projections. The right-hand
axis plots the Fed funds target rate. When the Fed announces a range for its target, the arithmetic
average of that range is used. Gray shades indicate NBER recessions.
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Notes: Each bar represents average misalignment (left-hand axis) in the fourth week before
a FOMC meeting. The misalignment was derived assuming perfect foresight of the central
bankers. The right-hand axis plots the Fed funds target rate. When the Fed announces a range
for its target, the arithmetic average of that range is used. Gray shades indicate NBER recessions.
Black bars are unscheduled FOMC meetings which will be excluded in the regressions.
Figure A.4: Time series of misalignment for upcoming decision (perfect foresight)
End-of-month volatility and aggregate excess reserves. Two complications with
my measurements of EMarkett (rt f omc) arise from the fact that the effective Fed funds
rate (EFFR), rt does not perfectly match the “target rate,” formally rt = rtart + εt.
In a frictionless and risk-neutral world, it would hold ∑t εt = 0. The relevance
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and implications of risk premia were discussed in Section 1.2.2 and are omitted
here as a source of εt. The first source of non-zero εt are end-of-month/settlement-
period effects, which normally affects the average EFFR only by very few basis
points. However, when very high volatility materializes (mostly relevant for before
2000) and the FOMC takes place at the end of the month (large dD−d ), it can bias
EMarkett (rt f omc). To avoid such bias, I replace r̄t<d with r̄
tar
t<d for the sample before
2002 at end-of-month FOMC meetings. I choose 2002 because it marks the end of a
downward trend in the standard deviation of daily values of the EFFR, see Figure
A.5. An alternative break point could be 2000 but I prefer 2002 because it excludes


















































































Notes: Standard deviation of daily effective fed funds rate computed over FOMC periods.
Figure A.5: Standard deviation of daily effective fed funds rate by FOMC period
The second source of εt are more persistent shifts in the position of the average
EFFR relative to target. This is most important in the post-crisis period. First
because the FOMC started to announe a target range instead of a target rate and
second because of the build-up of large aggregate excess reserve holdings in the
banking system. During this period, the EFFR deviated systematically from the mid
point of the range. Examining the forecast errors implied by the futures suggests
that markets are indeed able to predict these deviations correctly (unreported).
I adjust the measure of the target rate and of misalignment (defined below) to
account for the fact that the market correctly anticipates them. I do this by using,
for the post-crisis period, the realized average effective fed funds rate instead of
the future target rate for the misalignment measure under perfect foresight. Table
A.15 shows that the main findings do not change with this adjustment.
Contract months. If the next FOMC meeting is in the current month, we use
the expected rate EMarkett (rt f omc) as implied by the generic current month contract
(FF1t). If it is in the month following the current month, we use the generic second
month contract (FF2t). Let t f omc be the date of the next FOMC meeting at any date
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t. Let m(t) be the function that returns the number of the calendar month of date t.
The contracts used to derive EMarkett (rt f omc) are then
Contract used =

FF1t, if m(t f omc) = m(t)
FF2t, if m(t f omc) = m(t) + 1
FF3t, if m(t f omc) = m(t) + 2.
(A.1)
Instrument Bloomberg Ticker Reference period
30 Day Federal Funds Futures (from CBOT) ff1 Comdty Current calendar month
30 Day Federal Funds Futures (from CBOT) ff2 Comdty Next calendar month
30 Day Federal Funds Futures (from CBOT) ff3 Comdty After next calendar month
OIS based on FOMC announcement dates USSOFED1 Curncy Next FOMC
OIS based on FOMC announcement dates USSOFED2 Curncy After next FOMC
Notes: The table lists the Bloomberg tickers of the time series used to construct the measures of
market expectations in this analysis.





















































Target Rate Futures implied expectation
Notes: The figure plots the market’s expectations concerning the interest rate after the next
FOMC decision EMarkett (r
tar
t f omc ), as defined in Equation 1.2, along with the actual Fed funds target
rate rtart f omc .









































































Target Rate Futures OIS
Notes: The figure plots interest expectations based on Fed funds futures and OIS swaps. Vertical
bars mark dates of FOMC meetings.
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Notes: The figure shows kernel estimates of the empirical density functions of misalignment
measures.
Figure A.8: Empirical distribution of misalignment
A.1.3 Measuring macroeconomic news
Table A.6 provides the Bloomberg ticker and basic summary statistics for the data
used to construct the surprise indices covering the categories employment, inflation,
output and macro-sentiment. Variables are first standardized with telescopic averages
and standard deviations. To summarize all variables within a given category, the
equally weighted average of these standardised variables is computed. Let surpCt









where N is the number of surprise variables in category C and x̂t,j,C is the stan-
dardised data surprise for variable j on day t.
event category ticker Obs Start End Mean(X) σ(X) Mean(x̂) σ(x̂)
Initial Jobless Claims employment INJCJC Index 1084 1997 2018 -46.13 17521.28 -0.02 0.98
Change in Nonfarm Payrolls employment NFP TCH Index 255 1997 2018 -13180.39 82430.83 0.00 0.80
Change in Manufact. Payrolls employment USMMMNCH Index 233 1999 2018 -5394.12 21663.72 0.25 0.74
Unemployment Rate employment USURTOT Index 254 1997 2018 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.99
Avg Weekly Hours Production employment USWHTOT Index 130 1999 2010 -0.02 0.10 -0.04 0.92
ADP Employment Change employment ADP CHNG Index 141 2006 2018 5943.26 52689.90 0.15 0.79
Average Weekly Hours All Employees employment AWH TOTL Index 99 2010 2018 -0.01 0.08 -0.17 0.99
Change in Private Payrolls employment NFP PCH Index 97 2010 2018 -5443.30 58715.76 0.02 0.84
Change in Household Employment employment USEMNCHG Index 16 2013 2016 -36.69 267.28 -0.04 0.94
CPI MoM inflation CPI CHNG Index 259 1996 2018 -0.01 0.12 0.05 1.04
CPI Ex Food and Energy YoY inflation CPI XYOY Index 175 2003 2018 -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.90
CPI YoY inflation CPI YOY Index 176 2003 2018 0.00 0.15 -0.06 0.83
CPI Ex Food and Energy MoM inflation CPUPXCHG Index 257 1997 2018 -0.01 0.09 0.03 1.02
CPI Index NSA inflation CPURNSA Index 164 1998 2018 4.07 25.89 -0.27 0.28
Employment Cost Index inflation ECI SA% Index 85 1997 2018 -0.01 0.17 -0.02 0.90
GDP Price Deflator inflation GDP DCHG Index 85 1998 2005 -0.07 0.74 0.21 0.39
ISM Prices Paid inflation NAPMPRIC Index 215 2000 2018 0.36 5.11 0.06 0.91
PCE Core YoY inflation PCE CYOY Index 164 2004 2018 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.87
PCE Deflator YoY inflation PCE DEFY Index 163 2004 2018 -0.01 0.13 -0.06 0.71
PPI MoM inflation PPI CHNG Index 193 1997 2014 0.02 0.46 0.09 1.14
PPI Ex Food and Energy YoY inflation PPI XYOY Index 115 2003 2014 0.00 0.24 0.06 0.84
PPI YoY inflation PPI YOY Index 119 2002 2014 0.05 0.51 -0.15 0.92
PPI Ex Food and Energy MoM inflation PXFECHNG Index 205 1996 2014 0.00 0.25 0.09 1.06
CPI Core Index SA inflation CPUPAXFE Index 64 2010 2018 -0.01 0.20 0.13 0.89
GDP Price Index inflation GDP PIQQ Index 156 2005 2018 -0.03 0.37 0.02 0.92
Core PCE QoQ inflation GDPCPCEC Index 141 2006 2018 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.85
PCE Core MoM inflation PCE CMOM Index 155 2005 2018 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.84
PCE Deflator MoM inflation PCE DEFM Index 74 2012 2018 -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.92
PPI Final Demand MoM inflation FDIDFDMO Index 53 2014 2018 -0.01 0.26 0.00 0.83
PPI Ex Food, Energy, Trade MoM inflation FDIDSGUM Index 41 2014 2018 0.00 0.19 0.28 0.89
PPI Final Demand YoY inflation FDIUFDYO Index 52 2014 2018 -0.02 0.26 0.06 0.92
PPI Ex Food, Energy, Trade YoY inflation FDIUSGUY Index 16 2014 2017 -0.07 0.17 0.41 0.81
ABC Consumer Confidence macro_sent ACNFCOMF Index 131 2004 2011 -0.64 2.76 -0.03 0.88
Bloomberg Consumer Comfort macro_sent COMFCOMF Index 167 2004 2012 -0.54 2.54 -0.01 0.83
Conf. Board Consumer Confidence macro_sent CONCCONF Index 254 1997 2018 0.27 4.94 -0.03 1.02
Avg Hourly Earning MOM Prod other USHETOT% Index 140 1998 2010 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.91
Avg Hourly Earning YOY Prod other USHEYOY Index 47 2003 2010 0.04 0.17 -0.13 0.90
Average Hourly Earnings MoM other AHE MOM% Index 99 2010 2018 -0.05 0.15 0.07 0.90
Average Hourly Earnings YoY other AHE YOY% Index 99 2010 2018 -0.03 0.18 -0.04 0.96
GDP Annualized QoQ output GDP CQOQ Index 253 1997 2018 0.02 0.48 -0.15 0.89
Leading Index output LEI CHNG Index 253 1996 2018 0.02 0.17 0.03 1.15
ISM Non-Manufacturing output NAPMNMAN Index 109 1999 2008 0.43 3.37 -0.04 0.99
ISM Manufacturing output NAPMPMI Index 258 1996 2018 0.14 1.86 0.03 0.97
Retail Sales Advance MoM output RSTAMOM Index 205 2001 2018 -0.01 0.58 -0.07 0.63
Retail Sales Ex Auto MoM output RSTAXMOM Index 205 2001 2018 -0.03 0.44 -0.01 0.86
Advance Retail Sales output RTSDCHNG Index 54 1996 2001 -0.01 0.34 0.23 1.02
Retail Sales Less Autos output RTSDXCHG Index 47 1997 2001 0.01 0.29 0.34 1.29
ISM Non-Manf. Composite output NAPMNMI Index 124 2008 2018 0.12 1.93 0.08 0.80
Retail Sales Ex Auto and Gas output RSTAXAG% Index 107 2009 2018 -0.06 0.32 -0.14 0.87
ISM New Orders output NAPMNEWO Index 3 2016 2017 1.57 1.55 -0.76 0.08
Notes: List of data releases included in the macro surprise indices. Data is from Bloomberg’s ECOS function. X is
the surprise variable defined as actual minus the median forecast from the Bloomberg survey. σX is the standard
deviation. x̂ is the standardised surprise variable. Standardisation is done with telescopic means and standard
deviations to avoid forward-looking biases. The category column follows the classification in Beber et al. (2015).
Table A.6: Data underlying macro surprise indeces
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A.1.4 Forward-looking Taylor Rules
For few occasions where the interest rate projections underlying Greenbook fore-
casts are not available, I estimate forward-looking Taylor rules to construct interest
rate projections from the inflation and output forecasts.
Dependent variable:
it Orphanides FGB(it) FGB(it+1) FGB(it+2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
θπ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.130) (0.046) (0.072) (0.092)
θ∆y 0.300∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.170) (0.041) (0.059) (0.066)
θy 0.245∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.030) (0.023) (0.028) (0.036)
θi 0.778∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.060) (0.030) (0.038) (0.045)
θ0 −0.130 −0.340 −0.049 −0.144 −0.232∗
(0.088) (0.320) (0.086) (0.116) (0.133)
Observations 160 - 144 158 157
R2 0.978 - 0.980 0.959 0.948
Adjusted R2 0.977 - 0.979 0.958 0.947
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS estimates of
xt = θ0 + θixt−1 + θππat+3 + θ∆y∆
ayt+3 + θyyt−1, where x is the realized average Fed funds rate
(it), the Greenbook forecast for the current (FGB(it)), next (FGB(it+1)) or after next (FGB(it+2))
quarter. The equation follows Orphanides (2003) and column 2 shows the estimates by Or-
phanides, based on the sample period 1982Q3 to 1997Q4. The first column is on the largest
sample from 1987Q2 to 2007Q4.
Table A.7: Taylor rule estimates
Median forecasts from the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) are likely
not a viable alternative to the Taylor rule implied interest rate projections. The SEP
was first released in October 2007, but only from 2012 onwards it includes a table
with forecasts for the Fed funds rate. Between 2007 and 2012, the SEP includes
a section where individual members comment on whether their forecast for the
target rate is aligned with the Greenbook projections, converting this into a FOMC
median forecast would entail many degrees of freedom as the format and content











Constant −0.060 −0.079 −0.085
(0.060) (0.082) (0.091)
Observations 150 164 163
R2 0.977 0.955 0.945
Adjusted R2 0.977 0.955 0.944
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. The table shows regressions of Greenbook interest rate
projections on the Taylor Rule implied interest rate forecasts based on inflation and output gap
forecasts.
Table A.8: Comparison of Greenbook interest rate projections and rates implied by Taylor Rule
using Greenbook forecasts
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A.2 Further analysis and robustness tests
(a) Presidents
Dependent variable: τjt
misalt−1 −0.164∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.059) (0.053) (0.064)
Speaker FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Subset MP5 MP7.5 MP10 MP12.5
Observations 938 762 589 449
R2 0.231 0.254 0.239 0.263
(b) Governors
Dependent variable: τjt
misalt−1 −0.066 −0.098∗ −0.157∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.053) (0.063) (0.089)
Speaker FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Subset MP5 MP7.5 MP10 MP12.5
Observations 765 483 289 194
R2 0.113 0.111 0.116 0.217
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation: τj,t = a + αj + βmisalt−1 +
θmisalt−1× Statusjt + φStatusjt + γXt−1 + εj,t for subsets on speeches based on monetary policy
relevance measure defined in the main text. “Presidents” (“Governors”) denotes the sample
of speeches by Fed presidents (Fed Board Governors). Standard errors are HC White-Hubert.
misalt−1 is lagged 5-day rolling average misalignment, standardized by its standard deviation.
Statusjt is a dummy equal to one if the speaker is a voting FOMC member (in the Fed presidents
sample) or equal to one if the speaker is the chair/vice chair (in the Board of Governors sample).
Controls are data surprises for 51 macroeconomic variables at t− 1 (see Appendix A.1.3) and
dummies for the Asian, Russian, Dotcom and 2008 financial crisis. Sample includes speeches
within 5 weeks of the upcoming FOMC. ZLB period is excluded.




1Q ahead 1Q ahead 2Q ahead 2Q ahead
misalt−1 −0.199 −0.012 −0.210∗∗ −0.028
(0.122) (0.161) (0.103) (0.136)
misalt−1 ×Votingjt −0.467∗∗ −0.452∗∗
(0.201) (0.179)
MPshock 1.990 1.046 2.288 1.621
(3.710) (3.611) (3.744) (3.583)
Obs 205 205 200 200
R2 0.387 0.395 0.394 0.402
(b) Governors
Dependent variable: τjt
1Q ahead 1Q ahead 2Q ahead 2Q ahead
misalt−1 −0.189 0.173 −0.169 0.174
(0.182) (0.198) (0.162) (0.203)
misalt−1 × Chairsjt −1.121∗∗∗ −0.845∗∗
(0.324) (0.328)
MPshock 9.261∗∗ 10.008∗∗ 8.995∗∗ 9.711∗∗
(4.036) (4.248) (3.941) (4.111)
Obs 102 102 100 100
R2 0.309 0.359 0.306 0.346
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Speech sentiment τjt on day t is regressed on the mis-
alignment based on Greenbook projections between 1996 and 2012. “Presidents” (“Governors”)
denotes the sample of speeches by Fed presidents (Fed Board Governors). Standard errors are
HC White-Hubert. Misalignment compares market expectations measured at date t with the
projections from the most recent Greenbook. Votingjt (Chairsjt) is a dummy equal to one if the
speaker is a voting president (chair/vice chair of Fed Board). For each Greenbook, speeches
up to 3 weeks after it was released to the FOMC are included. Periods between unscheduled
and subsequent scheduled FOMC meetings are excluded. Controls are rolling 5-day averages of
data surprises at t− 1 (see A.1.3) and real-time estimates of previous quarters CPI inflation and
real GDP growth obtained from the Greenbooks. Based on the subsets of speeches “MP10” with
at least 10% of all words are “monetary policy relevant words.”
Table A.10: Effects of misalignment based on Greenbook projections, controlling for monetary




misalt−1 −0.288∗∗∗ −0.452∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗ −0.308∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.110) (0.081) (0.098)
misalt−1 × week3 0.170 0.428∗∗ 0.342 0.032
(0.150) (0.174) (0.292) (0.337)
misalt−1 × week4 0.071 0.281∗∗ 0.199 −0.012
(0.102) (0.143) (0.151) (0.241)
misalt−1 × week5 −0.048 0.176 0.390∗ 0.040
(0.150) (0.177) (0.200) (0.228)
Speeches MP10 MP12.5 MP10 MP12.5
Speaker FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 589 449 289 193
R2 0.248 0.281 0.134 0.225
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation:
τjt = αj + βmisalt−1 + ∑5week=3 γ
week ×misalt−1 + γXt−1 + ejt. Misalignment is standardized
by its standard devation. “Presidents” (“Governors”) denotes the sample of speeches by Fed
presidents (Fed Board Governors). Standard errors are HC White-Hubert. Controls are data
surprises for 51 macroeconomic variables at t− 1 (see A.1.3) and dummies for the Asian, Russian,
Dotcom and 2008 financial crisis. Based on the subsets of speeches “MP10” (“MP12.5”), at least
10% (12.5%) of all words are “monetary policy relevant words”, and within 5 weeks of the
upcoming FOMC. ZLB period is excluded.




misalt−1 −0.170∗∗∗ −0.189∗ −0.164∗∗
(0.061) (0.110) (0.067)
misalt−1 ×Votingjt −0.250∗∗ −0.174∗ −0.273∗∗
(0.111) (0.103) (0.129)
Excl GFC N N Y
FOMC FE N Y N
Observations 589 589 559
R2 0.247 0.578 0.197
(b) Governors
Dependent variable: τjt
misalt−1 −0.055 −0.325 −0.073
(0.078) (0.416) (0.079)
misalt−1 × Chairsjt −0.273∗∗ −0.265∗ −0.305∗∗
(0.121) (0.156) (0.150)
Excl GFC N N Y
FOMC FE N Y N
Observations 289 289 274
R2 0.122 0.608 0.111
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation: τj,t = a + αj + βmisalt−1 +
γXt−1 + εj,t, where (j, t) indexes speaker and day of speech. misalt−1 is lagged 5-day rolling
average misalignment, standardized by its standard deviation. “Presidents” (“Governors”)
denotes the sample of speeches by Fed presidents (Fed Board Governors). Standard errors are
HC White-Hubert. Controls are data surprises for 51 macroeconomic variables at t− 1 (see
Appendix A.1.3) and dummies for the Asian, Russian, Dotcom and 2008 financial crisis. Sample
includes speeches of the subset “MP10” (least 10% of all words are “monetary policy relevant
words”), and within 5 weeks of the upcoming FOMC. ZLB period is excluded.




Adj. L&McD Original L&McD Apel & Grimaldi
misalt−1 −0.244∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −6.157∗∗
(0.053) (0.052) (2.408)
Speaker FE Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Observations 589 589 589
R2 0.239 0.257 0.106
(b) Governors
Dependent variable: τjt
Adj. L&McD Original L&McD Apel & Grimaldi
misalt−1 −0.157∗∗ −0.139∗∗ −10.269∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.059) (3.803)
Speaker FE Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Observations 289 289 289
R2 0.116 0.115 0.119
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation: τj,t = a + αj + βmisalt−1 +
θmisalt−1× Statusj,t +φStatusj,t +γXt−1 + εj,t for subsets on speeches based on monetary policy
relevance measure defined in the main text. “Presidents” (“Governors”) denotes the sample
of speeches by Fed presidents (Fed Board Governors). Standard errors are HC White-Hubert.
misalt−1 is lagged 5-day rolling average misalignment, standardized by its standard deviation.
Statusj,t is a dummy equal to one if the speaker is a voting FOMC member (in the Fed presidents
sample), or equal to one if the speaker is the chair/vicec hair (in the Board of Governors sample).
Controls are data surprises for 51 macroeconomic variables at t− 1 (see Appendix A.1.3) and
dummies for the Asian, Russian, Dotcom and 2008 financial crisis. Sample includes speeches
within 5 weeks of the upcoming FOMC. ZLB period is excluded.
Table A.13: Different speech tone measures
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Dependent variable: Prob(Speech with “Mexp”)jt
Presidents Governors
abs(misal)t−1 0.89 0.78∗ −0.05 0.26
(0.60) (0.46) (0.38) (0.30)
abs(misal)t−1 × Statusjt 1.05∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗
(0.40) (0.32) (0.43) (0.40)
Model Logit Relogit Logit Relogit
Obs 4490 4490 3700 3700
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Relogit uses a rare-events logistic regression estimator
that corrects for the potential small sample bias stemming fron a rare-event outcome vari-
able. Estimates of equation Prob(Topic = “Mexp”)jt = φ
[
β abs(misal)t−1 + θ abs(misal)t−1 ×
Statusjt + Statusjt + φ abs(misal)t−2 + Xjt−1
]
where (j, t) indexes speaker and week. “Presi-
dents” (“Governors”) denotes the sample of speeches by Fed presidents (Fed Board Governors),
both including weeks 5 to 2 before each FOMC. Topicjt = “Mexp” indicates whether a speech
mentions market expectations. abs(misalt−1) is the absolute value of misalignment. Xt−1 is a
vector of controls (see main text). Statusjt is a dummy equal to one if the speaker is a voting
FOMC member (in the Fed presidents sample) or equal to one if the speaker is chair/vice chair
(in the Board of Governors sample).




misalt−1 −0.176∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗ −0.054 −0.043 −0.037
(0.065) (0.065) (0.062) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
misalt−1 × Statusjt −0.243∗∗ −0.242∗∗ −0.169∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.114) (0.093) (0.061) (0.070) (0.066)
Incl ZLB N N Y N N Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
Speaker FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs 589 589 789 289 289 336
R2 0.238 0.241 0.214 0.101 0.119 0.114
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation: τj,t = a + αj + βmisalt−1 +
θmisalt−1 × Statusj,t + φStatusj,t + γXt−1 + εj,t. “Presidents” (“Governors”) denotes the sample of
speeches by Fed presidents (Fed Board Governors). “Incl ZLB” indicates whether zero lower bound
period was included. Standard errors are clustered at the speaker-level. misalt−1 is misalignment
about the future effective Fed funds rate (EFFR), not future target rate as in baseline. EFFR-
misalignment is used to account for QE-related structural shifts of the EFFR within the target
rate corridor. Statusj,t is a dummy equal to one if the speaker is a voting FOMC member (in the
Fed presidents sample), or equal to one if the speaker is the chair/vice chair (in the Board of
Governors sample). Controls are data surprises for 51 macroeconomic variables at t− 1 (see A.1.3)
and dummies for the Asian, Russian, Dotcom and 2008 financial crisis. Sample includes speeches
of the subset “MP10” (at least 10% of all words are “monetary policy relevant”), and within 5
weeks of the upcoming FOMC.
Table A.15: Effects of misalignment (about EFFR) and ZLB
Appendix A 133
A.3 Model Appendix
A.3.1 Deriving the optimal forecast function
Since all variables involved are zero mean, I can omit the constant. Optimal
coefficients are given by




i∗t − (a1∆it + a2st)
)2] (A.3)
Differentiating with respect to (a1, a2) gives the usual orthogonality conditions
E
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Inverting the variance-covariance matrix and multiplying from the left gives the
coefficients:
a1 =
Var(st)Cov(i∗t , ∆it)− Cov(∆it, st)Cov(st, i∗t )
Var(st)Var(∆it)− Cov(st, ∆it)2
a2 =
Var(∆it)Cov(i∗t , st)− Cov(∆it, st)Cov(∆it, i∗t )
Var(st)Var(∆it)− Cov(st, ∆it)2
.
A.3.2 Deriving the loss function
Due to the random walk property of the Fed target, the t = 2 infinite-horizon




2 |∆i1, s2) = ê1,t=2. Thus the change
in the forward rate in period 2 is
∆i∞2 = ê1,t=2 − ê1,t=1
= (α1 − χ)∆i1 + α2s2
(∆i∞2 )
2 = (α1 − χ)2(∆i1)2 + 2(α1 − χ)α2∆i1s2 + α22s22.
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The other loss term in period 2, (i∗2 − i2)2, is obtained by plugging in the respective
definitions. We have
(i∗2 − i2)2 =
(




e1 − (βs2 + u2)
)2
= σ2e − 2e1(βs2 + u2) + β2s22 + σ2u
In period 3, the market will be able to fully infer e1 because the central bank is
known to set the nominal interest rate exactly at target. The change in the forward
rate will be
∆i∞3 = e1 − ê1,t=2
(∆i∞3 )
2 = (e1 − ê1,t=2)2
= σ2e − 2e1(α1∆i1 + α2s2) + (α1∆i1 + α2s2)2.
As the central bank sets the interest rate to target, we have (i∗3 − i3)2 = 0.
A.3.3 Remarks on central bank’s loss function
A noteworthy feature of this setup lies with the interpretation of the central bank’s
aversion to bond market volatility. Due to the random-walk assumption on the Fed
target rate, the infinite-horizon forward rate equals always the market’s estimate of
the former. In Stein and Sunderam, the measure used as volatility is the squared
change in the infinite-horizon forward rate. This term can be rewritten in terms of
the expectational error with respect to the true target rate:
∆i∞1 = ẽ1,1 − ẽ1,0
= −
[
e1 − ẽ1,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
FE1
− (e1 − ẽ1,0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FE0
]
∆i∞2 = e1 − ẽ1,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
FE1
.
The important implication is that while in period 2 the central bank cares about the
level of expectational error, in period 1 the central bank cares only about the change
in the expectational error. If one would instead assume that every period new
information about the target rate arrives, we would have (∆i∞1 )
2 = (∆FE1 − ∆e1)2.
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A.3.4 Proof of proposition 1
With Equations 1.26, it’s immediately clear that if θ = 0, k = 1. Also, v1 = β and


























It follows immediately the content of Proposition A.3.4: If θ = 0 and β > 0,
k = 1 and α1, α2 > 0. From Equation 1.24, α1 > 0 requires σ2e , σ2γ > 0. For α2, the
expression above trivally suggests that iff β, σ2u > 0, α2 > 0.
A.3.5 Further illustrations














































Varying relative noisiness of communication
Notes: The figure plots the equilibrium value of v1 − k ∗ v2 as a function of θ. A.9a varies the
ratio of the variance of interest rate noise σ2u to the variance of the private information σ2e . A.9b
varies the ratio of the variance of the communication noise σ2σ to the variance of the private
information σ2e .
Figure A.9: Analysis of threshold θ̄
The main feature of the multiplicity is the emergence of α2 < 0. To find θ̄, I
solve the model for different values of θ, starting at θ = 0 and going to θ = 1 with
a stepsize of 0.0125. By Equation 1.25, we must have v1 − k ∗ v2 > 0 for α2 < 0.
I therefore use it as a sufficient statistic for equilibrium uniqueness. Figure A.9
shows the results. Indeed, v1 − k ∗ v2 is positive and monotonically increasing in θ
until a discontinuity emerges: v1 − k ∗ v2 suddenly jumps to negative values. This
is the numerical solution for the critical threshold value θ̄.
Figure A.9a illustrates that θ̄ is decreasing in the variance of the interest rate
noise relative to the variance of the private information. As explained in the main
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text, the intuition is that as the relative variance of the interest rate noise term
increases, the margin of error for the market’s estimate in period 1 increases. This
leaves more room for speculation and hence makes multiple equilibria possible for
lower degrees of aversion to bond market volatility. The opposite holds for the vari-
ance of the noise term in the signal s (Fig. A.9b) As the noisiness of communication
increases, agents put less weight on it and therefore the interpretation becomes less
important.
Figure A.16 compares the outcomes in the two types of equilibria (see discussion
in main text).
(a) unique equilibrium with θ = 0.2
Private info (i∗) Interest rate Guess of i∗ (end of per) Signal Loss (i∗ − i)2 Loss((∆i∞)2)
Period 1 0.750 0.697 0.347 - 0.003 0.024
Period 2 0.750 0.710 0.662 7.104 0.002 0.020
Period 3 0.750 0.750 0.750 - 0.000 0.002
Total - - - - 0.004 0.045
(b) bad equilibrium with θ = 0.6
Private info (i∗) Interest rate Guess of i∗ (end of per) Signal Loss(i∗ − i)2 Loss((∆i∞)2)
Period 1 0.750 0.708 0.353 - 0.002 0.075
Period 2 0.750 -0.051 0.367 -0.507 0.641 0.001
Period 3 0.750 0.750 0.750 - 0.000 0.088
Total - - - - 0.643 0.163
Notes: The trajectory of key variables is reported for θ = 0.2 and θ = 0.6. For illustration the





3 = e1 for simplicity and without loss of generality. Loss(i ∗ −i)2 and Loss((∆i∞)2)
show the central bank’s loss due to the wedge between the actual short rate and the target
rate and the loss due to bond market volatility respectively. The baseline calibration was used
σ2u , σ2γ, σ2e = 1 and β = 0.1.
Table A.16: Equilibrium outcomes
A.4 Narrative analysis
This Appendix provides a brief narrative analysis of FOMC transcripts and minutes
to showcase how FOMC members are comparing their own and market expecta-
tions, consistent with the observed misalignment measure. Important parts are
highlighted in bold letters.
Positive misalignment ahead of the tightening cycles in 1999 and 2004.
• Transcript from the FOMC meeting on 12th August 2003:
– Kohn: “In that regard, the implied upturn in Eurodollar rates next
spring is at odds with the flat path in the staff forecast and I suspect
from the tenor our last meeting with many of our own forecasts as
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well. The market seems to be anticipating some combination of a more
vigorous bounceback in demand and greater inflation pressure than is
built into these forecasts.”
– Ferguson: “Nobody can understand fully why market expectations for
monetary policy have shifted so dramatically toward a future tighten-
ing by the FOMC. It may be due to the more positive tone in the recent
economic information, as Governor Kohn has suggested, but it may also
be that communication challenges will create a bit of a problem for us
going forward.”
– Bernanke: “This time around is different, or should be. Inflation is not a
threat. Therefore, the FOMC does not need to take away the punch bowl
so early in the party, so by rights interest rates should remain subdued
despite the pickup in growth. Judging by federal funds futures and
other indicators, however, the markets have largely missed this point
and have bid up interest rates well beyond where they ought to be
in some sense, to the detriment of the recovery. To the extent that we
can sharpen our message that economic growth no longer implies an
immediate and automatic policy tightening, we should make every
effort to do so.”
The statements made in 1999 are less straightforwardly interpreted in terms of
“misalignment” but there are still clear references to market expectations and
comparisons to the FOMC views.
• Minutes from the FOMC meeting on 30th March 1999:
– The FOMC members agreed that the next policy move was likely to be a
tightening:
∗ “many of the members commented that the risks to their forecasts
were tilted toward the eventual emergence of somewhat greater
inflation pressures.”
∗ “While many believed that the next policy move likely would be
in the direction of some tightening, such an outcome was not a
foregone conclusion, and in any event the timing of the next policy
action was highly uncertain.”
– But “it was clear that forecasts in recent years typically had overstated
the rise in inflation”
– And therefore “the members agreed that were they to announce a shift
to a tightening bias, it would likely have in current circumstances a
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relatively pronounced and undesired effect on financial markets. In
particular, the markets might well build in higher odds of a policy
tightening move at the May or June meetings than currently was con-
sistent with the members’ thinking.”
• Transcript from FOMC Meeting in May 1999:
– Ferguson: “As others have indicated, the markets have already priced
in some of this policy tightening, so we need not be concerned about
an outsized reaction on their part, although there may be some as Don
Kohn has indicated. ”
– Poole: “I anticipate a tightening trend. [...] I think we need to have
some idea of how much that is going to be. [...] it is possible that
the markets will move long-term interest rates higher than we might
consider justified. I think we are now at about the outer time limit of
being able to make a credible case that we are simply undoing some of
the policy easing from last fall. The more distant in time that becomes,
the less credible it will be to appeal to that as a way of providing some
cap on market expectations of where this tightening process might
take us.”
Negative misalignment during 2007. For most part of the year 2007, market
expectations have been more dovish than the Fed’s own expectations. However,
there were considerable dynamics within the year. According to the transcripts,
misalignment narrowed by June 2007 before it widened again, consistent with
observed misalignment.
• Transcript from FOMC in March 2007:
– Dudley: “Nevertheless, the potential gap between market expectations
and the Committee’s interest rate expectations may pose a bit of a
conundrum for the Committee. If the Committee were to shift the bias
of its statement in the direction of neutral, market expectations with
respect to easing would undoubtedly be pulled forward and might
become more pronounced.”
• Transcript from FOMC meeting in June 2007:
– Moskow: “The change in fed funds futures brings market expectations
into better alignment with what I think will be the appropriate path for
monetary policy.”
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– Reinhart: “For all this year you have been hinting that prevailing mar-
ket expectations for the fed funds rate were too low. Now that market
participants have adjusted in your desired direction, you might not
want to surprise them.”
• Transcript from FOMC in October 2007:
– Kohn: “The expectations now built into markets imply too much eas-





Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of speeches 1,735 0.504 0.814 0.000 4.000
Tone of speeches 586 96.093 1.337 90.810 99.457
Regional unemployment 1,735 5.745 1.763 2.725 11.481
Absolute unemployment gap 1,735 0.650 0.542 0.002 2.746
Regional inflation 1,735 2.406 1.314 -4.366 6.275
Absolute inflation gap 1,735 0.673 0.635 0.000 4.495
Regional return on assets 1,735 1.185 0.556 -3.330 2.780
Absolute return on assets gap 1,735 0.258 0.299 0.000 3.230
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the variables employed in the econometric analysis.
Table B.1: Summary statistics
District MSA MSA-states Series ID Source
Boston Boston-Cambridge-Newton MA-NH CUURA103SA0 fred
New York New York-Newark-Jersey City NY-NJ-PA CUURA101SA0 fred
Philadelphia Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington PA-NJ-DE-MD CUURA102SA0 fred
Cleveland Cleveland-Akron OH CUURA210SA0 fred
Richmond Washington-Baltimore (pre 2008) DC-VA-MD-WV CUURA311SA0 fred
Richmond Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV CUURS35ASA0 bls
Atlanta Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell GA CUURA319SA0 fred
Chicago Chicago-Naperville-Elgin IL-IN-WI CUURA207SA0 fred
St. Louis St Louis MO-IL CUURA209SA0 fred
Minneapolis Minneapolis-St.Paul-Bloomington MN CUURS24ASA0 bls
Kansas City Denver-Aurora-Lakewood CO CUURS48BSA0 bls
Dallas Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington TX CUURA316SA0 fred
Dallas Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land TX CUURA318SA0 fred
San Francisco Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County CA CUURA421SA0 fred
San Francisco San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward CA CUURA422SA0 fred
Notes: The table shows lists the data sources used to compile CPI inflation for individual districts of the
Federal Reserve System.
Table B.2: Population weights of states within Fed districts
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District State Weight District State Weight
Boston Connecticut 0.199 St Louis Illinois 0.113
Maine 0.099 Missouri 0.278
Massachusetts 0.486 Arkansas 0.188
New Hampshire 0.090 Indiana 0.068
Rhode Island 0.081 Kentucky 0.164
Vermont 0.045 Mississippi 0.080
New York Connecticut 0.034 Tennessee 0.108
New Jersey 0.220 Minneapolis Michigan 0.042
New York 0.745 Minnesota 0.578
Philadelphia Delaware 0.058 North Dakota 0.084
New Jersey 0.209 South Dakota 0.092
Pennsylvania 0.733 Wisconsin 0.099
Cleveland Ohio 0.673 Montana 0.105
Kentucky 0.101 Kansas Kansas 0.183
Pennsylvania 0.214 Missouri 0.120
West Virginia 0.011 Colorado 0.243
Richmond Virginia 0.265 New Mexico 0.071
West Virginia 0.070 Wyoming 0.034
Dc 0.026 Oklahoma 0.232
Maryland 0.205 Nebraska 0.117
North Carolina 0.284 Dallas Louisiana 0.050
South Carolina 0.149 Texas 0.920
Atlanta Georgia 0.203 New Mexico 0.030
Tennessee 0.111 San Francisco California 0.637
Alabama 0.127 Hawaii 0.024
Florida 0.406 Nevada 0.026
Louisiana 0.103 Arizona 0.078
Mississippi 0.049 Idaho 0.022
Chicago Illinois 0.327 Oregon 0.061
Indiana 0.153 Washington 0.104
Iowa 0.091 Utah 0.037
Wisconsin 0.135 Alaska 0.012
Michigan 0.293
Notes: The table shows the weights of each state within a Fed district based on population weights based
on material published by the Federal Reserve Board (access link here).






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































First intervention All interventions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Absolute UE gap (βWu ) 0.058 – 0.064 0.024 – 0.023
(0.143) (0.144) (0.044) (0.044)
Absolute UE gap × voting (γWuv) -0.095 – -0.107 0.018 – 0.020
(0.138) (0.147) (0.034) (0.036)
Number of speeches (βWN ) – -0.065 -0.068 – 0.010 0.009
(0.051) (0.048) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of speeches × voting (γWNv) – 0.070 0.079 – -0.011 -0.014
(0.061) (0.060) (0.015) (0.016)
Voting status (βWv ) -0.052 -0.146*** -0.082 0.011 0.027 0.016
(0.089) (0.046) (0.089) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
Absolute UE gap, voting (βWu + γWuv) -0.037 -0.044 0.042 0.043
(0.125) (0.133) (0.031) (0.029)
Number of speeches, voting (βWN + γ
W
Nv) 0.004 0.012 -0.001 -0.004
(0.056) (0.060) (0.011) (0.012)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
President FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.335 0.335 0.336 0.849 0.849 0.849
Observations 1,714 1,714 1,714 1,714 1,714 1,714
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the effect of regional macroeconomic conditions, the
number of speeches and voting status on the tone of interventions at the FOMC meeting, following the OLS
regression: Wi,t = µi + µt + βWu |udit − uUS,t|+ β
W
v vdit + γ
W
uvvdit|udit − uUS,t|+ β
W
N Ni,t + γ
W
Nv Ni,tvdit + εit.
The left panel relates to the tone of the first intervention at the FOMC meeting, the right panel to the
tone of all interventions together. Standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients in bold are statistically
significantly different from the top row coefficients at least at the 10% level. ***/**/* denote statistical
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.





C.1.1 Robustness: Macro heterogeneity
Dep-var: ∆kp,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mp$W ×Mat
$
p,Z −1.268∗∗ −0.659∗∗ −1.695∗∗ −1.270∗∗
(0.621) (0.272) (0.814) (0.484)
mp$W ×Mat
$
p,Z × 1nfltc,t −1.754∗∗∗ −3.178∗∗ −3.124∗∗ −2.755∗
(0.610) (1.550) (1.276) (1.435)
Maturing timing (Z) F2(t− 1)−F1(t) F1(t− 1)−F1(t) F2(t− 1)+2w F2(t− 1)+2w−F1(t)+2w
MP shock from (W) F2(t− 1) F1(t− 1)+F2(t− 1) F2(t− 1) F2(t− 1)+F1(t)
Obs 208,479 208,631 208,479 208,479
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.176 0.180 0.180
Notes: “Maturing timing (Z)” indicates the timing over which maturing debt is captured. “MP shock
from (W)” indicates the corresponding monetary shocks. F1(t− 1) refers to the first FOMC in previous
quarter, F1(t) to first FOMC in current quarter. F2(t− 1)+2w captures the two weeks following the second
FOMC in previous quarter. If two shocks are used (e.g. F2(t− 1)+F1(t)) the shocks are effectively weighted.
∆kp,c,t is the log change in net PPE, normalized by its standard deviation. Includes triple interaction with
openess index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006), estimates thus conditional on financial openness. All specs
include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction controls. Standard errors
two-way clustered by country and date. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
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Notes: Local projection estimates á la Jordà (2005) of the specification
kp,c,t+h − kp,c,t = βh mp$t−1 × Mat
$
p,t−1 + γ1Xp,t−1 + γ2 mp
$
t−1 × Xp,t−1 +~ap,t + εp,t,h,
for horizons h ∈ [0, 8]. k is in log of net PPE. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed futures
from same meeting (from Jarocinski,Karadi 2018). Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had
USD debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. ~ap,t denotes firm-, fiscal-quarter-,
and country×date FE. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
Figure C.1: Dynamics of maturing×shock-interaction coefficient
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Dep-var: ∆kp,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mat$p,t−1 0.006 −0.018 0.041 −0.005 −0.004
(0.043) (0.028) (0.044) (0.021) (0.032)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −1.782∗∗∗ −1.304∗∗∗ −2.889∗∗∗ −1.954∗∗∗ −2.441∗∗∗
(0.537) (0.399) (0.280) (0.637) (0.731)
Group All Float Non-Float Developed Developing
Obs 208,479 71,774 136,561 90,848 117,425
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.141 0.156 0.115 0.161
Notes: ∆kp,c,t is the log change in net PPE, normalized by its country-specific standard deviation.
Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous
quarter. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed futures from same meeting (from Jarociński
and Karadi, 2020). Includes triple interaction with openess index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006),
estimates thus conditional on financial openness. All specs include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and
country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction controls. Firm controls (at previous quarter) are real
sales growth, cash flow, log assets, leverage, cash/TA, variable-rate debt/TA, USD-debt-dummy.
Int-controls are interactions of mp$t−1 with the latter five controls. Standard errors two-way
clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
Table C.2: Spillover estimates by sub-sample, ∆kp,t normalized by country-specific SD
Dep-var: ∆kp,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mat$p,t−1 0.006 −0.018 −0.002 −0.016
(0.043) (0.028) (0.051) (0.083)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −1.782∗∗∗ −1.304∗∗∗ −3.021∗∗∗ −3.151∗∗∗
(0.537) (0.399) (0.768) (1.062)
Group All Float Managed Peg
Observations 208,479 71,774 66,437 69,826
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.141 0.121 0.215
Notes: ∆kp,c,t is the log change in net PPE, normalized by its country-specific standard deviation.
Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in
previous quarter. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed futures from same meeting (from
Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). Includes triple interaction with openess index KOc,t (Chinn and
Ito, 2006), so that estimates of maturing interactions are conditional on financial openness. All
specs include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction controls.
Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016,
crises excluded.
Table C.3: Granular classification of exchange rate regime
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Dep-var: ∆kp,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MP$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −1.258∗∗ −1.250∗∗ −1.272∗∗ −1.268∗∗ −1.273∗∗ −1.425∗∗∗
(0.596) (0.594) (0.625) (0.621) (0.554) (0.511)
MP$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −1.818∗∗∗ −1.790∗∗∗ −1.774∗∗∗ −1.754∗∗∗ −1.613∗∗ −1.392∗∗
(0.564) (0.571) (0.625) (0.610) (0.651) (0.626)
Int-controls None +TA +Cash +Lev +STdebt +TobinQ
Obs 208,479 208,479 208,479 208,479 206,005 179,268
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.184 0.202
Notes: Interaction controls are added 1-by-1 as indicated in row Int-controls. Cash and short-term debt
(STdebt) are ratios over total assets. Int-controls means triple interactions of mp$t−1 with firm controls
and ER-regime-dummy. Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt maturing after the last
FOMC in previous quarter. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed futures from same meeting
(from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). Includes triple interaction with openess index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito,
2006), estimates of maturing interactions are thus conditional on financial openness. All specifications
include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE. Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date.
Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
Table C.4: Floaters vs Not-Floaters-differences by controls
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excluded mp$ ×Mat$ mp$ ×Mat$ × 1nflt cccc excluded mp$ ×Mat$ mp$ ×Mat$ × 1nflt
IRL −1.32∗∗ (0.59) −1.70∗∗∗ (0.60) PER −1.23∗ (0.63) −1.26∗∗ (0.55)
FRA −1.30∗∗ (0.62) −1.72∗∗ (0.67) LKA −1.27∗∗ (0.58) −1.78∗∗∗ (0.65)
CYP −1.11∗∗ (0.58) −1.94∗∗ (0.80) CHL −1.28∗ (0.63) −1.88∗∗∗ (0.64)
ESP −1.15∗∗ (0.47) −1.92∗∗∗ (0.64) SWE −1.31∗∗ (0.63) −1.71∗∗ (0.64)
GRC −1.28∗∗ (0.63) −1.74∗∗ (0.64) TUR −1.30∗∗ (0.57) −1.58∗∗∗ (0.53)
GBR −1.38∗∗ (0.61) −1.67∗∗∗ (0.57) MEX −1.27∗∗ (0.62) −1.98∗∗ (0.95)
LUX −1.30∗∗ (0.62) −1.73∗∗ (0.70) POL −1.14∗ (0.64) −2.19∗∗ (0.89)
NLD −1.27∗ (0.64) −1.74∗∗ (0.71) DEU −1.37∗∗ (0.55) −1.67∗∗∗ (0.53)
DNK −1.27∗ (0.63) −1.75∗∗ (0.64) IND −1.32∗∗ (0.63) −1.89∗∗∗ (0.67)
CHE −1.52∗∗ (0.72) −1.54∗∗ (0.65) ISR −1.19∗∗ (0.58) −2.03∗∗∗ (0.43)
ARG −1.27∗ (0.63) −1.76∗∗ (0.66) BRA −1.43∗∗∗ (0.50) −1.26∗∗∗ (0.33)
ITA −1.24∗ (0.63) −1.78∗∗ (0.68) IDN −1.25∗ (0.64) −1.90∗∗∗ (0.65)
HRV −1.28∗ (0.66) −1.71∗∗∗ (0.62) SGP −1.29∗∗ (0.53) −1.87∗∗∗ (0.68)
NOR −1.55∗∗ (0.61) −1.52∗∗∗ (0.48) KOR −1.28∗∗ (0.62) −1.99∗∗∗ (0.60)
HKG −1.29∗∗ (0.63) −1.81∗∗ (0.74) THA −1.25∗ (0.63) −1.73∗∗ (0.66)
PHL −1.28∗ (0.63) −1.68∗∗ (0.67) MYS −1.27∗∗ (0.62) −1.70∗∗ (0.76)
FIN −1.28∗∗ (0.62) −1.74∗∗∗ (0.61) JPN −1.15∗∗ (0.57) −1.91∗∗ (0.93)
VNM −1.27∗ (0.63) −1.76∗∗ (0.66) CHN −1.17∗ (0.62) −1.61∗∗ (0.63)
Notes: Estimates of Eq.: ∆kp,c,t = βR mpUSt−1 × Mat
$
p,t−1 + γ




c,t +~ap,t + εp,t,
Columns “excluded” indicate the country that was dropped from the sample. 1nfltc,t equals 1 if country
c has a de-facto non-floating exchange rate (from Ilzetzki et al., 2019). Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1
if firm p had USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency
response of fed futures from same meeting (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). Includes triple interaction
with openess index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006), so that estimates of maturing interactions are conditional
on financial openness. All specs include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE; and firm-, and
interaction controls. Firm controls (at previous quarter) are real sales growth, cash flow, log assets,
leverage, cash/TA, variable-rate debt/TA, USD-debt-dummy. Int-controls are interactions of mp$t−1 with
the latter five controls. Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data from
2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
Table C.5: Float vs Non-Float gap (γR) in subsamples excluding one country at a time
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C.1.2 Robustness: Macro x firm heterogeneity
Dep-var: ∆kp,t
Sorting variable: Net lev(t− 2) Net lev (t− 1,w/i regime) Book lev (t− 1) Net lev (t− 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −1.661∗∗ −0.832∗∗ −1.757∗∗ −0.902∗ −2.641∗∗∗ −0.548 −0.503 −1.679∗∗
(0.770) (0.331) (0.726) (0.444) (0.549) (0.377) (1.164) (0.673)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −2.349∗∗∗ −0.751 −2.065∗∗∗ −0.994 −2.031∗∗∗ −1.623 −3.663∗∗∗ 0.642
(0.634) (1.085) (0.606) (1.244) (0.401) (1.368) (1.242) (1.459)
Firm group (R) High Lev Low Lev High Lev Low Lev High Lev Low Lev High Lev Low Lev
Firm types All All All All All All Exporter Exporter
Obs 102,450 103,546 103,100 102,896 102,371 103,625 56,924 56,783
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.220 0.169 0.219 0.181 0.203 0.165 0.200
Notes: The table reports estimates of βR and γR, split the sample into high and low leverage groups using
different measures of leverage. Eq.: ∆kp,c,t = βR mp$t−1 × Mat
$
p,t−1 + γ
R mp$t−1 × Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t +~ap,t + εp,t,
Net lev is debt minus cash over assets, the baseline. t− 2 indicates that I sorted on the second lag. For
Net lev (t− 1,w/i regime), I classify firms based on the median of net leverage computed within the
group of firms in floaters and non-floaters, rather than the grand-median (baseline). Book lev is debt over
assets. In Columns 7 and 8, I compare, within the group of exporters, high vs low net leverage. 1nfltc,t
equals 1 if country c has a de-facto Non-floating exchange rate (from Ilzetzki et al., 2019). Mat$p,t−1 is a
dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. mp$t−1 is the
high-frequency response of fed futures from same meeting (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). Includes
triple interaction of mp$t−1, Mat
$
p,t−1 with openess index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006), thus estimates of
maturing interactions are conditional on financial openness. All specs include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and
country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction controls. Interaction controls are triple interactions of mp$t−1
with firm controls and 1nfltc,t . Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data
from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
Table C.6: Leverage sub-samples, different leverage measures for sorting
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Dep-var: ∆kp,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −2.198∗∗ −1.544∗∗ −1.413∗ −2.436∗∗∗
(0.832) (0.626) (0.717) (0.677)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −1.561∗∗ −0.946 −1.310 0.817
(0.650) (0.989) (0.968) (1.039)
mpERt−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 0.028 0.056 0.046 0.083
∗
(0.056) (0.044) (0.061) (0.042)
mpERt−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −0.136∗∗ −0.088 −0.108 −0.173∗∗
(0.059) (0.076) (0.078) (0.071)
Firm group (R) High Lev Low Lev Export Non-Export
Obs 70,245 65,932 80,801 57,410
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.162 0.150 0.139
Notes: mpERt−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1, the home currency depreciation after FOMCs interacted with the
maturing dummy. 1nfltc,t equals 1 if country c has a de-facto managed exchange rate (from
Ilzetzki et al., 2019); hard pegs are excluded from the sample. Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal
to 1 if firm p had USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. mp$t−1 is the
high-frequency response of fed futures from same meeting (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020).
Includes triple interaction of mp$t−1, Mat
$
p,t−1 with openess index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006),
thus estimates of maturing interactions are conditional on financial openness. All specs include
firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction controls. Interaction
controls are triple interactions of mp$t−1 with firm controls and 1
nflt
c,t . Standard errors two-way
clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
Table C.7: Exporter/Leverage sub-samples controlling for ER, excl. hard pegs
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Dep-var: ∆kp,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 ×KOc,t 1.304∗∗ 1.102∗ 1.958∗∗∗ 1.844∗
(0.628) (0.623) (0.684) (1.024)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −1.900∗∗ −2.153∗ −2.734∗∗ −3.307∗∗∗








p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −2.710∗∗∗ −1.566∗ −1.029 −0.115
(0.787) (0.826) (0.987) (1.045)
mpERt−1 ×Mat
$








p,t−1 × FinDevc,t −0.112 −0.283 −1.068∗ −1.380∗∗
(0.715) (0.727) (0.579) (0.556)
Firm group (R) High Lev High Lev Low Lev Low Lev
Obs 104,063 104,063 101,933 101,933
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.170 0.219 0.219
Notes: FinDevc,t is IMF yearly financial development index (higher values=less developed).
KOc,t measures capital openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006;higher values=less open). 1nfltc,t equals 1 if
country c has a de-facto Non-floating exchange rate (from Ilzetzki et al., 2019). Mat$p,t−1 is a
dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter.
mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed futures from same meeting (from Jarociński and
Karadi, 2020). All specs include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE; and firm-, and
interaction controls. Interaction controls are triple interactions of mp$t−1 with firm controls and
1
nflt
c,t . Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to
2016, crises excluded.






























p,t−1 × FinDevc,t −0.924
(0.758)
Obs 208,479 208,470 208,470
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.182 0.182
Notes: 1high-levp,t−1 equals 1 if firm p’s net leverage is above the median. 1
nflt
c,t equals 1 if country c
has a de-facto Non-floating exchange rate (from Ilzetzki et al., 2019). FinDevc,t is IMF yearly
financial development index (higher values=less developed). KOc,t measures capital openness
(Chinn and Ito, 2006;higher values=less open). Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had
USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency
response of fed futures from same meeting (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). All specs include
firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction controls. Interaction
controls are triple interactions of mp$t−1 with firm controls and 1
nflt
c,t . Standard errors two-way
clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
Table C.9: Leverage-interaction, exchange rate regime and fin. development
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Dep-var: ∆kp,c,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −1.268∗∗ −1.012∗∗ −0.954∗∗ −1.355∗ −0.470
(0.621) (0.414) (0.458) (0.689) (0.856)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −1.754∗∗∗ −0.135 −0.075 0.021 0.856





p,t−1 −0.358 1.011 −0.254 −0.761





p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −2.898∗∗ −4.061∗∗ −3.054∗∗ −3.557∗∗
(1.392) (1.715) (1.456) (1.725)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$




p,t−1 × Zp,t−1 × 1nfltc,t 1.526 −1.194 −1.380
(1.848) (2.770) (2.495)
New control (Zp,t−1) - - ST debt Bond debt Cash
Obs 208,479 208,470 207,577 207,577 207,577
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.182 0.183 0.183 0.184
Notes: This table reports the effect of the leverage-regime interaction controlling for other firm
balance sheet features. Zp,t−1 equals 1 if firm p’s share of short-term debt, bond debt or cash
over assets is greater its grand median. Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt
maturing after the last FOMC in previous quarter. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed
futures from same meeting (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). 1nfltc,t equals 1 if country c has a
de-facto Non-floating exchange rate (from Ilzetzki et al., 2019). Includes triple interaction of
mp$t−1, Mat
$
p,t−1 with openess index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006), thus estimates of maturing
interactions are conditional on financial openness. All specs include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and
country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction controls. Interaction controls are triple interactions
of mp$t−1 with firm controls and 1
nflt
c,t . Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date.
Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
Table C.10: Controlling for shares of short-term debt, bond debt, cash holdings
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Dep-var: ∆kp,c,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
p,t−1 −1.592∗∗∗ −1.124∗ −0.781 −1.210∗
(0.489) (0.589) (0.669) (0.649)
mp$t−1 ×Mat
$
























p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −3.781∗
(1.877)
Leverage measure - - overall USD
Obs 111,736 111,736 111,736 111,736
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.171 0.172 0.171
Notes: The table contrasts estimates based on overall leverage (basline, column 3) with those
based on USD-leverage (USD-debt over assets, column 4). 1high-levp,t−1 and 1
high-USD-lev
p,t−1 equal 1
if the respective leverage measure is above the median. Based on subsample of firms with
USD-debt outstanding. Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt maturing after
the last FOMC in previous quarter. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed futures from
same meeting (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). 1nfltc,t equals 1 if country c has a de-facto Non-
floating exchange rate (from Ilzetzki et al., 2019). Includes triple interaction of mp$t−1, Mat
$
p,t−1
with openess index KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006), thus estimates of maturing interactions are
conditional on financial openness. All specs include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE;
and firm-, and interaction controls. Interaction controls are triple interactions of mp$t−1 with
firm controls and 1nfltc,t . Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data
from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.



















Obs 208,479 208,479 208,479
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.181 0.181
Notes: 1mp>0t equals 1 if the sign of monetary shock is positive and 1
>2010
t equals 1 for the sample after
2010. Mat$p,t−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt maturing after the last FOMC in previous
quarter. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed futures from same meeting (from Jarociński and
Karadi, 2020). All specs include firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction
controls. Firm controls (at previous quarter) are real sales growth, cash flow, log assets, leverage, cash/TA,
variable-rate debt/TA, USD-debt-dummy. Int-controls are interactions of mp$t−1 with the latter five
controls. Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date. Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016,
crises excluded.

















Notes: Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date. Estimates of a linear probability
model, regressing the maturing-dummy Mat$p,t on firm characteristics measured at preceding
quarter. Firm characteristics are (in this order) real growth in sales, log of total assets, cash flow
over assets, cash over assets, and book leverage. Further controls for a dummy that equals 1
if firm p has USD-debt (mechanically linked to Mat$p,t; omitted for brevity). All specs include
firm-, country×date and fiscal-quarter-FE. Mat$p,t is a dummy equal to 1 if firm p had USD-debt
maturing after the last FOMC in current quarter.
Table C.13: Effect of firm characteristics on main maturing variable
C.2 Additional analysis
C.2.1 Further discussion of results
Economic magnitude of effects. Interpreting the economic size of my estimates of
the maturing debt effect requires careful attention.
An important reference point are the estimates reported in Ottonello and
Winberry (2018) because they provide an estimate of the level of the effect of
US monetary policy shocks on US investment, as opposed to estimates of firm
heterogeneity. The estimates reported in Ottonello and Winberry (2018) imply that
the average US firm cuts investment by around -4% on impact following a 1 pp.
contractionary shock. I estimate that firms with USD debt reduce their investment
by -5% relative to firms without USD debt. Firms with maturing USD debt, reduce
their investment by -12% relative to all other firms. The maturing effect (on average
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across non-US firms) is thus around 2-3 times larger than the difference between
firms with and without USD debt, and around 3 times larger than the average
reaction of US firm. This is large but reasonable, for two key reasons
1. the maturing effect captures also exchange rate effects, which provide an
amplification mechanism that is absent for US firms
2. my estimates isolate a bond-financing spillover channel. Other monetary
spillover channels might influence investment in the opposite direction. For
instance, the estimates based on country-level aggregate data reported in
Ilzetzki and Jin (2013) imply that the overall effect of US monetary tightening
on economic activity could be positive (which could be explained with Fed
information effects).
Another reference point are the estimates of firm heterogeneity in investment
responses provided in Jeenas (2018). Jeenas (2018) estimates that firms with a
leverage that is 1-standard deviation higher than the average firm experience -6.6%
lower cumulative growth in physical capital over three years.
Focus on large, public firms. Given my data sources, my analysis focuses on large,
publicly traded firms. The lack of consistent quarterly accounting data for private
companies does not allow me to analyze private firms, which make up a substantial
part of many economies. Equally, my identification approach based on maturing
debt means that I require detailed information on the firms’ debt maturity structure,
which I do not have for small private firms. Despite this limitation, the finding that
few large firms drive a significant share of aggregate fluctuations (Gabaix, 2011)
strongly supports the importance of my results.
Unconventional monetary policy. Empirical papers generally find that the Fed’s
forward guidance and quantitative easing measures have had significant impact on
international asset prices (Chen et al., 2012; Neely, 2015; Bowman et al., 2015; Rogers
et al., 2018) and portfolio flows (Fratzscher et al., 2018). Duca et al. (2016) shows
that the Fed’s large scale asset purchases programmes (LSAP) were associated with
increases in gross corporate bond issuance, particularly in Advanced economies.
It is less clear whether and how international transmission differs between
unconventional and conventional US monetary policy regimes. Examining yields
on USD-denominated sovereign bonds in Emerging and Advanced economies,
Gilchrist et al. (2019) concludes that international transmission of US monetary pol-
icy is broadly similar between conventional and unconventional regimes. Instead,
examining local currency sovereign bond yields, Albagli et al. (2019) finds that US
monetary spillovers have strengthened significantly after 2008.
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In the context of unconventional monetary policy, the literature typically takes
into account the multi-dimensionality of monetary surprises, i.e. news relevant
for specific parts of the yield curve (e.g. Swanson, 2020). Three separate measures
of monetary surprises are derived for the level of future short-term interest rates
(the traditional level/target shock), the path of future short-rates (path shock) and
the long-end of the yield curve (term premium/LSAP shock). All three types have
been shown to affect foreign long-term bond yields (Kearns et al., 2020) and Dollar
exchange rates (Rogers et al., 2018).
To test whether my estimates of the real effects are different for unconventional
policies, I estimate the effect of the maturing×shock variables for the subsets of
FOMC announcements related to LSAPs and forward guidance.1
First, I use my baseline monetary shock measures from Jarociński and Karadi
(2020) based on 3-month future contracts. To facilitate comparison, I rescale the
coefficients such that the standard deviation of the shocks is the same across
samples (the unit of coefficient is still 1 percentage point). Table C.14 confirms
that the Fed’s unconventional policy had significant real effects (columns 2 and 3)
but also that the main effect is robust to excluding them (column 1). Columns 4
and 5 show that the investment responses to LSAP announcements are driven by
non-floaters. Instead, the responses to forward guidance announcements are also
significant for floaters (similar to the baseline). This seems consistent with Albagli
et al. (2019) who find that spillovers to long-term rates in Emerging markets arise
through the responses in term premia whereas in Advanced economies through
future short-rates.2
1I obtain dates of major unconventional policy announcements from
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/programs-archive/large-scale-asset-purchases and
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/timeline-forward-guidance-about-the-federal-
funds-rate.htm. I end up with 17 dates for LSAPs and 18 for forward guidance (with 4 coinciding),
ranging from initial announcement over extension/slowdowns/modifications to normalization.
For continuity in the analysis, I ignore announcements outside the regular FOMC schedule which
means I also disregard the announcement of the Fed’s first round of QE in November 2008. These
simplifications mean that my estimates for unconventional policy likely represent the lower bound.
2Albagli et al. (2019) uses the two-day change over the FOMC annoucement day in the 2-year US
Treasury yield as monetary policy shock measure, which captures news about both the level and
path of future short-rates.
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Dep-var: ∆kp,c,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
mp$,Xt−1 ×Mat
$,Z
p,t−1 −1.023∗∗∗ −2.940∗∗∗ −2.595∗∗∗ −0.146 −1.435∗∗ 0.176 −2.090∗∗∗
(0.358) (0.789) (0.582) (1.362) (0.639) (1.311) (0.675)
mp$,Xt−1 ×Mat
$,Z
p,t−1 × 1nfltc,t −3.983∗∗∗ −1.786∗∗∗ −4.776∗∗∗ −1.434∗
(0.782) (0.393) (1.721) (0.828)
FOMCs (Z) excl QE/FWG QE FWG QE FWG QE FWG
Shock type (X) baseline baseline baseline baseline baseline path path
Obs 208,479 208,479 208,479 208,479 208,479 208,479 208,479
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180
Notes: “Shock type” indicates the monetary policy shock measure: baseline is the high-frequency
response in Fed futures (3-month contracts). path is the principle component of high frequency
response in Fed futures/Eurodollars with up to 1 year horizon from Steinsson et al. (2018). FOMCs
indicates the set of announcements used in defining the maturing variable, e.g. FWG refers to
FOMCs with forward guidance announcements. Includes triple interaction with openess index
KOc,t (Chinn and Ito, 2006), estimates thus conditional on financial openness. All specs include
firm-, fiscal-quarter-, and country×date FE; and firm-, and interaction controls (following preceding
tables).
Table C.14: Investment responses to unconventional monetary policy
Second, I use the path shock from Steinsson et al. (2018).3 The results (columns
6 and 7) are qualitatively similar to the baseline shock4 and broadly consistent
with the findings in Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020) using a similar path shock.
Using the long-end/LSAP shock, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020) find that the
international effects of US monetary easing were the opposite of the traditional
findings, i.e. associated with a sell-off in risky assets and Dollar appreciation. I
currently do not have the long-end shocks available but it will be interesting to
explore in future work.
The findings remain largely unchanged when controlling also for the comple-
ment (orthogonal) set of FOMCs (omitted for brevity).
C.2.2 Analysis of bond-level data
Number of bonds over the FOMC cycle. Figure C.2 shows that corporate bond
maturity is approximately uniformly distributed across the FOMC cycle. Two
consecutive scheduled FOMC meetings are usually between 6 and 7 weeks apart.
Under the uniform distribution hypothesis, each week should contain between 1/7
and 1/6 of the total number of issuances/maturing observations in a given FOMC
3Steinsson et al. (2018) obtain their path shock as first principle component of high-frequency
changes in Fed future and Eurodollar prices for contracts up to 1-year ahead. Their sample ends in
March 2014, after which I classify all announcements as conventional.
4To assess the quantitative differences across shock types carefully, the coefficients should be
rescaled to imply the same change in a target variable like the 10-year UST yield.
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period.5






















































































Notes: The figures plot the share of bonds maturing/issued by weeks before the FOMC, relative to the total in the
FOMC period. Dots represent the average shares. The error bars represent one standard deviation ranges (of the
shares across FOMCs). Weeks are measured as 7-day intervals before the FOMC announcement day, e.g. Week 0
covers the 7 days leading up to the announcement day. Sample includes corporate bonds by non-US, non-financial
issuers covering the period between 2003 and 2017 and excluding periods preceding or following unscheduled FOMC
meetings.
Figure C.2: Bond-level data over the FOMC cycle
with a new bond? Table C.15 in Appendix C.2.2 suggests that there is a significant
link between the maturity of one bond and the issuance of a new one.6 For this
purpose, I assemble a balanced week-firm panel and estimate a probit regression
that explains the probability that firm p issues a bond in week w with a dummy
indicating whether it has a bond maturing in the same week. For the sub-sample of
USD denominated bonds, the average marginal effect implies that having a bond
maturing raises the probability of new bond issuance by around 10 percentage
points. This 10 percentage point increase is economically substantial since the
unconditional probability of bond issuance in any week is very low at the firm-level
(firms issue at most few times a year). In unreported results, I do not find any
evidence that the monetary policy shocks are associated with a switch between
issuance currencies.
5A formal test should account for variations in the length of FOMC periods, holidays/weekends.
6The related corporate finance literature highlights the importance of credit risk premia in
exacerbating rollover exposure. He and Xiong (2012) provide a theoretical model, Nagler (2020)
provides evidence on the US and Valenzuela (2016) on international corporate bonds. Choi et al.
(2018) explain why firms take on rollover risk with costly issuances.
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Sample Currency AME SE p
Floater home 0.021 0.003 0.000
Floater US Dollar 0.103 0.007 0.000
Not-Floater home 0.074 0.004 0.000
Not-Floater US Dollar 0.096 0.007 0.000
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects (AME) of probit regression. AME indicate the change in
probability, expressed in decimals, that firm p issues a bond in week w given that it has a bond maturing
in the same week. Estimated on a balanced firm × week panel, and separately for bonds denominated in
p’s home currency or in US Dollars.
Table C.15: Predict bond issuance with bond maturity by currency and ER regime
C.2.3 Trade effects
Table C.16 reports estimates of the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on sales
growth for non-exporters relative to exporters, controlling for country×date×sector
fixed effects. The estimates suggest that non-exporters’ sales growth is generally
less correlated with US GDP forecasts.
For floaters, home currency depreciations are associated with stronger sales
growth for non-exporters, relative to exporters. This effect could point to that non-
exporters benefit from expenditure switching towards locally produced goods (sold
relatively more by non-exporters). This is supported by the fact that depreciation-
sales correlation is weaker for countries with a low share of imports invoiced in
USD.
However, the issue requires further analysis and my analysis should be consid-
ered only a first attempt for two reasons. First, I control for country×date×sic1-
fixed effects. While it ensures that my results are not driven by depreciation-induced
increases in country/sector-level prices (and hence nominal sales volumes), I cannot
rule out that the result is driven by different price dynamics at the firm-level.
Second, the empirical trade literature displays ambiguous messages regarding the
speed of adjustment of international trade after aggregate shocks. Traditionally,
trade is viewed to respond only with a lag, which is confirmed in shipment-level
data. In contrast, in recent experience, e.g. the Great Recession, trade adjustment













p × ∆ERc,t × low-$invoice
Imports
c,t −0.630∗ −0.906 0.064
(0.347) (0.553) (0.397)
Group All Float Not-Float
Country×date×sic1 FE Y Y Y
Obs 121,149 66,475 54,674
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.283 0.157
Notes: ∆salep,c,t is the quarterly percentage change in sales, normalized by its grand standard deviation.
1
non-export
p equals 1 if firm p does not report international sales. ∆ERc,t is the quarterly change in country
c exchange rate in pp (positive value=Dollar strength). In “country×date×sic1”, “sic1” refers to 1-digit
SIC sector codes. low-$invoiceImportsc equals 1 if country c share of USD invoicing of imports is below
median (yearly). Ft(rgdpUS) is the two-quarter ahead SPF forecast of US real GDP growth. All specs
include firm-, fiscal-quarter-FE; and firm-, and interaction controls. Firm controls are lag of dependent
variable, cash flow, total assets, book leverage (at previous quarter). Int-controls are interactions of ∆ERc,t
with the firm controls. Unreported interaction terms are omitted for brevity. Invoicing currency shares
are from Gopinath (2015) and Ito and Kawai (2016). Standard errors two-way clustered by firm and date.
Quarterly firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises excluded.
Table C.16: Effect of exchange rate on sales growth, non-exporters vs exporters
C.2.4 Further summary statistics
Assets(USD,m) Debt/TA(%)
Not-Float Float Not-Float Float
Not-Exp Exporter Not-Exp Exporter Not-Exp Exporter Not-Exp Exporter
Mean 577.14 823.91 789.93 2495.9 28.23 27.09 27.01 24.68
p25 52.13 99.09 36.91 151.8 13.80 12.88 12.29 11.30
p50 163.44 261.70 149.77 567.8 26.98 26.12 25.15 23.00
p75 512.24 817.81 565.11 2305.2 40.95 39.60 39.99 35.80
SD 1119.06 1594.78 2086.22 4965.9 17.57 17.02 17.60 16.37
Notes: Not-Exp stands for Not-exporter. Exporter status measured as non-zero international sales. Ratios
expressed in percentage points. TA is book value of total assets. Debt is book value of debt. Quarterly
firm data from 2003 to 2016, crises (author’s update of Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) excluded.









Float Managed Peg Float Managed Peg Float Managed Peg Float Managed Peg
Mean 0.26 0.28 −0.19 −0.06 −0.07 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
p25 −3.16 −2.42 −1.08 −0.52 −0.30 −0.05 −0.05 −0.23 −0.16 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02
p50 −0.13 −0.23 −0.21 0.05 −0.06 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
p75 3.51 2.36 0.02 0.42 0.20 0.03 0.05 0.19 0.30 0.01 0.02 0.02
SD 4.74 4.68 1.57 0.86 0.56 0.10 0.23 0.55 0.48 0.02 0.06 0.06
Notes: All variables in percentage points. For average magnitude of exchange rate fluctuations
compare standard deviation and interquartile ranges. ∆y2yc,t and ∆spotc,t are quarterly changes.
Variables “mp” are two-day changes over the FOMC announcement days. Sample period from
2003 to 2016.
Table C.18: Summary statistics of asset prices by exchange rate regime
C.3 Data details
This Appendix contains a detailed description of the data and its construction
process.
C.3.1 Country classifications
Table C.19 shows the classifications and sample period for each country in my
sample.
country Dev-Status (WB) ER-regime Start End country Dev-Status (WB) ER-regime Start End
Argentina UM nflt 2006 2015 Luxembourg H flt 2003 2016
Brazil UM mgdd 2003 2016 Malaysia UM mgdd 2003 2016
Chile H mgdd 2003 2016 Mexico UM mgdd 2003 2016
China UM nflt 2003 2016 Netherlands H flt 2003 2016
Croatia H flt 2005 2016 Norway H flt 2003 2016
Cyprus H flt 2005 2016 Peru UM nflt 2003 2016
Denmark H flt 2003 2016 Philippines LM mgdd 2003 2016
Finland H flt 2003 2016 Poland H flt 2003 2016
France H flt 2003 2016 Singapore H mgdd 2003 2016
Germany H flt 2003 2016 South Korea H mgdd 2003 2016
Greece H flt 2003 2016 Spain H flt 2003 2016
Hong Kong H nflt 2003 2016 Sri Lanka LM nflt 2009 2016
India LM nflt 2003 2016 Sweden H flt 2003 2016
Indonesia LM mgdd 2003 2016 Switzerland H flt 2003 2016
Ireland H flt 2003 2016 Thailand UM mgdd 2003 2016
Israel H flt 2003 2016 Turkey UM mgdd 2003 2016
Italy H flt 2003 2016 United Kingdom H flt 2003 2016
Japan H flt 2003 2016 Vietnam LM nflt 2005 2016
Notes: List of countries in sample, with classifications in last year of sample. “Dev-Status”
shows the development status according to the Worldbank. UM = Upper middle income, H =
high, LM = lower middle. “ER-regime” gives the exchange rate regime label, based on Ilzetzki
et al. (2019). “flt”=floating ER, “nflt”=non-floating, and “mgdd”=managed. Start and End give
the year of first and last observations.
Table C.19: Country sample list with classifications
Exchange rate regime. I classify countries as floating, managed, or pegged
exchange rate regimes against the US Dollar based on the quarterly version of the
scheme by Ilzetzki et al. (2019). Countries like Denmark or Bulgaria, who peg their
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exchange rates to the Euro, are classified as “floating” because the currency they are
pegging to is floating against the dollar. Specifically, my regime labels correspond
to the group numbers from the “coarse” classification as follows (abbreviated
description by Ilzetzki et al. (2019) in brackets). The floating group consists of
group 4 (“freely floating”). “Not floating” is group 1 (“de facto peg”) and 2
(“crawling peg” with narrow band). “Managed” group is group 3 (“crawling peg”
with wide band, “moving band”, or “managed floating”).7 Figure C.3 shows the
evolution of regime classifications over time.
Capital controls and development. For capital account policies, I use the index
provided in Chinn and Ito (2006). For financial development, I use the IMF’s
financial development index, available here. Further, I follow the Worldbank






































































Notes: Three groups of countries according to the exchange rate flexibility against the US dollar.
Original classification taken from Ilzetzki et al. (2019).
Figure C.3: Regime classification used in empirical analysis
C.3.2 Data construction
Firm-level accounting data. The quarterly firm-level accounting data is obtained
from four sources. From Compustat Global and Worldscope, I obtain standard
7Fratzscher et al. (2019) provide evidence on the efficacy of FX interventions to implement
exchange rate policies using a unique data set for 33 countries. Melvin et al. (2009) analyze
empirically the implementation of crawling pegs.
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variables such as investment, total assets etc. From Capital IQ, I obtain detailed
information about the firms’ debt structure, in particular the currency denomination
of debt and approximate maturity dates. I capture international trade activity at
the firm-level using the annual Geographic Segment dataset in Worldscope, or
Annual Orbis data if the former is not available. For each firm, I construct two
dummy variables indicating whether it has reported sales abroad and sales to the
United States respectively.
I do not use Orbis and Amadeus to increase coverage of private companies
because the frequency of observation is predominantely annual for these datasets.
Final sample. Firms are only included if there are at least 15 quarters of complete
observations. Firms in my sample are the subset of the Compustat and Worldscope
universes, which I could match with the bond and Capital IQ data. When a firm is
covered by both sources, the source with the least missing observations is selected.
Each firm has at least one quarter with maturing debt (denominated in US Dollars
or other currencies).
I exclude all firms in the finance (SIC 6000− 7000) and public sectors (SIC
≥ 9000). I also exclude utility companies (2-digit SIC code 49). Most firms are
publicly traded, given the coverage of Worldscope and Compustat.
Category Key variables Obs-level Data source








Debt maturing in quarter
(by currency, bond/bank)
Firm-Qtrs Capital IQ
Bonds maturing in quarter
(by currency, issuance data)
bond SDC, Mergent, Dealogic
Firm trade activity Dummy flagging exporters Firm Worldscope and Orbis
Exchange rates, bond yields Exchange rate against USD, 2- and
10-year nominal bond yields.
Quarterly changes and (1 or 2-day)
changes over FOMC dates.
Country-Day Global Financial Data & Eikon
US monetary policy High-frequency shocks
(Fed Funds Futures)
FOMCs Jarociński and Karadi (2020)
Exchange rate regime Classification of regime
(floating, pegged, managed)
and anchor currency.
Country-Year Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019)
Trade data Direction of trade Country-Year IMF website
Invoicing currencies Country-Year Gopinath (2015),
Ito and Kawai (2016),
author’s own calculation
Notes: Table lists key variables and data sources as used in analysis.
Table C.20: Summary of data sources
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Country-level inflation and deflators. I obtain GDP price deflators from the IMF’s
international financial statistics. If this is not available, I use the CPI index.
Country-level sovereign and corporte bond yields and exchange rates. For each
country in my sample, I obtain daily observations of 2-year or 10-year nominal
government bond yields and the US Dollar exchange rate from Global Financial
Data. The corporate bond yield indeces for most countries are from Standard
& Poors and track the yields and returns of domestic, local currency corporate
bonds. I then compute two key time series for each country’s bond yields and
exchange rate. First, one day changes over the FOMC announcement day and,
second, quarterly time series.
Invoicing currency data. The invoicing data I use is a combination of two sources.
First, data presented in Gopinath (2015) downloaded from Gita Gopinath’s website
(link). Second, Hiro Ito kindly shared with me the data presented in Ito and Kawai
(2016).
Data cleaning. I clean the data with the following operations (this in order):
• exclude firm-quarters
– flagged as being affected by Mergers & Acquisitions
– with total assets greater than 500 billion US Dollars
– with negative total assets
– with quarterly growth in PPE beyond the 0.5% percentiles
– with absolute value of quarterly percentage growth in real sales greater
than 100%
• winsorize accounting variables at the 2% level (by country)
My main findings are robust to winsorizing only at 1% level. My baseline choice
is 2% because cross-country (country group) comparisons are important for my
analysis but data quality varies by country. Therefore it seems prudent to clean
somewhat more strongly and to do so by country.
For my daily country-level asset price data, I disregard observations when
• the 1-day percentage change in the spot exchange rate over the FOMC an-
nouncement day exceeds 10%
• the 1-day change in nominal interest rates over the FOMC announcement day
exceeds 5 percentage points
I then winsorize these variables at the 1% level.
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C.3.3 Bond data details
I merge the accounting data with information on bonds issued by these firms. The
bond-level data is the union of three sources: Mergent Fixed Income Securities
Database (FISD), SDC Platinum New Issues and Dealogic. I merge these datasets
at the bond-level using CUSIP or ISIN bond identifiers. Bond information includes
dates of issuance and maturity, issuance amount, coupon, yield to maturity and
currency denomination.
The final data set covers around half a million bond issuances. I can match
around 60% of these bonds successfully to firms in Compustat (Global and North
America) and Worldscope. Around 55% of the matched bond issuances are issued
by financial companies, which are not included in my sample. I then also delete all
bonds issued by US firms, callable bonds and bonds at variable rates.
Firm-quarter aggregates. I then aggregate the bond-level information to quarter-
firm level. For each firm and quarter, I record the total sum of face values of bonds
maturing in that quarter. The Mergent database provides historic snapshots of the
amounts outstanding of each bond at a given reporting date, allowing to account
for early redemptions etc. SDC and Dealogic do not provide this information and I
therefore exclude all callable bonds and use the face value at issuance to compute
the amount due at maturity date. The exact maturity dates allow me to keep track
of the time of maturity relative to the FOMC meetings within a given quarter.
Bond-firm map. Creating a map between the security identifiers and the firm-level
data is challenging because both Compustat and Worldscope contain only the
most recent security identifier of each firm (if at all). I address this challenge by
creating a historic firm-bond mapping using information contained in the FactSet
Ownership database, allowing me to link active and inactive CUSIP and ISIN
identifiers contained in the historic portfolio holding statistics to the permanent
firm identifiers of this database.
C.4 Asset price reactions
This Appendix provides direct evidence on the effect of US monetary policy shocks
on sovereign bond yields, corporate bond yields, and exchange rates. In C.4.1,
I report results based on the bond-level corporate bond issuance data. In C.4.2,
I examine daily country-level data for the countries in my sample. In C.4.3, I
examine FOMC-level data, regressing US treasury yields, aggregate corporate bond
indices and the Dollar factor on the monetary policy shocks. In C.4.4, I provide a
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brief overview of the empirical literature on international asset price reaction to US
monetary shocks.
C.4.1 Corporate bond issuance yields
Spillovers on yields of USD-denominated corporate bonds. Due to data con-
straints, I have to assume in the 2SLS exercise that the reaction of financing
conditions is the same for all firms within a given country. I further have to fo-
cus on the yields of local currency bonds because long time series on yields of
USD-denominated corporate bonds are sparse even at the country-level.
Dep-var: yb,p,t




∗∗ 1.289∗ 1.401∗∗ 1.190∗
(0.563) (0.685) (0.671) (0.635)
mp$fomc(t) × 1
after




b,t × 1HYb 0.965
(1.571)
Rating FE N N Y Y
Bond controls N Y Y Y
Obs 15,961 14,805 14,206 14,206
Adjusted R2 0.724 0.726 0.769 0.769






b,t +~αp,fomc(t) + εb,p,t,
Standard errors clustered by FOMC-period. All specifications include issuer and FOMC-period
fixed effects (~αp,fomc(t)). Sample of issuances of USD-denominated corporate bonds by non-US,
non-financial firms within 2 weeks of closest FOMC. 1afterb equals 1 if bond b was issued after
the FOMC closest to the date of issuance. 1nfltp equals 1 if issuer p is headquarted in non-floater
country. 1HYb equals 1 if bond b has a high yield rating. mp
$
t−1 is the high-frequency response
of fed futures from same meeting (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). Other controls are: time





p , omitted for brevity, are always close to zero and insignificant.
Table C.21: Issuance yields and monetary shocks, before and after FOMC
To alleviate concerns arising from these assumptions, I estimate the relationship
between the monetary shocks and corporate bond yields at time of issuance from
my bond issuance data set. Specifically, I match each bond b with the FOMC date
fomc(t) that is closest to the issuance date t. I then define a dummy 1afterb,t that
equals 1 if the bond was issued after the closest FOMC date, and 0 if it was issued
before. In my baseline specification, shown in top of Table C.21, I regress the yield
on the monetary shock, interacted with the after-FOMC-dummy.8 I also include
8I thank Yannick Timmer for providing me with the idea for such specification.
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issuer and FOMC fixed effects. Note that the magnitude of estimates cannot be
readily compared with the first stage of the 2SLS.
Table C.21 shows that the yields of USD-denominated corporate bonds react
significantly to the US monetary shocks. The coefficient on the non-floater interac-
tion is estimated to be positive but insignificant, which is the case for a wide-range
of unreported specifications and subsamples. The statistical insignificance is due
to persistently large standard errors. Columns 2 and 3 report specifications with
rating fixed effects and a triple interaction with a dummy flagging high-yield bonds.
The coefficient on the non-floating interaction shrinks, suggesting that at least part
of the non-floating dummy captures effects also associated with credit ratings.
For the purpose of this study, my evidence based on USD-denominated bonds
further cements the view that differential asset price reaction cannot fully explain
the heterogeneity in reduced form estimates. Even taking the estimates at face
value, they imply that yields react more strongly in non-floaters by a factor of 1.4 to
1.9 (consistent with literature). Since my reduced-form estimates differ by a factor
of 2.4 to 3, the stronger asset price response would still not be enough to explain it
away.
C.4.2 Country×FOMC panel regressions
I construct a country×FOMC-date panel and estimate the equation
Yc,t = αc + θYMP$t × 1nfltc,t + 1nfltc,t + ec,t, (C.1)




c,t , ∆ERc,t} is the two-day
change over the FOMC announcement t in country c’s domestic corporate bond
yield, 2-year (10-year) nominal government bond yield or bilateral exchange rate
against the USD. 1nfltc,t equals one if the country does not have a floating exchange








(1) (2) (3) (4)
mp$t 0.398
∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 12.429∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.103) (0.066) (0.866)
mp$t−1 × 1nfltc,t 0.376∗ −0.010 0.460∗∗ −8.283∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.347) (0.216) (1.537)
mp$t−1 ×KOc,t −0.051 0.079 −0.248∗∗ −0.638
(0.222) (0.257) (0.104) (0.689)
Obs 3,678 3,492 3,678 3,678
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.028 0.088 0.122





c,t , ∆ERc,t are the two-day changes over FOMC announcement day t in two-
and ten-year government bond yield, domestic corporate bond yield and bilateral exchange
rate, respectively. mp$t−1 is the high-frequency response of fed futures from same meeting
(from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). KOc,t measures capital openness (Chinn, Ito 2006;higher
values=less open). 1nfltc,t equals 1 if country c has a de-facto not-floating exchange rate (from
Ilzetzki et al 2017). Sample excludes unscheduled FOMCs and crises.
Table C.22: Asset price reponses to US monetary shocks, country×FOMC-panel
C.4.3 Time series of FOMCs
US Treasury yield curve and US monetary shocks. In Table C.23, I show that




Sample 1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y Obs R2(1y) R2(2y) SD(1y) SD(2y)
1994-2016 0.593∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 194 0.33 0.21 0.06 0.07
(0.062) (0.079) (0.090) (0.100) (0.101) (0.096)
1994-2007 0.584∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.127 119 0.31 0.19 0.06 0.07
(0.081) (0.098) (0.103) (0.101) (0.096) (0.088)
2003-2016 0.659∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.251 118 0.27 0.20 0.06 0.07
(0.101) (0.130) (0.150) (0.172) (0.177) (0.168)
2009-2015 1.227∗∗∗ 2.254∗∗∗ 2.596∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗ 2.14∗ 1.672 57 0.26 0.27 0.03 0.06
(0.279) (0.504) (0.727) (1.013) (1.115) (1.094)
Notes: Each cell reports an estimate of Φ from a separate estimate of Equation:
∆ymt = Φ mp
$
t + εt, where ∆y
m
t is the change of the nominal zero-coupon US Treasury yield
with maturity m over the FOMC announcement day t. SD(m) is the standard deviation of
∆ymt . R2(m) is the R-squared from the regression with ∆y
m
t as dependent variable. mp
$
t is the
high-frequency response of fed futures from same meeting (from Jarociński and Karadi, 2020).
The nominal UST yield curve data is from Gürkaynak et al. (2007a).
Table C.23: Nominal UST yield curve and fed funds future shocks
Sovereign yield averages for country groups. Figure C.4 provides a scatter plot
to illustrate the main finding in a simple and robust way: When the Fed tightens,
foreign government bond yields rise along with US rates. This effect is stronger for




























Notes: US monetary policy shocks (x-Axis) are plotted against two-day changes in local government bond yields over
the corresponding FOMC meeting, averaged across country groups with floating (float) and non-floating (notfloat)
exchange rates against the US Dollar. The US monetary shock is measured as the two-day change in the 2y nominal
UST yield, as in Hanson and Stein (2015).
Figure C.4: Changes in local-2y yields (group-averages) and US monetary shocks
Aggregate corporate bond indeces. Table C.24 provides benchmark results on the
reaction of corporate bond yields to US monetary policy shocks using aggregate
bond indeces by Bank of America & Merill Lynch and ICE Bank of America. I
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regress daily changes in yields or returns, measured over the FOMC announcement
day, on the monetary policy shock.
Dep-var: ∆yinxt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MP$t 0.451
∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.442∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.084) (0.132) (0.068) (0.083) (0.099) (0.187) (0.086)
Bond index (inx) US.AAA US.BBB EM.HY EM.IG Asia.EME Lat.EME EUR.HY NFC.EME
Observations 160 160 144 144 144 144 152 144
R2 0.160 0.119 0.032 0.065 0.079 0.041 0.036 0.070
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.114 0.025 0.059 0.072 0.034 0.029 0.064
Notes: Changes in corporate bond yield indices regressed on US monetary shocks.
Table C.24: Reaction in corporate bond yields (aggregate indices)
Dep-var: Rinxt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MP$t −2.113∗∗∗ −1.957∗∗∗ −0.913∗∗∗ −1.216∗
(0.597) (0.569) (0.304) (0.663)
Bond index (inx) US.AAA US.BBB EM.ALL EM.HY.USD
Observations 144 144 144 144
R2 0.081 0.077 0.060 0.023
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.070 0.053 0.016
Notes: Corporate bond returns regressed on US monetary shocks.
Table C.25: Reaction in corporate bond returns (aggregate indices) to US monetary shocks
Exchange rate reaction: Robustness check with Dollar factor. I compute the
dollar factor for different subsets of countries. Specifically, I define the dollar factor
for all countries with exchange rate regime type R as the arithmetic average of
changes in the bilateral exchange rates ∆ec,t, that is DOLt,R = 1N ∑
N
c∈R ∆ec,t. I define
ec,t as foreign currency units per US Dollar such that ∆ec,t > 0 and DOLt > 0
signify Dollar appreciation. The changes are computed as one, or two-day changes
over the FOMC announcements.
I estimate the following equation for the full sample (“Full”) and each regime
type R ∈ {Full, float, managed, peg} separately
DOLt,R = α + θe MP$t + et, (C.2)
where MP$t is the high-frequency response of fed futures to FOMC announcements
(from Jarocinski,Karadi 2018). Figure C.5 illustrates the main result for the group
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of countries with floating exchange rate against the dollar: A surprise tightening of
US monetary policy is, on average, associated with a significant strengthening of
























Figure C.5: Value of dollar against basket (Dollar factor) and US monetary shocks
Table C.26 reports OLS estimates of Equation C.2 for the different regimes.
Dep-var: DOLt,R
R = Full Float Managed Peg
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MP$t 1.236
∗∗∗ 3.075∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗∗ 0.215
(0.294) (0.716) (0.444) (0.139)
Obs 191 191 191 191
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.120 0.044 0.015
Notes: MP$t is the two-day change of the 2y-nominal US Treasury over the FOMC announcement
day, in percentage points. Unscheduled FOMC meetings and the Global Financial Crisis are
excluded.
Table C.26: Dollar and US monetary shock by FX regime
Table C.27 then focuses on the sample of countries with floating exchange rate
against the Dollar (“Float”) and reports estimates for different sample periods.9
9The regimes R were defined in Section C.3.
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Dep-var: DOLt,float
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MP$t 2.793
∗∗∗ 3.075∗∗∗ 1.676∗∗∗ 4.895∗∗∗
(0.610) (0.716) (0.463) (1.481)
Sample Full ex08 pre08 post08
Obs 214 191 109 80
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.120 0.103 0.192
Notes: MP$t is the two-day change of the 2y-nominal US Treasury over the FOMC announcement
day, in percentage points. Unscheduled FOMC meetings and the Global Financial Crisis are
excluded.
Table C.27: Dollar and US monetary shock by period, floaters only, 2day chg
C.4.4 Previous literature
Timmer (2018) shows that US monetary tightening is associated with higher yields
abroad using local currency corporate bond indeces. The link is stronger for
Emerging market economies and non-floaters, but the difference is statistically
significant only for the former. Gilchrist et al. (2019) find that yields of USD-
denominated foreign sovereign bonds increase after US monetary tigthening. Yield
increases of bonds with speculative ratings are larger than those of investment
grade bonds by a factor of 1.4 to 2.4. Albagli et al. (2019) find that the reaction of
local government bond yields to US monetary shocks is larger in EMEs than in AEs
only in the post-2008 sample. Yields of EME bonds with 2 and 10 year maturity
react more strongly by a factor of 1.6 and 1.3 respectively. Bowman et al. (2015) find
that, within EMEs, countries with higher financial vulnerability experience stronger
passthrough of US monetary shocks to sovereign yields by a factor of 2. Managed
exchange rates are only associated with higher passthrough of US risk-free rates,
not US corporate bond high-yield bonds.
Table C.28 summarizes several empirical studies that have studied close relatives
of θ across country groups.
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Study Asset class Groups compared (Y,X) θY/θX
Gilchrist et al (2019) USD sov. bonds (Speculative-,IG) 1.4-2.4
Albagli et al (2019) LC sov. bonds, 2y (EME,AE) 1.6
LC sov. bonds, 10y (EME,AE) 1.3
Bowman (2015) LC sov. bonds (EME) (high, low vulnerab.) 2
Bluedorn et al(2015) short-term rate (Peg,Non-Peg) 4.06
Timmer (2018) LC corp. bonds (Peg,Non-peg) 0.56
Notes: Table summarizes empirical studies providing evidence related to the relative sensitivity
of financing conditions θnflt/θflt.




The levels of benchmark interest rates, R̄$,t and R̄e,t, and the time-0 exchange rate
e0 are log-normally distributed, following the processes
log(R̄$,t) = log(R̂$) + σUSZUSt (C.3)
log(R̄e,t) = log(R̂e) + βeσUSZUSt + σeZ
e
t (C.4)
log(e0) = log(ê0)− β$σUSZUSt , (C.5)
where log(·) is the natural log and ZUSt ∼ N(0, 1) and Zet ∼ N(0, 1) are indepen-
dent standard-normal random variables.10 These stochastic properties imply the


























10Equation C.5 could equivalently be formulated in terms of the log-change in the exchange
rate as log( e1e0 ) = log(e1)− log(ê0) + β$σUSZ
US
t . Concerning the distribution of
e1
e0 and e0, multiply-



















Using the reciprocal property of the log-normal distribution and substituting






The distribution of log(R̄e,t) is derived as the sum of two (correlated) normal
variables, and the distribution of R̄e,t (not the log) as the product of two log-normal
variables. The mean my and standard deviation σy of the log-normal distribution
of variable Y, whose natural log is normally distributed with log(Y) = X ∼




x) and σ2y = exp(2mx + σ2x)(exp(σ2x)− 1).
To simplify expressions, I define the means of the log-normal variables as follows:






US , and R̂e = R̄e exp(− 12 (β2eσ2US + σ2e)). See
Appendix C.5.1.2 for a discussion without rescaling. I then use these definitions
and the formula to go from the parameters of the normal distribution to the means






R̄$,t ∼ LogNorm(R̄$, σ̂2$ )
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C.5.1.2 First moments and UIP without rescaling of means
For the main part of the analysis, the rescaling of the means of stochastic processes
in Appendix C.5.1.1 is covenient and inconsequential. However, since it obscures
how changes in the exchange rate regime might impact the first moments, I report
them here without rescaling. No rescaling implies the definitions R̂e = R̄e, and
11In slight deviation from notational convention, I report here the expected value and variance of
the log-normal distribution not the associated normal distribution.
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R̂$ = R̄$, and ê0 = ē0. Based on the distributional assumptions in Equations C.3 to






















In both equations, the left-hand exponential terms can be thought of as “risk
premia” compensating for fluctuations due to the shocks.12
As discussed in the main text, a simple way to think about a managed exchange
rate regime is as low β$ and high βe (so after US shocks, the exchange rate reacts
weakly but therefore home interest rates strongly). Compared to a free float (high
β$, low βe), home currency bond premia will be higher (because the loading on
US shocks is higher) and the premium on exchange rate adjusted USD borrowing
costs will be lower. For the risk-adjusted UIP to continue to hold when shifting
from free float to managed exchange rate regime (βe ↑,β$ ↓), risk-free rates (R̄k
etc) need to adjust. Importantly, the properties of the log-normal distribution
imply that adjustments in R̄k, to leave the first moment unchanged, do not fully
offset the effect of changes in β on the variances. Such “mean-preserving” regime
change then still affects firm decisions via the probability of being constrained (as
discussed in the main text).
Extensions should account for asymmetry in exchange rate changes implied
by some regimes (e.g. “depreciations are welcome, appreciations not”), and for
exchange-rate specific shocks.
C.5.2 Solution details
C.5.2.1 Problem setup & solution strategy









s.t. Q$,pR$pe1 + Qe,pRep ≤ φAp(Q$,pe0 + Qe,p) + ξp
Xp + γQp,91Rp,91 = Ep + Qe,p + Q$,pe0
Rk,p = R̄k,t + Γk/EpQp,k, for k ∈ {e, $}.
Auxiliary assumptions. To focus on economically interesting outcomes, I maintain
the following assumptions 1) Ap − e1e0 R̄$ = Ap − R̄e > 0 ∀ p ensures positive
investment by all firms. To ensure non-negative investment if starting capital
12Changes in the variance matter to the risk-neutral firms because the shocks are log-normally
distributed, and I solve the model in levels not in logs.
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is negative, a lower bound ξ
¯
< ξp is derived below. 2) Γe, Γ$ > 0 ensure that
investment will be finite. 3) Γe > Γ$ signifies benefits from issuing in US Dollar
even in absence of UIP deviations.
Problem reformulation. The optimization problem can be simplified by sub-
stituting in the flow-of-funds identity and defining aggregate borrowing Qw,p =
Qe,p + Q$,pe0 expressed in Euros and a weighted average multi-currency interest
rate Rw,p = w$,pR$,pe1 +we,pRe,p. (Definitions of multi-currency variables are based
on Q$,pR$,pe1 + Qe,pRe,p = w$,pQw,pR$,pe1 + we,pQw,pRe,p = Qw,p (w$,pR$,pe1 + we,pRe,p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rw,p
.)
Solution. Problem C.6 can be solved by first characterising the optimal choices
of the two types of firms that will arise: Home currency (HC) and multi currency
firms (MC). Each firm type has two varieties. For the first variety, the borrowing
constraint is not binding (“unconstrained firms”). For the second, it is binding
(“constrained firms”). Since firms learn their productivity, size and starting capital
at t = 0−, the only source of uncertainty are the levels of the benchmark rates.
C.5.2.2 Currency choice
Multi-currency firms: optimal currency choice. To find the optimal currency











subject to w$p + wep = 1, and the debt demand curves defined in Equation 3.9.




















































. Note that if the share of Dollar debt increases by δ, while keeping total debt fixed,
the amount of Dollar debt issued increases by δē0 . Plugging in the demand curves and w$p + wep = 1,
we have Cp = e1e0 (R̄$ + Γ$
w$p
ē0 )w$p + [R̄e+ Γe(1−w$p)](1−w$p). The expected interest rate expenses
for Dollar debt in Euro terms are R$pe1, but given the definition of the curreny shares (in terms of
total borrowing in Euros), the Dollar-share needs to be normalized by 1/ē0.
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where I have used the assumption that the risk-adjusted UIP holds.14
As in Maggiori et al. (2018), if the demand curve for e-denominated debt gets
steeper (Γe ↑), all else equal, firm p issues a higher proportion of its debt in US
Dollar. As the expected Euro depreciation rate increases ( e1ē0 ↑), the repayment
value of Dollar debt rises in Euro terms. This makes Dollar debt less attractive and
leads to a higher proportion of debt issued in home currency. As stated before, the
curreny shares in pre-existing debt, ŵ$,p,91 and ŵe,p,91 are exogenous. However, I
impose that they take the same values as the endogenous currency shares of the
newly issued debt in Equation C.8. The idea is that, if firm p has become a MC
firm in the current period, persistent firm characteristics would have made it a MC
firm already in earlier generations.
C.5.2.3 Deriving optimal borrowing amounts
I now derive the optimal borrowings of firm p as home- and multi-currency firm.
The firm solves for its optimal borrowings twice. The first time at t = 0−, it
evaluates its expectations and derives its optimal expected borrowing amounts to
assess its profit prospects as each type. (Since fixed cost C is a sunk cost, firms do
not switch type after t = 0−.) The second time at t = 0+, it uses the realized value
of R̄t,k.
The home-currency firm simply uses the debt-demand curve for the Euro. For
the problem faced by multi-currency firms, the optimal currency shares can be
used to define a multi-currency demand curve Rwp as













and R̄w,t = ŵ$,pR̄$,te1 + ŵe,pR̄e,t. Qw,p = Qe,p + Q$,pe0 is the
total amount of debt issued by firm p.
Optimal unconstrained borrowing. If the borrowing constraint is not binding,
optimal borrowing is pinned down by the first order condition for Problem C.6.








Constrained borrowing. If the borrowing constraint imposed by the lenders is















. ŵ$p shows that 1) if the covariation between the Dollar interest rate
and the exchange rate rises, the weight on Dollar debt falls 2) as in the previous analyses, differences
in the levels of interest rates shift the weight as expected 3) covariation between US and Euro interest
rates would add further terms.
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binding, Equation 3.8 holds with equality. Plugging in the flow-of-funds identity
and the debt demand curve yields
Q̂chc,p =Ep





















If ξp > 0, the firm starts with positive starting capital and therefore, pledgeable
income is depleted only at higher levels of borrowing relative to a firm with ξ ≤ 0.
For derivation details, see Appendix C.5.4.2.
C.5.2.4 Selection into firm types
Two conditions pin down which firms become home- or multi-currency firms and
for which the borrowing constraint is binding:





2. E0−(πmc,p) > E0−(πhc,p)
The first two conditions represent the definition of being constrained. A firm is
constrained if, in the absence of the borrowing constraint, it would increase its
borrowing. As explained earlier, at t = 0− firm p is uncertain whether it will be
constrained or unconstrained due to the stochasticity of the interest rates.
Probability of being constrained. To derive the probability that firm p is
constrained or unconstrained as a given firm type, I solve the first two conditions.
I solve the two inequalities for firm-specific threshold benchmark interest rates, R̃$
and R̃e. For derivations, see C.5.4.1. If the benchmark interest rate realizes above
the threshold, the firm is constrained. It holds that
R̄w,t∼̇ LogNormal(µ̃w, σ̃2w), with cdf Fw(·)
R̄e,t ∼ LogNormal(R̄e, σ̂2e), with cdf Fe(·)
R̄w,t follows an approximate log-normal distribution whose analytical distribution
is not known but can be approximated well based on the parameters of its two
summands.15 Appendix C.5.4.3 shows the analytical distribution with normal
distributions.
15The common approach is to sample from the two terms of the sum, ŵ$R̄$,te1 and ŵeR̄e,t, and
then estimate on the sum the parameters of the approximated shifted Log-normal distribution. See
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Fixing the level of benchmark rates at their expected values, Section C.5.4.1
presents derivations for threshold levels of initial capital ξ̄p or benchmark rates R̃.
By switching off the uncertainty about rates, this allows to understand the role of
firm characteristics in driving firm selection.
Expected profits. The firm uses Fw(·) and Fe(·) to compute the expected profits















































Each firm then selects its firm-type according to the rule16
type of p =
{
multi-currency if E0−(πmcp,t=1) ≥ E0−(πhcp,t=1)
home-currency if otherwise.
(C.15)
Equation C.15 pins down the regions in the parameter space associated with
different firm-types. Investment X̂p is then determined simply by substituting the
derived optimal borrowing amounts into the flow-of-funds identity






C.5.3.1 Total derivative: Exchange rate response to interest rates
In the data, as well as in the model, R̄$,t, R̄e,t and et are correlated. Shocks to the
US interest rate affect the exchange rate and foreign interest rates. In Equation C.16,
that is emphasised through the notation e0(R̄$). Before analysing partial derivatives,























if p is a multi-curreny firm.
(C.17)




are non-zero, it is clear that also home-currency firms will
be effected by US monetary policy shocks through the reaction of local benchmark
rates. Similarly, the exposure of multi-currency firms to US monetary policy does
not stem only from changes in the US benchmark rate but also from associated
Fenton (1960) or more recently Lo (2012). The firms in my model follow this procedure and are thus
able to fully understand the stochasticity of R̄w,t.
16I made the assumption that the “roll-over problem” does not drive the decision to become
a multi-currency firm. The firm does not anticipate systematically different costs of rolling over
pre-existing debt as multi-currency firm or home-currency firm.
Appendix C 183
responses in local currency rates and the exchange rate. The strength and direction
of the responses of local rates and exchange rates are parametrized in the model
with βe and β$ respectively.
C.5.3.2 Analytical expressions for partial derivatives
In the main text, I illustrated graphically the investment responses to a change
in the US benchmark rate. Here I present analytical derivatives and distinguish























Equation C.18 shows that the response of investment to an interest rate change can
be split into two components. The first one reflects the first order condition and is
the same for constrained and unconstrained firms. Firms increase their borrowing
until the marginal borrowing costs reach the marginal productivity. Increases in
the benchmark rates squeeze the initial margin, and therefore reduce the space to
raise borrowing. The second term is specific to constrained firms and reflects how
borrowing responds to changes in pledgeable income induced by the rate change.
Finally, Equation C.19 shows the investment response to an exchange rate
change. In addition to the net worth effect, investment is also reduced by the





























The partial derivatives in Equations C.19 and C.18 can be plugged into the total
derivative in Equation C.17, to derive the overall investment reponse to a monetary
shock, allowing exchange rate responses to the monetary shock.
Cross-partial w.r.t. share of maturing debt. Equation C.20 confirms that the



































C.5.4.1 Selection into firm-types
The following presents the derivations for the regions of the parameter space for
each firm type when the uncertainty is switched off (“fixed cost channel”).
Deriving borrowing amounts for types and varities. In a first step, I derive
the borrowing amounts firm p expects as each firm-type variety (constrained vs
unconstrained). I compute the constrained amounts by setting the pledge income
equal to zero. (see the following section C.5.4.2) Conditions under which the
borrowing constraint will be binding, can be characterized by solving Q̂cmc,p,w <
Q̂umc,p,w. If ξ = 0, this condition is simply Ap <
R̄e
2(φ− 12 )
≡ Ã or solving for R̄,
R̃e ≡ R̄e > Ap2(φ− 12 ) and R̃w ≡ R̄w > Ap2(φ−
1
2 ). For ξp 6= 0, it is
Q̂umc,p,w > Q̂
c






Assuming that both sides of the inequality are greater than zero,17 it is




A2p(1− 2φ) + 2φApR̄w − R̄2w
4Γw
≡ ξ̄mc,p. (C.21)
Condition C.21 highlights that, if firms start with positive or negative pledgeable
income, the conditions under which the borrowing constraint becomes binding
is different for multi-currency and home-currency-only firms. This can be seen,
inter alia, through the presence of Γw in the condition. To explain the economics of
this, consider the case ξp > 0. The pace at which borrowing costs rise, which is the
slope of demand curve for debt, determines how fast the initial pledgeable income
is driven to zero once the marginal pledgeable revenue is less than the marginal
cost of borrowing.




For home-currency only firms, it is
Q̂chc,p,e < Q̂
u
hc,p,e ⇐⇒ ξp < Ep
A2p(1− 2φ) + 2φApR̄e − R̄2e
4Γe
≡ ξ̄hc,p. (C.22)
Comparing profits between firm-type varieties. Each firm selects the firm-
type variety that yields the highest (expected) profit. The minimum profit of
a multi-currency firm conditional on ξp is the one associated with constrained
borrowing. Instead the maximum profit reaped by a home-currency firm is the
one associated with its unconstrained optimal borrowing Q̂uhc,p. I can therefore
focus on the comparison of constrained multi-currency firms vs unconstrained
home-currency firms. Thresholds are given by E0−(πcmc,p,t=1) > E0−(π
u
hc,p,e,t=1).
C.5.4.2 Maximum feasible borrowing under binding constraint
For the multi-currency firm, expected pledgeable income is
E(PImc,p) = E(φApQmc,p − Rw,pQmc,p + ξp)
The maximum permissable borrowing is reached when the pledgeable income
equals zero:
(φAp − R̄w)Qmc,p −
Γw
Ep
Q2mc,p + µξp = 0 (C.23)





. If µξp 6= 0, we
have
Q̂cmc,p = Ep
φAp − R̄w ±
√





At issuance level Q = Ep
φAp−R̄w
2Γw
, the partial derivative of pledgeable income
wrt to borrowing switches sign from positive to negative. In economic terms,
if ξp > 0, pledgeable income is boosted, and the maximum feasible borrowing
will exceed Q̂c,ξ=0mc,p = Ep
φAp−R̄w
Γw
. If ξp < 0, firm p enters the model with negative
pledgeable income, hence maximum feasible borrowing declines relative to the
case with ξp = 0. Considering the negative root in expression C.24 would imply
that Q̂c,ξ>0mc,p < Q̂
c,ξ=0
mc,p which is economically not permissable. Therefore I focus on
the positive root in C.24. Derivations for the home-currency firm are completely
analogous.
Appendix C 186
C.5.4.3 Distribution of R̄w,t with normal distributions
Recall the definition
R̄w,t = ŵ$R̄$,te1 + ŵeR̄e,t = ŵ$R̄$e1 + ŵeR̄e︸ ︷︷ ︸
=a





Define R̄w,t = X + Y with X ∼ N(a, b2σ2US) and Y ∼ N(0, c2σ2e). The characteristic














e). It follows that
R̄w,t ∼ N(ŵ$R̄$e1 + ŵeR̄e, (ŵ$e1 + βe)2σ2US + ŵ2eσ2e).
